U.S. v. Wright
| Decision Date | 22 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1124,79-1124 |
| Citation | 627 F.2d 1300 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Beachey L. WRIGHT, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.Criminal 78-309-1).
Amy G. Rudnick * with whom Michael Zeldin (Appointed by this Court) and Sandra Richardson * were on the brief, for appellant.
William J. Bowman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Carl S. Rauh, U. S. Atty. (at the time the brief was filed), Washington, D. C., John A. Terry, Michael W. Farrell, Roger M. Adelman and John H. E. Bayly, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge BAZELON.
After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial judge declined to interpose a defense of insanity over the objections of appellant, Beachey Wright. Wright was charged with destruction of government property (18 U.S.C. § 1361). The indictment alleged that Wright damaged a model of the United States Capitol building and its glass display case, both housed in the Capitol.
Wright was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment with credit for time served. 1 In this appeal, he contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to raise the insanity defense sua sponte over appellant's objections.
The facts are undisputed. Between 11:30 and 11:45 a. m. on the day of the offense, appellant entered the United States Capitol building, and began "walking around observing the tourists, taking in the building and the artworks and exhibits that were on display." 2 Wright then was "inspired" by the Holy Spirit to commit a symbolic act, intended to warn people of God's impending judgment that the nation "has deviated from his original designs." 3 Wright saw a metal stanchion, used with a cordon to rope off displays. He also noticed a replica of the Capitol building behind a glass display case. He "tossed" the stanchion at the model and the glass case, causing both to break. 4 A police officer on duty heard the crash and arrested Wright.
Following his arrest, appellant was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for a mental examination pursuant to 24 D.C.Code § 301(a). The Hospital report represented the shared opinions of psychiatrist Dr. Glen H. Miller, two other psychiatrists, a psychologist, and a social worker. The report concluded that Wright was competent to stand trial, but had suffered from a mental disease at the time of the offense; the report also diagnosed him as "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." 5
The judge found appellant competent to stand trial, but in light of the diagnosis, he ordered further psychiatric examination. 6 Informed by Wright's counsel that Wright would not rely on an insanity defense, the court also appointed an amicus curiae to advise the court whether it should impose the defense over Wright's objection. Amicus counsel recommended that an evidentiary hearing be held (1) to determine whether the court should sua sponte raise the insanity defense 7 and (2) to "explore carefully the quality of the defendant's decision not to raise the defense." 8
Three psychiatrists testified at the two-day evidentiary hearing. All three testified that appellant was competent to stand trial, 9 but their diagnosis differed. Dr. Miller, who contributed to the initial report by St. Elizabeths, 10 diagnosed Wright as suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, at the time of the offense. He based his conclusion on 1) appellant's conception of himself as "God's harbinger for future destruction of the world"; 11 2) his inability "to distinguish reality from fantasy in important ways"; 12 and 3) his apparently compulsive belief in his mission. 13 Dr. Miller concluded that the appellant could "appreciate the wrongfulness of his act" but "could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 14 In addition, Dr. Miller said appellant's decision not to raise the insanity defense was "tied in with the psychosis," but not itself delusional. 15
The two other psychiatrists testified that the appellant was not psychotic at the time of the offense, although there were paranoid elements to his thinking. Dr. Pepper said that the appellant "likened himself to Old Testament prophets and mentioned how they had been persecuted(,) and I thought that this was a pretty good display of both the grandiose and the persecutory aspects of the paranoid thinking." 16 Nonetheless, Dr. Pepper testified that Wright was able to distinguish what he thought was God's law from human law, and was capable of choosing which to obey. 17 Dr. Sack similarly found Wright to have "very intense private religious beliefs" 18 and "paranoid thinking," but able to distinguish right from wrong. 19 Both psychiatrists reported that Wright chose to avoid harming himself or the efficacy of his message when he declined to raise the insanity defense. 20
All three psychiatrists acknowledged that the appellant's case was a difficult one, and that he suffered from some kind of psychological disorder. 21 All three also acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing passionate religious beliefs from mental illness. 22
The appellant, Beachey Wright testified that he had been educated in a private Seventh Day Adventists' grammar school. 23 He described religious experiences starting while he was stationed with the army in Vietnam. After an honorable discharge, he attended college but left in 1971 because "God had told me to go and prophesy" about God's plan to destroy the government. 24 He traveled to Washington, D.C. where he burned American flags in public places. 25 He returned to college, and then traveled again to Washington to perform his prophetic mission. His activities at that time led to an indictment, and ultimately commitment to St. Elizabeths Hospital. 26 Wright said that after visiting religious colleges in the South, he arrived in California, where he worked as a construction worker. Then he left for Washington once more to fulfill his mission and performed the acts giving rise to the instant indictment.
Wright told the court that he declined to raise the insanity defense not for fear of stigma: "I have a stigma of being an ex-mental patient, as it is." 27 Instead, Wright said he rejected the defense because
the whole idea of the notion that I am suffering from some kind of mental illness is absurd to me. I know I express a great amount of religious conviction, more so than the ordinary person, but that is not in itself, as far as I am concerned, an indication of mental illness. I cannot accept a mental insanity plea because it would be a compromise of my faith and the principles that have motivated me up to this point. It would discredit everything that I represent in coming here. 28
The district court declined to raise the insanity defense over appellant's objection. 29 In its order, the court carefully reviewed the history of the case, acknowledged the conflict among the experts, and cited three related grounds for declining to interpose the defense. First, Wright was able to make "a rational and intelligent choice with respect to raising the insanity issue as a defense." 30 In support, the court noted the appellant's reliance "on a religious ground," on his own conviction that he was not mentally ill, and on his awareness of the possible consequences of raising the defense that could include commitment to St. Elizabeths. 31 Second, the court cited its own observations of defendant in court on at least seven occasions. Finally, the court found the testimony of Drs. Sack and Pepper "credible and believable" although in conflict with the views of Dr. Miller. 32 The court concluded that "Mr. Wright's decision to abandon and reject an insanity defense is not a product of any mental illness or abnormal mental condition but rather a considered determination on his part." 33
At trial, the arresting officers and a detective gave evidence about the incident alleged in the indictment. One reported that the defendant spontaneously said at the time of arrest, "Jehovah had sent me." 34 The government also obtained testimony from an architectural historian about the value of the model and the cost of repairing both it and the glass display case. 35 Appellant, the sole defense witness, told of his mission to warn of God's pending judgment, and his use of symbolic acts as religious prophesy. The jury found appellant guilty.
At sentencing, the appellant asked for probation, promising that his conduct would not be repeated. He said, 36 The judge rejected his request and set the sentence. This appeal followed. 37
While knowingly violating the law, 38 the appellant apparently believed sincerely that he was selected to prophesy God's disapproval of the national government. 39 Put this starkly, this case appears destined for a textbook discussion of the moral and political implications of the insanity defense. 40 For here the need to recognize religious or political expression competes with the criminal law's refusal to punish those who cannot fairly be blamed. 41 But no matter what we may think of these moral and political issues, the doctrinal treatment of Wright's claim is now fixed in our jurisprudence. Before this court is solely the narrow question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to interpose the defense over appellant's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Treece v. State
...of the case. Despite considerable criticism 1 the District of Columbia Circuit has adhered to the Whalem rule. See United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C.Cir.1980); Cross v. United States, 389 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir.1968). We observe in passing that Whalem supports the State's position in t......
-
Tavoulareas v. Piro
... ... Walsh, New York City, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of N.Y., pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., was on the brief, for appellant. Abel J. Mattos, Washington, D.C., entered an appearance, for appellant ... Edward ... Waldbaum thus provides us with useful analytic tools; nevertheless, the touchstone remains whether an individual has "assumed [a] role[ ] of especial prominence in the ... ...
-
Lluberes v. Uncommon Productions, LLC
... ... Although not in so many words, the Vicinis ask us to graft the common-law privilege of reply onto the constitutional public-figure analysis. To our knowledge only one court of appeals has explicitly ... ...
-
Tavoulareas v. Piro
... ... Artabane, Washington, D.C. and Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., were on brief, for appellant ... David E. Kendall, Washington, D.C., with whom Irving Younger, Kevin T. Baine and ... Such independent inquiry convinces us that the evidence is sufficient to clearly and convincingly establish actual malice, which the jury found existed on the part of the defendants ... ...