U.S. v. Wilson, 75-1713
| Citation | 540 F.2d 1100,176 U.S.app.D.C. 321 |
| Decision Date | 28 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1713,75-1713 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Luther R. WILSON, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Timothy J. Reardon, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
This case presents the question of the jurisdiction and duty of a federal district court in a criminal case to return to the defendant that property seized from him in the investigation but which is not alleged to be stolen, contraband, or otherwise forfeitable, and which is not needed, or is no longer needed, as evidence. We hold that the district court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to ensure the return of such property.
In an indictment filed on February 21, 1974, appellant was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)); possession of cocaine (33 D.C.Code § 402); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)), and possession of marijuana (33 D.C.Code § 402). At his arraignment on March 14, 1974, appellant pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for trial on May 29. On March 18, appellant in the criminal case filed a "Motion for the Return of Seized Property," in which he sought the return of $2,725 in cash which had been seized pursuant to a search warrant by police officers from his apartment:
Comes now the defendant, through his attorney and moves this Court for an order directing the United States Government and the Metropolitan Police Department to return to the defendant a quantity of money that was seized from his apartment at the time the metropolitan police department raided his apartment pursuant to a United States Magistrate's Search Warrant. In support it is alleged as follows:
1) On December 5, 1973, members of the Metropolitan Police Department raided the premises 1830 17th Street NW, Apt. 102, and seized a quantity of money that beloned (sic) to the defendant and which was not proceeds of crime.
2) The defendant contends that the police do not have any lawful right to the money and the same must be returned to the defendant. In addition the same will not be used as evidence in the case as it cannot be traced to criminal conduct.
3) And for reasons as may appear on the hearing of the motion.
When the case was called for trial on May 29, appellant, without pressing the motion withdrew his previously entered plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute it.
On July 16, 1974, the court imposed a sentence of one to three years' imprisonment, suspended its execution, and placed appellant on two years' probation. Additionally, appellant was fined $1,000. At the time of sentencing, appellant's counsel, repeating his earlier request, made an oral motion for the return of the $2,725. Thereafter, at the court's request, defense counsel and the prosecutor met informally to try to resolve the matter. The March 18 motion was never ruled upon.
On September 26, 1974, the prosecutor presented a memorandum to the court in which he analyzed appellant's bank accounts in light of appellant's representations about the money made during the informal negotiations and stated his belief that the bulk of the cash had been acquired in narcotics traffic. A copy of the memorandum was also sent to appellant. As a result of his analysis, the prosecutor returned $175 of the confiscated total to appellant. Appellant has paid the $1,000 fine. On December 3, 1974, approximately one year after its seizure, the remaining sum $2,725 less $175, or $2,550, was deposited by the property clerk of the Metropolitan Police into the General Revenue fund of the District of Columbia, where it now remains.
On April 7, 1975, appellant renewed his earlier request, through new counsel, by filing a motion in the criminal case for the return of the remaining sum. The motion bore the criminal case number and relied both upon Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) 1 and upon appellant's simple claim to have his property returned. The motion was denied by fiat on the same date. On April 17 appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and for a hearing. The Government filed an opposition stating that the money was subject to forfeiture. On June 4 the court denied the motion, again by fiat. On June 13 appellant filed a notice of appeal "from the order denying his Motion for Return of Seized Property entered in this action on the 7th day of April, 1975, and from the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration and for Hearing entered in this action on the 4th day of June, 1975."
At oral argument in this court, the Government disclaimed the position that defendant was not entitled to the money and disclaimed reliance on the prosecutor's letter of September 26, 1974. 2 Given the difficult-to-trace nature of cash currency, we believe the Government's disclaimers were proper.
Appellant here argues his right to the money under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) and a due process right to have his property returned. The Government's position, as reiterated at oral argument, rests on four arguments. We deal with each of the Government's arguments in turn.
First, the Government, conceding that the district court had jurisdiction to dispose of the property before sentencing, argues that after sentencing the criminal matter terminated, and the district court thereafter lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to dispose of the property. The Government asserts that the case does not meet the second and fourth criteria of Morrow v. District of Columbia, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 172, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (1969):
(A)ncillary jurisdiction should attach where (1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course of the main matter, or is an integral part of the main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantial procedural or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter must be settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will not be frustrated.
As to the second criterion, Government counsel has acknowledged that the remaining $2,550 is appellant's. The fine has been paid. There are no facts left to determine. 3 As to the fourth criterion, it is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that property involved in the proceeding, against which no Government claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner. Therefore, the district court has both the jurisdiction and duty to return such property. Appellant's efforts to regain the property were begun before sentencing and renewed at sentencing. The district court directed the parties to meet informally to resolve the matter. When it became clear that no fair resolution would issue, appellant properly returned to the court to vindicate his claim. There lay jurisdiction to consider the April 7, 1975 motion, and appeal from the denial thereof was timely filed in this court.
Second, the Government argues that appellant's guilty plea included a waiver of any claim of unlawfulness in the search and seizure of appellant's property, so that reliance on Rule 41(e) is fruitless, in that Rule 41(e) by its terms provides only for relief from illegal search and seizure. This argument of the Government highlights a difficulty in the federal rule provisions for custody and disposition of property: the failure to discriminate between proceedings for suppression of evidence and proceedings for the return of seized property. Bova v. United States, 460 F.2d 404, 406 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1972). 4 We hold that the district court once its need for the property has terminated, has both the jurisdiction and the duty to return the contested property here regardless and independently of the validity or invalidity of the underlying search and seizure.
It is unnecessary...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Matthews v. US
...41(e) or under ancillary jurisdiction from the criminal trial. See Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d at 158 (citing United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.Cir.1976); United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Palmer, 565 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir.197......
-
U.S. v. Hubbard
...for a return of the property, or it may make application in the court where the criminal proceedings were pending. United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1976). These provide sufficient alternatives so that intervention in a pending criminal case should not be allowed. The ma......
-
U.S. v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, Pittsburgh, Pa.
...as to the source of this limitation. E. g., United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilson, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 325, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (1976); In re Brenner, 6 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1925); United States v. Pardo-Bollard, 229 F.Supp. 473 The parties in thi......
-
McSurely v. McClellan
...the property is subject to forfeiture, appropriate proceedings should be started expeditiously." United States v. Wilson, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 321 at 325, 540 F.2d 1100 at 1104 (1976). Given the state interest, then, in the speedy identification of contraband, it is unlikely that a custody orde......