U.S. v. Wood, 03-4427.
Decision Date | 04 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-4427.,03-4427. |
Citation | 378 F.3d 342 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher WOOD, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, James H. Michael, Jr.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
ARGUED: Richard Charles Armstrong, Wyatt & Armstrong, P.L.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Nancy Spodick Healey, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of The United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge DUNCAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge KING joined.
Defendant Christopher Wood appeals from the district court's judgment, entered May 15, 2003, sentencing him to one hundred thirty-five months' imprisonment upon a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Wood sought to contest the drug weight attributed to him at sentencing, but the district court refused to hear evidence on this point. According to the court, Wood's plea agreement precluded him from doing so. Wood also sought relief under the "safety valve" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The district court held that such relief was unavailable as Wood did not satisfy all of the statutory requirements. We hold that the district court erred by denying Wood the opportunity to contest the drug weight attributable to him. We also hold that the district court correctly interpreted the "safety valve" provision. Accordingly, we reverse the district court in part, affirm in part, and remand for resentencing.
On April 9, 2002, Wood pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The plea agreement contained a provision limiting Wood's ability to contest the drug weight attributed to him:
I agree that the total drug weight for which I should be held accountable as reasonably foreseeable conduct relevant to my own actions is at least 500 grams, unless a presentence investigation finds a lesser amount. I understand that my attorney will argue that I should [b]e held accountable for less than 1.5 kilograms but that the United States intends to argue that I should be held accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, unless the presentence investigation reveals a lesser amount.
J.A. 16 ("Drug Weight Clause"). Wood also agreed to waive his right to appeal any issues relating to his sentence under the sentencing guidelines, provided he first receive a "full and fair sentencing hearing." J.A. 17. Wood and his attorney signed this agreement on February 28, 2002. The Government signed it on March 4, 2002.
On April 9, 2002, the district court held a Rule 11 hearing to determine the appropriateness of Wood's plea. At that hearing, the district court repeatedly assured Wood that he would have the opportunity at sentencing to contest the drug weight attributable to him. First, Christopher Collins, Wood's defense counsel, explained to the district court that "our only disagreement is as to total amount [of drugs] and that will be argued at another time." J.A. 29. The district court responded, "Right." Id. Second, explaining to Wood that the length of his incarceration could not be determined until sentencing, the district court told Wood that his attorney would receive a probation officer's presentencing report, and that J.A. 33. Third, the following exchange occurred after the court asked Wood if he was pleading guilty of his own free will:
J.A. 39-40 (emphasis added).
After explaining Wood's ability to challenge the presentence report, the district court asked the Government to summarize its evidence against Wood. The Government called a state narcotics investigator to testify and, after the investigator described Wood's conduct, the prosecutor asked, "Understanding, of course, that there will be a more full hearing at sentencing concerning the drug weight issue, does your investigation indicate that this defendant was responsible for, was aware of at least 500 grams of crack cocaine being distributed amongst or during the course of this conspiracy?" J.A. 42-43 (emphasis added). The investigator answered in the affirmative. The district court then turned again to Wood:
J.A. 43-44 (emphasis added). Neither the court nor the Government described Wood's ability to contest a drug weight finding as in any way limited. The district court thereafter accepted Wood's plea.
The probation office twice revised the presentence report. The original version estimated the drug weight as over 1.5 kilograms. Wood submitted written objections to this determination, arguing that its basis was speculative. The probation officer revised his finding, noting that "[a]ctual weight estimates by some of the co-conspirators alone totaled more than 285.5 grams of cocaine base." J.A. 108. The probation officer attributed an additional approximately 1.25 kilograms of crack cocaine to Wood based on co-conspirator statements that Wood had possessed "a `sandwich bag and two or three Kleenex boxes'" of crack cocaine. Id.
On October 24, 2002, the district court held the first sentencing hearing in this case. Collins attempted to challenge the drug weight attributed to Wood in the presentence report, but the district court refused to consider it due to the Drug Weight Clause:
J.A. 67-68. Because the district court believed that there was "substantial confusion here about exactly where we stand on drug weight," it granted the defendant's motion for a continuance. J.A. 69.
Two months later, Wood wrote a letter to the district court explaining that he was unsatisfied with his lawyer:
Mr. Collins is not representing me and my best interest. He wants me to take responsibility for something that I'm not "fully" responsible for. I've admitted to selling drugs, but not the amount of cocaine base that I'm being charged with. The only way I can prove this is with the help and assistance of my attorney. I can see that he is not trying to help me argue my case. He wants me to accept the charge for what it is.
J.A. 124. He also complained that he had not heard from Collins since the October court appearance, that he no longer trusted him, and that he did not want to get a "Raw Deal" from "lack of counsel." Id.
On April 23, 2003, the Government filed its opposition to Wood's request to...
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