U.S. v. Williams, 1:02CR22-3.
| Citation | 355 F.Supp.2d 903 |
| Decision Date | 04 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:02CR22-3.,1:02CR22-3. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Martin T. WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
James A. Jenkins, Cleveland, OH, for Martin T. Williams, Defendant.
Following his conviction on charges related to alleged healthcare billing fraud, Williams filed a Rule 29 motion for a new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal. Williams's new trial motion contends that the government violated Brady and Giglio by failing to turn over a letter wherein the prosecution told two subpoenaed government witnesses that (1) they would not be investigated or charged and (2) the prosecution expected them to comply with the subpoenas and testify at trial. Williams's acquittal motion contends that the evidence was insufficient to support finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed below, the court vacates Williams's convictions and orders a new trial pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker (2005) and Blakely (2004). The court also notes that the prosecution's alleged Brady violation might entitle Williams to a new trial as well. This disposition obviates the need to consider Williams's attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, so his motion for judgment of acquittal will be denied without prejudice.
Williams is fifty-three years old, has earned a bachelor's degree in psychology, a master's in counseling, and a Ph.D. in psychology, and is a licensed clinical counselor in Ohio. See Tr. Wed. Dec. 10 at 2:6-23 and 3:23 to 4:4. He worked for Dr. Rohira's psychiatry /psychotherapy practice, which had offices in Lorain, Vermilion and Sandusky. The government indicted Rohira, Williams, and Rohira employee Sharonne Szyrej for offenses involving knowing and willful billing fraud. Williams was tried separately from Rohira, and the jury convicted Williams of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud and health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; three counts of committing and aiding wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343; and one count of committing and aiding health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1347.
The court recounts Booker's precursors: Jones v. US, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), Apprendi v. NJ, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Blakely v. WA, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
In Jones the Supreme Court considered the federal carjacking statute, which provides different maximum terms of imprisonment based on the extent of harm to the victim: fifteen years if there was no serious bodily injury, twenty five years if there was, and life if the victim died. At first blush these seemed to be only sentencing provisions. On further analysis, however, the Court concluded that harm to the victim should be treated as an element of the offense and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Foreshadowing the rule in Booker, the Court noted that its holding was consistent with a "rule requiring jury determination of facts that raise a sentencing ceiling" in a state or federal sentencing guidelines system. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 n. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1215.
In Apprendi the defendant burned a black family's home and pled guilty to inter alia, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, punishable by five to ten years in prison. After Apprendi's plea, the prosecution moved to enhance the sentence based on the state's hate crime statute. That statute authorized the court to increase the maximum sentence to between ten and twenty years if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted with the purpose of intimidating a person because of the person's race or other specified characteristics. The district judge found that Apprendi had acted with the requisite purpose, and enhanced his sentence accordingly, and the Third Circuit affirmed. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-73, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not permit the defendant to be Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.
Two years later, the Supreme Court elaborated in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). A jury acquitted Ring of premeditated murder but found him guilty of felony murder. Under state law, the court could not sentence him to death unless it found at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The court found two aggravating factors (the offense was especially cruel, and it was committed for pecuniary gain) and one mitigating factor (Ring's minimal criminal record). Finding that the mitigating factor did not merit leniency, the court sentenced Ring to death. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589-95, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Court held that as interpreted by Apprendi, the Sixth Amendment did not allow Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)).
Then, last year, the Supreme Court issued Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping, punishable by up to ten years in prison under state law. Other provisions of state law mandated a "standard" sentence of 49 to 53 months unless the judge found aggravating facts justifying an exceptional sentence. Although the prosecutor recommended a sentence in the standard range, the judge found that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty and sentenced him to ninety months. The Supreme Court held, in pertinent part,
[T]he "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. * * * In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment," ... and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court held that the state system, which determined sentences from a grid based on facts found by the judge, encroached on the jury's Sixth Amendment factfinding authority.
Last month the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005). The government charged Booker with possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine base. Having heard evidence that Booker had 92.5 grams of crack in his duffel bag, the jury found him guilty. The statute prescribed a minimum of ten years in prison and a maximum of life. Based on Booker's criminal history and the quantity of drugs necessarily found by the jury, the Guidelines required 210 and 262 months imprisonment.
The judge, however, held a post-trial sentencing hearing and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and that he was guilty of obstructing justice. Given those findings, the Guidelines required 360 months to life in prison, and the judge chose the low end. Thus, instead of the 21-plus years Booker could have received based on the facts proved to the jury, Booker received thirty years. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at ___, 2005 WL 50108 at *___.
The Supreme Court held that the judge violated Booker's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by increasing his sentence based on a fact found by the judge by a preponderance (rather than by the jury). The Court first held that Blakely applies to the federal Guidelines:
[T]here is no distinction of constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Washington procedures at issue in that case. * * * This conclusion rests on the premise, common to both systems, that the relevant sentencing rules are mandatory and impose binding requirements on all sentencing judges.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 749. The Court concluded that two Guidelines provisions are unconstitutional under Blakely: the provision making the Guidelines mandatory,1 and the appellate review provision that required district judges to impose sentence within the Guideline range or justify their departure. The Court found these provisions severable from the remainder of the Guidelines, so there was no need to invalidate the Guidelines in their entirety. Instead, the court invalidated only the two provisions,2 rendering the Guidelines merely advisory. The Court wrote:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in...
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U.S.A v. Williams
...by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before it may be used to help convict him or to increase his sentence. United States v. Williams, 355 F.Supp.2d 903, 908 (N.D.Ohio 2005) (footnote omitted), United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and Blakely v. Was......