U.S. v. Woods, 86-5093

• Decision Date: 05 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-5093,86-5093
• Citation: 812 F.2d 1483
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Roosevelt WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1483

812 F.2d 1483

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Roosevelt WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-5093.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 9, 1987.

Decided March 5, 1987.

William L. Runyon, Jr., Charleston, S.C., on brief for defendant-appellant.

Vinton DeVane Lide, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., (Dale L. DuTremble, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, S.C., on brief) for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HALL and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and SENTELLE, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:

Robert Roosevelt Woods appeals his convictions on eighteen counts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341. These charges arose out of the operation of a United States Department of Agriculture sponsored child feeding program operated at the Wallingford United Presbyterian Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The Appellant was the pastor of the church and responsible for the administration of the program. He was also a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives. Following a lengthy trial, the Appellant was found not guilty on the one forgery count contained in the indictment, and guilty on all of the mail fraud counts. This appeal raises no claim of insufficient evidence to support the convictions, so a lengthy recitation of the facts is unnecessary. The Appellant has raised several exceptions, but the only exception that merits substantial discussion is his claim that blacks were excluded from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We affirm.

I.

This matter was tried before a statewide jury, selected from the statewide jury wheel that contains the names of individuals living in every section of the state of South Carolina. When prospective jurors received a summons to jury duty, they also received a lengthy questionnaire to be filled out and returned to the clerk of court. This questionnaire was prepared by the joint effort of the United States Attorney's Office and defense counsel and was under the sanction of the district judge. The questionnaire inquired as to the age, address, employment history, political preference, church affiliation, whether the juror attended church regularly, and whether the juror or any close family members had been subject to criminal prosecution. Since the defendant was an ordained minister and also an elected member of the South Carolina General Assembly, the questions about political and religious affiliations were deemed important by both sides. These completed questionnaires were made available to the attorneys prior to the jury selection.

The jury selection and trial of this case occurred in March, 1986. At the beginning of the jury selection process all members of the venire were brought into the courtroom and in the presence of the defendant, defense counsel and government counsel, the court asked general questions about the jurors qualifications to serve. Thereafter the entire venire was removed from the courtroom and the names of individuals on the venire were drawn at random. As each name was drawn, the prospective juror returned to the courtroom and was questioned individually by the court. Following this individual examination, the individual was presented to the parties and the attorneys could then challenge for cause, exercise a peremptory challenge or accept the individual on the petit jury.

At the conclusion of the selection process a petit jury of nine whites and three blacks was seated. There were three alternate jurors selected, and one of these alternates was black. Although Batson v. Kentucky did not come down until April 30, 1986 defense counsel during the selection of the jury objected each time the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse a black person from service on the petit jury.

The jury returned its guilty verdicts on March 18, 1986, and on March 24, 1986, defendant's trial counsel filed motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The following day the defendant filed a pro se supplemental motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 13, 1986, the trial court allowed defendant's trial counsel to withdraw and substituted the present appellant counsel to represent the defendant. Extensive hearings were held in May, 1986 on the pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and the motion for a new trial under Batson v. Kentucky.

At the post conviction hearings the attorneys and the court were uncertain as to whether Batson would be held retroactive. This question was answered on January 13, 1987 by the Supreme Court in Griffith v. Kentucky, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 which determined that Batson should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final. Therefore Batson applies to the present appeal.

At the May 13, 1986 hearing appellant's attorney claimed that the United States Attorney had violated Batson in exercising peremptory strikes against four black persons during jury selection. The defense counsel contended that this showing of the use of peremptory challenges against four black prospective jurors was sufficient under Batson to state a prima facie case and require the prosecution "to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the black jurors." Batson, 476 U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1723.

The trial judge found that the defendant had not made out a prima facie case under Batson. He explained that the trial jury contained three black jurors, and of the three alternates, one was black. He found this representation to be in keeping with the racial composition ¹ of the State of South Carolina from which the jury had been drawn. He also pointed out that the first juror seated in the case was black and that the last juror seated was also black. The last juror was seated at a time when the United States Attorney still had an unused peremptory challenge.

The court noted that although he had found that there was no prima facie case presented by the defendant under Batson, and that the court and the attorneys felt that Batson would not be applied retroactively, he offered the United States Attorney the opportunity to explain his exercise of peremptory challenges as to four blacks and one white. The United States Attorney then gave an explanation of his reasons for challenging each of the jurors. The Appellant conceded in his brief that the reasons given by the United States Attorney were "fairly neutral" as to all of the challenges except the prosecution's second challenge, which was against juror number fifteen, Lloyd K. Dawson, a black from Charleston, South Carolina. The United States Attorney explained this strike by pointing out that Dawson listed himself as non-denominational, but stated that he frequently attended church and visited various churches in the Charleston area. This juror also stated that he had seen some press stories about the case, and the United States Attorney was aware of certain stories in the Charleston Chronicle which he considered very unfavorable to the prosecution and highly inflammatory if read by jurors. The Charleston Chronicle is a publication primarily distributed among black residents of Charleston County. The United States Attorney felt that this juror may have been exposed to what he considered unfair, inaccurate, inflammatory and racial pre-trial publicity. Since the juror attended various churches in Charleston County, the prosecution felt that he may have been a constituent of the defendant. This juror also stated that a close relative had been convicted of driving under the influence and a relative was a member of a fraternity known as Omega Phi Psi, an organization with which the prosecution was unfamiliar.

The district court found the reasons stated by the United States Attorney to be a sufficient explanation. The court stated "I think for the record for any appeal I should state upon what he has represented to the court as is his reasons at this point, I would accept them as bonafide reasons other than race as to why he used his peremptory challenges, not only on the four blacks but also on the one white."

II.

In Batson v. Kentucky, the court outlined the requirements for a defendant to prove a prima facie case of discriminatory selection of a petit jury on evidence of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges, at ----, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1723:

"To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida, supra, [430 U.S. 482] at 494 [97 S.Ct. 1272 at 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) ], and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Avery v. Georgia, supra [345 U.S. 559] at 562 [73 S.Ct. 891 at 892, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953) ]. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.

In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are...