U.S. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 09 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-5047.,02-5047.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America and Peter N. Kirsanow, in his official capacity as Member, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Appellants v. Victoria WILSON, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

290 F.3d 347

UNITED STATES of America and Peter N. Kirsanow, in his official capacity as Member United States Commission on Civil Rights, Appellants v. Victoria WILSON, et al., Appellees.

No. 02-5047.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 1, 2002.

Decided May 9, 2002.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 01cv02541).

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard Jr., U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Jacob M. Lewis and Ara B. Gershengorn, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

Leon Friedman and Theodore V. Wells Jr. argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Julia Tarver, Geoffrey F. Aronow and Paul S. Mandell.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:

On January 13, 2000, President Clinton appointed appellee Victoria Wilson to the United States Commission on Civil Rights under a commission expressly stating that the appointment was "for the remainder of the term expiring November 29, 2001," left vacant by the death in office of a prior member. After November 29, 2001, President Bush, treating Wilson's commission as having expired on that date, appointed appellant Peter Kirsanow to succeed her. At the next meeting of the Commission, that body recognized Wilson as a continuing member on her assertion that she was entitled to a full six-year term on the Commission running from January 13, 2000, to January 12, 2006. The United States and Kirsanow filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that Wilson's term had expired and that Kirsanow is now a member of the Commission. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilson. The United States and Kirsanow appealed. Because we agree with appellants that Wilson's term had expired, we reverse the District Court and remand with instructions for it to enter summary judgment for the appellants.

I. Background

The United States Commission on Civil Rights ("the Commission") is charged with investigating allegations of deprivation of voting rights on the basis of "color, race, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(a)(1). In addition the Commission is empowered to conduct studies and disseminate information relating to discrimination. Id. § 1975a(a)(2). The Commission's functions are purely investigatory and advisory—it has neither the power to enforce federal law, nor to promulgate any rules with the force of law. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2168, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001).

The Commission was first created in 1957, and as originally established was composed of six members serving open-ended terms at the pleasure of the President. See Pub.L. No. 85-315 § 101(b), 71 Stat. 634 (1957). Congress reauthorized and reorganized the Commission in 1983 by expanding it from six to eight members, providing that not more than four of the members could at any one time be from the same party, dividing the appointment power between the President and Congress, establishing that the President could only remove members for neglect of duty or malfeasance, and staggering the terms of the Commissioners. Specifically, the 1983 Act stated that the "term of office of each member of the Commission shall be six years; except that (A) members first taking office shall serve as designated by the President, subject to [provisions staggering the initial appointments], and (B) any member appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder of the term for which his predecessor was appointed." Pub.L. No. 98-183 § 2(b)(2), 97 Stat. 1301 (1983) ("the 1983 Act"). The staggering provisions created two groups of four commissioners each. The first group would serve for three years, at which point their successors would be appointed to six-year terms. The second group would serve for six years from the outset. See id. § 2(b)(3). Under this structure, the terms of office would be regularly staggered with half of them expiring every three years. The 1983 Act provided for the Commission to expire in 1989. Nonetheless the Commission continued to operate via the process of annual appropriations until reauthorized. In 1994 the Commission was formally reauthorized. Pub.L. No. 103-419, 108 Stat. 4338 (1994) ("the 1994 Act"). This Act has been dubbed an effort to "more concisely rewrite[ ] the 1983 [Act]." H.R.Rep. No. 103-775, at 4, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3532, 3533 (1994). Like the 1983 Act, the 1994 Act provides that "[t]he term of office of each member of the Commission shall be 6 years." 42 U.S.C. § 1975(c). However, instead of the initial staggering provisions that followed in the 1983 Act, the 1994 Act merely provided: "The term of each member of the Commission in the initial membership of the Commission shall expire on the date such term would have expired as of September 30, 1994." 42 U.S.C. § 1975(c). The Act did not contain any language referring to filling vacancies. The 1994 Act did preserve the division of appointment power between the President and Congress, as well as the requirements for partisan balance, and the limitations on presidential removal of members. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975(b), (e). The 1994 Act provided for the Commission to terminate on September 30, 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1975d, however, it has again continued to operate pursuant to annual appropriations.

On November 30, 1995, then-President Clinton appointed retired Judge A. Leon Higginbotham to a six-year term as a member of the Commission. His commission stated that his appointment was "for a term expiring November 29, 2001." He replaced Arthur A. Fletcher, whose term expired on November 29, 1995. On December 14, 1998, Judge Higginbotham died in office. To fill this vacancy, President Clinton appointed appellee, Victoria Wilson, to the Commission on January 13, 2000. Her commission expressly states that her appointment was "for the remainder of the term expiring November 29, 2001." Treating Wilson's term as having expired on November 29, President Bush appointed appellant Peter Kirsanow on December 6, 2001, to succeed Wilson on the Commission. Kirsanow was administered the oath of office by D.C. Superior Court Judge Maurice A. Ross; however, the Chair of the Commission, Mary Frances Berry, refused to recognize him or allow him to participate in Commission activities. The Chair instead continued to recognize Wilson as a member of the Commission and allowed her to participate as such.

The United States and Kirsanow (collectively "appellants") filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory relief against Wilson. The Commission, Mary Frances Berry (Chair), and Cruz Reynoso (Vice-Chair), moved to intervene. The United States objected that neither the Commission nor its officers in their official capacity have the right to appear in litigation without the permission of the Attorney General, which they had not obtained. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."). The district court summarily permitted the intervention. As the United States has not raised this issue on appeal, claiming "it has no practical effect upon the issues presented, since Wilson herself is entitled to defend against the government's complaint," we do not decide whether this intervention was permissible. The parties filed dispositive motions and on February 4, 2002, the district court issued an oral ruling granting Wilson's motion for summary judgment.

The district court concluded that "the 1994 Amendments Act ... does not mandate regularly staggered terms. Rather, its plain language clearly requires that all Commissioners serve six-year terms, regardless of whether, as in this case, their predecessors completed their terms." Thus, under the district court's reading of the statute, Wilson would be entitled to serve a full six years, until January 12, 2006. The district court first found that the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1975(c) "is perfectly clear. It contains no exceptions, qualifications, not for delayed appointments and not for appointments to fill unexpired terms." Second, the court noted that a staggering provision had been proposed, but not adopted by Congress in the 1994 Act. Third, the district court relied on the removal of the staggering and vacancy provisions from the 1983 Act, holding that "when Congress affirmatively deletes language which had been included in pre-existing legislation, then Congress means what it said."

Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that failure to maintain staggering would undermine "the bipartisan nature of the Commission as well as its integrity and credibility." The court found "nothing to suggest that the absence of such a requirement would frustrate Congress' purpose." Although acknowledging that its ruling would eliminate "uniformly staggered terms," the court opined that its decision would not result in the "complete elimination of all staggering." Even so, the court reasoned that the "staggered term requirement was only one amongst a large constellation of protections that were introduced by the 1983 Act" and "[a]ll of these protections, except staggered terms, remain expressly included in the 1994 Act." The district court concluded that "[i]f Congress believes that the regularly staggered terms should be among these protections, then, of course, it is free to make its intention explicit by including express...