U.S. v. Wood, 03-4427.

Decision Date04 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-4427.,03-4427.
Citation378 F.3d 342
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher WOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, James H. Michael, Jr.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Richard Charles Armstrong, Wyatt & Armstrong, P.L.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Nancy Spodick Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of The United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge DUNCAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge KING joined.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Christopher Wood appeals from the district court's judgment, entered May 15, 2003, sentencing him to one hundred thirty-five months' imprisonment upon a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Wood sought to contest the drug weight attributed to him at sentencing, but the district court refused to hear evidence on this point. According to the court, Wood's plea agreement precluded him from doing so. Wood also sought relief under the "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The district court held that such relief was unavailable as Wood did not satisfy all of the statutory requirements. We hold that the district court erred by denying Wood the opportunity to contest the drug weight attributable to him. We also hold that the district court correctly interpreted the "safety valve" provision. Accordingly, we reverse the district court in part, affirm in part, and remand for resentencing.

I.

On April 9, 2002, Wood pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The plea agreement contained a provision limiting Wood's ability to contest the drug weight attributed to him:

I agree that the total drug weight for which I should be held accountable as reasonably foreseeable conduct relevant to my own actions is at least 500 grams, unless a presentence investigation finds a lesser amount. I understand that my attorney will argue that I should [b]e held accountable for less than 1.5 kilograms but that the United States intends to argue that I should be held accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, unless the presentence investigation reveals a lesser amount.

J.A. 16 ("Drug Weight Clause"). Wood also agreed to waive his right to appeal any issues relating to his sentence under the sentencing guidelines, provided he first receive a "full and fair sentencing hearing." J.A. 17. Wood and his attorney signed this agreement on February 28, 2002. The Government signed it on March 4, 2002.

On April 9, 2002, the district court held a Rule 11 hearing to determine the appropriateness of Wood's plea. At that hearing, the district court repeatedly assured Wood that he would have the opportunity at sentencing to contest the drug weight attributable to him. First, Christopher Collins, Wood's defense counsel, explained to the district court that "our only disagreement is as to total amount [of drugs] and that will be argued at another time." J.A. 29. The district court responded, "Right." Id. Second, explaining to Wood that the length of his incarceration could not be determined until sentencing, the district court told Wood that his attorney would receive a probation officer's presentencing report, and that "[i]f you find something with which you do not agree, take that up with the probation officer and see if you can get it resolved.... If you cannot, then that will come on, that disagreement will come on at the time of the sentencing hearing." J.A. 33. Third, the following exchange occurred after the court asked Wood if he was pleading guilty of his own free will:

THE DEFENDANT: I am guilty, but only to a certain extent. What's being charged in the indictment as far as the total drug weight I don't feel I'm responsible for, but since we have the chance to argue, I feel —

THE COURT: That issue will be resolved through the presentence report and you'll have the opportunity there to present everything that you know about it in an effort to get to the right amount. If you're not in agreement with what the probation officer comes up with, you still may be heard here in this court at the time of the sentencing hearing about what is the proper weight. So you will have two opportunities to persuade somebody of what the proper weight is; first, the opportunity to persuade the probation officer and if that is not successful, then the opportunity to show to the Court what the proper weight should be. Does that clarify it for you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

J.A. 39-40 (emphasis added).

After explaining Wood's ability to challenge the presentence report, the district court asked the Government to summarize its evidence against Wood. The Government called a state narcotics investigator to testify and, after the investigator described Wood's conduct, the prosecutor asked, "Understanding, of course, that there will be a more full hearing at sentencing concerning the drug weight issue, does your investigation indicate that this defendant was responsible for, was aware of at least 500 grams of crack cocaine being distributed amongst or during the course of this conspiracy?" J.A. 42-43 (emphasis added). The investigator answered in the affirmative. The district court then turned again to Wood:

THE COURT: ... Including the testimony here from the agent and everything else that has happened here in court this morning or this day, do you have any questions of any sort about anything? Now is the time. Get them out if you've got them.

THE DEFENDANT: None that I can think of at the moment.

THE COURT: After the moment is going to be a little bit late.

MR. COLLINS: I think, again, Judge, he's referring to the issue of weight. There's nothing to comment on at this point.

THE COURT: The weight is certainly reserved for later.

J.A. 43-44 (emphasis added). Neither the court nor the Government described Wood's ability to contest a drug weight finding as in any way limited. The district court thereafter accepted Wood's plea.

The probation office twice revised the presentence report. The original version estimated the drug weight as over 1.5 kilograms. Wood submitted written objections to this determination, arguing that its basis was speculative. The probation officer revised his finding, noting that "[a]ctual weight estimates by some of the co-conspirators alone totaled more than 285.5 grams of cocaine base." J.A. 108. The probation officer attributed an additional approximately 1.25 kilograms of crack cocaine to Wood based on co-conspirator statements that Wood had possessed "a `sandwich bag and two or three Kleenex boxes'" of crack cocaine. Id.

On October 24, 2002, the district court held the first sentencing hearing in this case. Collins attempted to challenge the drug weight attributed to Wood in the presentence report, but the district court refused to consider it due to the Drug Weight Clause:

THE COURT: It's hard to see how you can [object to the drug weight estimate in the presentence report] in light of the plea agreement.

MR. COLLINS: That was part of the plea agreement. We agreed it would be a particular weight unless the evidence showed otherwise.

THE COURT: Unless the probation officer found differently.

MR. COLLINS: The second, actually, second and third revised editions, while the probation officer says it's 285 grams, he concluded from the co-defendant, he then says using his method of estimating —

THE COURT: Are you challenging the language of the plea agreement which says that it's 500 or more grams unless the probation officer finds a different amount? Are you challenging that language?

MR. COLLINS: I am in that I would like that evidence presented to the Court.

THE COURT: On what basis? Are you saying it was fraudulent?

MR. COLLINS: No. I'm saying it is estimated, Judge, and not something that can be relied on unless the Court hears the evidence.

THE COURT: There's nothing about estimated in the plea agreement. It is the report of the probation officer. There are two ways of challenging that, as I see it. One is to assert that the probation officer was fraudulent in his calculations.

MR. COLLINS: I would not do that.

THE COURT: The other is that it is an abuse of discretion. Now, are you challenging on either of those bases?

MR. COLLINS: Judge, I can't say in good faith he did either of those. What I'm saying is it's merely an estimate and not something the Court can —

THE COURT: Go back to the plea agreement, Mr. Collins.

MR. COLLINS: I understand. Thank you.

J.A. 67-68. Because the district court believed that there was "substantial confusion here about exactly where we stand on drug weight," it granted the defendant's motion for a continuance. J.A. 69.

Two months later, Wood wrote a letter to the district court explaining that he was unsatisfied with his lawyer:

Mr. Collins is not representing me and my best interest. He wants me to take responsibility for something that I'm not "fully" responsible for. I've admitted to selling drugs, but not the amount of cocaine base that I'm being charged with. The only way I can prove this is with the help and assistance of my attorney. I can see that he is not trying to help me argue my case. He wants me to accept the charge for what it is.

J.A. 124. He also complained that he had not heard from Collins since the October court appearance, that he no longer trusted him, and that he did not want to get a "Raw Deal" from "lack of counsel." Id.

On April 23, 2003, the Government filed its opposition to Wood's request to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
39 cases
  • United States v. Brown
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 15 d5 Junho d5 2018
    ...that district courts accurately explain the scope of defendants' appeal waivers. Godoy , 706 F.3d at 495 (quoting United States v. Wood , 378 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) ). Specifically, we have examined whether "the district court mischaracterized the m......
  • U.S. v. Moussaoui
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 4 d1 Janeiro d1 2010
    ...as a criminal defendant." United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002); see also United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.2004) (explaining that the plea colloquy is the avenue by which the court conclusively "establish[es] that the defendant knowin......
  • U.S. v. Manigan, 08-4292.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 26 d2 Janeiro d2 2010
    ...sentence despite appellate waiver because court incorrectly advised defendant of right to appeal sentence); see also United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.2004) (determining that defendant did not knowingly waive right to appeal, in part because court mischaracterized plea agree......
  • U.S. v. Norris, 04-2073.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 23 d1 Abril d1 2007
    ...the Government must be held "to a greater degree of responsibility" during plea negotiations than the defendant. United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2004) (citing, in part, McGovern, 822 F.2d at 743) (internal marks As a result of the unique setting for such agreements, the Go......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT