U.S. v. Williamson, No. 02-12765.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-12765. |
| Citation | 339 F.3d 1295 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Linda WILLIAMSON, a.k.a. Linda West, Dwight Faulk, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Gregory M. Biggs, Montgomery, AL, George L. Beck, Jr., Beck & Byrne, P.C., David B. Byrne, Jr., Capell & Howard, Montgomery, AL, John D. Floyd, Jack Floyd, Floyd, Floyd & Floyd, Gadsden, AL, for Defendants-Appellants.
Verne H. Speirs, Montgomey, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before DUBINA and FAY, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*, District Judge.
On June 27, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a thirty-one count indictment against Defendants-Appellants Dwight Faulk ("Faulk"), Linda Williamson ("Williamson"), and Brian and Jennifer McKee for conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 2-18), conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 19), and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Counts 20-31). Following a joint jury trial, Faulk, Williamson and Brian McKee were found guilty on all charges. Jennifer McKee was found guilty for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The Appellants timely appealed their convictions.
In this appeal, the Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against them, and challenge the District Court's admission of nontestifying codefendant Brian McKee's inculpatory statements to law enforcement personnel pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).1 After consideration of the parties' briefs and oral argument as well as an independent review of the entire record of trial, we conclude that there exists a sufficient legal basis for a reasonable jury to have convicted the Appellants, and that the district court did not err in admitting Brian McKee's statements.
The Etowah Solid Waste Disposal Authority ("ESWDA") was established by the Etowah County Commission in September 1993 for the purpose of operating an inert landfill in Etowah County, Alabama. The ESWDA consisted of a five-member Board of Directors tasked by the Etowah County Commission with the responsibility of overseeing the operation of the landfill.
Because the Etowah County landfill did not meet certain federal and state guidelines, it only accepted disposal of non-putrescible waste such as construction and demolition ("C&D") materials and other inert, non-hazardous items. Putrescible waste such as household garbage was diverted from the Etowah County landfill to an Etowah County transfer station where, at considerable expense to the ESWDA, it was hauled to an adjacent county for disposal in a landfill that met the pertinent guidelines.
As it turns out, the Etowah County landfill was an extremely profitable venture for the ESWDA. However, the ESWDA was losing significant revenue through the transfer station as a result of having to separate and haul putrescible waste. Accordingly, the ESWDA sought to reduce the amount of putrescible waste entering the transfer station and to maximize the non-putrescible waste entering the Etowah County landfill. To meet this objective, in March 1995, the ESWDA passed two resolutions drafted and presented by Brian McKee, the Solid Waste Administrator for the ESWDA. The first resolution provided for a fifty percent reduction in the dumping fee at the Etowah County landfill to recycling companies located in Etowah County.2 The second resolution allowed commercial haulers to take advantage of the lower municipal rate provided that a minimum of 2,750 tons of waste were disposed of per month and that the hauler's account with the ESWDA was not past due. In August 1995, Brian McKee introduced and the ESWDA passed a third resolution which altered the 2,570 tons per month requirement for a commercial hauler to receive the municipal dumping rate. The new dumping requirement for a commercial hauler to qualify for the municipal rate was 100 tons per day. Finally, in August 1997 a fourth resolution was passed by the ESWDA concerning the minimum required dumping amount enabling a commercial hauler to qualify for the municipal rate. The fourth resolution provided that a commercial hauler was entitled to receive the municipal rate if 500 tons of C&D waste were dumped.3
Seven days following the passage of the first two resolutions, Faulk, Probate Judge of Crenshaw County, Alabama and Williamson, County Administrator for Crenshaw County, Alabama formed a company called Big Wheel Recycling, Inc. ("BWRI").4 BWRI was formed by Faulk and Williamson in an attempt to take advantage of the discounted dumping rate available to commercial recycling companies located in Etowah County.5 To this end, Faulk entered into contracts with four mobile home manufacturers located in Marshall County, Alabama to haul their C&D waste. Because of the discounted dumping rate at the Etowah County landfill, Faulk could offer the mobile home manufacturers significantly reduced hauling rates for their C&D waste and still earn a substantial profit for BWRI. In order to qualify for the discounted dumping rate, however, BWRI would have to meet certain criteria. Yet, as the government alleges, BWRI knowing and fraudulently received an $8.756 per ton dumping rate despite not meeting the criteria as established through the various ESWDA resolutions.
The government contends that the Appellants engaged in an elaborate scheme to defraud the ESWDA through a pattern of mail fraud and money laundering in order to impermissibly take advantage of the $8.75 per ton discounted dumping rate available at the Etowah County landfill. Simply explained, the government contends that Brian McKee directed employees of the ESWDA to give BWRI an $8.75 per ton dumping rate knowing that BWRI was not a recycling company located in Etowah County nor had met the minimum dumping requirements. As payoff for knowingly and impermissibly being given the $8.75 per ton dumping rate, according to the government, BWRI would funnel profits earned from the four mobile home manufacturers back to Brian McKee through his wife Jennifer, an employee of BWRI who ran an office for BWRI out of her Etowah County home. In total, the government contends that BWRI defrauded the ESWDA of approximately $1.4 million.
Appellants contend that there is insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. Appellants' contention that there is insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions is an issue we decide de novo. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir.2002). We review the evidence to determine whether "a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government could find the defendants guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 966 (11th Cir.1985) (internal citations omitted). A jury's verdict will be affirmed if the court determines that a "jury was rationally able to find that every element of the charged crimes was established by the government beyond a reasonable doubt." See United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir.2002).
The government presented evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the Appellants knowingly and willfully defrauded the ESWDA by receiving a discounted dumping rate of $8.75 per ton to which BWRI was not entitled. Whether BWRI was entitled to an $8.75 per ton dumping rate, at the most basic level and as was hotly litigated at trial, concerns whether BWRI was a recycling company located in Etowah County.7
The Appellants argue that BWRI was a recycling company because it engaged in what they term "source separation" which, as described by the Appellants, entails providing the means for separation and segregation of putrescible waste from non-putrescible waste. Appellants presented evidence at trial from both experts and lay witnesses which they argue proves that BWRI was engaged in source separation and that source separation is part of the recycling process. On this point, the evidence at trial shows that BWRI provided large trash containers known as pans to the various mobile home manufacturers so that the putrescible waste of the manufacturers could be disposed of separately from the non-putrescible waste. Thereafter, BWRI would pick up the pans of non-putrescible waste and haul them to the Etowah County landfill for dumping. The putrescible household garbage would also be picked up by BWRI, however, such waste was directed to a proper dump site. Thus, as Appellants argue, source separation is certainly the beginning of the recycling process.
The government presented evidence at trial showing that outside of the limited cardboard recycling that occurred in 1995, BWRI did not act as a recycling company. The government argued at trial and now argues on appeal that BWRI is, in reality, nothing more than a regular commercial hauler of waste. Evidence in support of this position shows that the non-putrescible waste removed from the mobile home manufacturer facilities was simply transported to and dumped at the Etowah County landfill where it was covered in dirt.8 Thus, as the government contends and as the evidence demonstrates, the non-putrescible waste hauled by BWRI was not part of the recycling process because it was not destined for a recycling facility nor was it being recycled by BWRI. We conclude, therefore, that although "source separation" may begin the recycling process in some instances, a reasonable jury could conclude that BWRI was not recycling because it simply transported the...
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