U.S. v. Worrell

Decision Date17 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-4857.,01-4857.
Citation313 F.3d 867
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Everette WORRELL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: George Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dennis M. Duffy, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and HILTON, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge HAMILTON and Chief Judge HILTON joined.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge.

James Worrell was convicted by a jury on two counts of mailing threatening communications. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 876 (West 2000). He received a prison sentence of 115 months. On appeal, Worrell contends that the district court erroneously excluded expert testimony regarding how his unmedicated mental condition affected his behavior at the time the threatening letters were mailed. Worrell also challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court improperly applied a six-level sentencing enhancement based on its determination that "the offense involved ... conduct evidencing an intent to carry out" the threats contained in the letters. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2A6.1(b)(1) (2000). We reject these arguments and affirm Worrell's convictions and his sentence.

I.

Worrell was incarcerated for an unrelated crime when he became convinced that Theresa Roberson, his former girlfriend and the mother of two of his children, had become romantically involved with another man. Worrell, who was due to be released from prison in late 2000, admits writing and mailing from prison a series of threatening letters to Theresa. Federal law makes it a crime to "knowingly deposit[] in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service" or to "knowingly cause[]" the Postal Service to deliver "any communication with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to ... injure the person of the addressee or of another." 18 U.S.C.A. § 876.

In one of the letters, dated February 28, 2000, Worrell wrote to Theresa that he knew she was "seeing some guy that [she] work[ed] with" and that he intended to "[p]ut a stop to it." J.A. 445. Worrell warned that "[w]hoever this guy is better be watching his ass [b]ecause I intend to do some harm ... [a]nd I will be loaded for bear. If you know what I mean." J.A. 445-46. Worrell also boasted that he could have someone hurt the man while Worrell was still incarcerated, but explained that he preferred to "do it [himself]. It'll be a lot more fun that way.... [H]e is a dead man if I catch him." J.A. 446-47. Before closing the letter, Worrell switched his attention to Theresa's stepfather, Mike, threatening that "this time I will get Mike. The first time you stopped me. This time you won't." J.A. 446. Theresa testified that she was attracted to a man with whom she worked but denied that they were romantically involved. Theresa also testified that Worrell and Mike had gotten into arguments about Worrell's physically abusive treatment of Theresa. Similarly, Worrell testified that he and Mike never got along and came close to blows but were restrained by other people. This letter was the basis for count one of the indictment.

Shortly after sending the February 28 letter, Worrell began threatening Theresa. In a letter dated March 20, 2000, Worrell opened with an obscenity-laced tirade against Theresa and her mother and closed with the following threat: "No matter what the law says I can always get a gun and no one can stop what I plan on doing with it. Can you guess what I plan on doing? Bang-Bang Bitch. Ha-Ha. How do you like that.... [Y]ou have been a very bad girl. So you mu[st] pay with your life." J.A. 451-52. The threats contained in the March 20 letter served as the basis for count two of the indictment.

Worrell's initial strategy was to raise a defense based on his diagnosis of bipolar disorder and intermittent explosive disorder. Prior to trial, Worrell moved for permission to file an untimely notice of an insanity defense under Rule 12.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the district court granted. Worrell also filed a notice pursuant to Rule 12.2(b) that he intended to present "expert testimony relating to [Worrell's] mental condition bearing on the issue of his guilt" from Dr. George Corvin, a forensic psychiatrist. J.A. 17.

After interviewing Worrell for approximately an hour and reviewing Worrell's mental health records, Dr. Corvin summarized his conclusions in a letter to Worrell's attorney which was proffered to the district court as reflecting the substance of Dr. Corvin's expected testimony.1 Dr. Corvin noted that the diagnoses of bipolar affective disorder and intermittent explosive disorder were "well supported by information obtained" during his evaluation of Worrell, and that Worrell "responded well to treatment with mood stabilizing and antipsychotic medications." J.A. 48. However, Dr. Corvin reported that when Worrell is not treated, "he experiences extreme affective instability, mood swings, irritability, grandiosity, impaired judgment, and disorganized thinking." J.A. 48. Observing that the medical staff at the Roanoke City Jail had discontinued Worrell's medication on February 16, 2000, shortly before he sent the first in his series of letters to Theresa, Dr. Corvin opined that "[a]lthough there is no clear indication that Mr. Worrell's psychiatric symptoms... around the time of his alleged offense were of sufficient severity to totally negate his ability to understand the nature[,] quality[,] or wrongfulness of his actions, it is quite clear that he was quite impaired psychiatrically during the time in question." J.A. 49. Dr. Corvin concluded that Worrell's "untreated psychiatric illness contributed substantially to the commission of his alleged offenses" and "the fact that he was taken off his medication clearly played a critical role in the gradual psychiatric decompensation that took place in the days leading up to his alleged offenses." J.A. 49. Dr. Corvin's letter did not address Worrell's intent to mail the letters to Theresa.

After receiving Dr. Corvin's summary of his evaluation of Worrell, the government moved in limine to exclude any evidence relating to Worrell's mental condition.2 The government made a two-fold argument based on the federal insanity defense, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 17(a) (West 2000), which was enacted through the Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA"), Pub.L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 402(a), 98 Stat.2057 § 20 (1984). First, the government contended that IDRA absolutely precludes a federal defendant from presenting any evidence relating to defendant's mental condition unless the defendant is pursuing a formal affirmative insanity defense. Second, the government argued that even if IDRA allows a defendant to offer such evidence, it would be for the narrow purpose of negating a specific intent element of a crime, and Dr. Corvin's opinion, as summarized in his letter to defense counsel, did not offer a basis to negate the specific intent required for the offense of mailing a threatening communication under § 876.

Given that Dr. Corvin could not say that Worrell was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his criminal acts, counsel for Worrell candidly conceded to the district court that Worrell did not qualify for an insanity defense. However, Worrell still sought to introduce Dr. Corvin's testimony on the basis that mailing a threatening communication in violation of § 876 is a specific intent crime, and that Dr. Corvin's testimony would negate the specific intent that the government was required to prove for a conviction under § 876.

The district court granted the government's motion to exclude Dr. Corvin's testimony. However, the district court did not prohibit Worrell, who testified in his own defense, from telling the jury that he suffered from "bipolar disorder and inter[mittent] explosive disorder," J.A. 254, that when he does not take his medication, he does not "really think about what [he is] doing before [he does] it," J.A. 255, and that, prior to writing the first letter to Theresa, he had been taken off of his medication. In fact, Worrell's attorney emphasized this point during his closing argument, suggesting to the jury that Worrell's "case would not be in front of you if it were not for the fact that, as Mr. Worrell testified, that he was taken off of his medication" and that "there were no letters submitted to you that were threatening while he was on his medication." J.A. 298.

On cross-examination, Worrell admitted writing the letters and mailing them to Theresa. He acknowledged that he understood that a letter must have an address and a zip code, that it requires a stamp and that it is delivered by the Postal Service. Worrell's testimony also reflected his understanding of certain internal prison mail procedures. Worrell explained that as an inmate, he was entitled to three free stamps per week, and that he had already used his allotment when he sent the February 28 letter to Theresa. Because he was out of stamps, Worrell used a fellow inmate's name for the return address in order to obtain an extra stamp free of charge.

Worrell further conceded that he had been trying to scare Theresa with his letters, and one of the investigating agents testified that Worrell told him the purpose of the letters...

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