U.S. v. Wynn
| Decision Date | 04 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-3024,92-3024 |
| Citation | 61 F.3d 921 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Charles L. WYNN, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
W. Gregory Spencer, Asst. Federal Public Defender, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, Washington, DC, was on the briefs, argued the cause for appellant.
James W. Cooper, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC, argued the cause pro hac vice for appellee. On the brief for appellee were Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Atty., and John R. Fisher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, DC. Elizabeth Trosman and Eileen C. Mayer, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, DC, entered appearances for appellee.
Before BUCKLEY, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
Charles Wynn was convicted of 34 counts of money laundering and related offenses following a three-week jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. For the reasons described below, we affirm 32 of Wynn's convictions but reverse his two convictions for illegally structuring financial transactions, in violation of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324(a)(3), because the Government failed to offer any evidence to support one essential element of that crime.
The majority of the charges against Wynn stemmed from his operation and co-ownership of Linea Pitti, an exclusive Washington, D.C., retail store specializing in expensive Italian men's clothing. Linea Pitti's two best customers were Rayful Edmond III and Tony Lewis. The two made cash purchases totaling more than $457,000 from the store in 1987 and 1988, accounting for more than 25 percent of Linea Pitti's gross sales in fiscal year 1988. Wynn served as their primary salesman. Edmond and Lewis commonly purchased large quantities of merchandise at one time and later paid for those purchases in relatively small installments. At trial, the Government presented evidence, which Wynn does not dispute, that Edmond and Lewis operated a large-scale, illegal narcotics trafficking operation in the District of Columbia during this same period. See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1084-86 (D.C.Cir.1995).
In May 1989, a federal grand jury indicted Wynn on 54 counts of laundering the proceeds of illegal activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956, based upon 54 separate payments allegedly made by Edmond and Lewis to Linea Pitti. The indictment alleged that Wynn knew that Edmond's and Lewis's money was obtained illegally and that he knew the drug traffickers purchased his merchandise in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the currency. The jury found Wynn guilty of 24 of the counts and not guilty of the remaining 30. The indictment also charged Wynn with three counts of engaging in financial transactions involving $10,000 or more of criminally derived proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1957, based on three bank deposits made by Linea Pitti that matched the amounts of three payments Edmond or Lewis had made to the store. The jury found Wynn guilty on one of these counts.
Most of the remaining convictions stemmed from Wynn's purchase of two expensive automobiles on behalf of Lewis. In December 1987, Wynn purchased four cashier's checks from banks, each in a denomination of less than $10,000, and used them to pay for a Range Rover automobile for Lewis. In January 1988, Wynn bought two additional cashier's checks, which he paid toward the purchase of another Range Rover for Lewis. Based on these transactions, the Government charged and the jury convicted Wynn of six additional counts of money laundering (one count for each cashier's check), in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956.
In connection with the first Range Rover purchase, the indictment also charged Wynn with one count of structuring a financial transaction to evade the requirement that banks report to the Government cash transactions of $10,000 or more, in violation of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324. In April 1988, Wynn paid off the $25,000 balance on a bank loan with three cashier's checks, each for less than $10,000. At least two of these were purchased with cash. Based on this transaction, which the Government does not allege involved Lewis or Edmond, the indictment charged Wynn with a second violation of section 5324. The jury convicted Wynn of both counts.
In addition, the jury found Wynn guilty of one count of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1957, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5324, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503 (obstruction of justice), but acquitted him of the charge of obstructing justice by impeding the grand jury's investigatory efforts, in violation of section 1503.
The district court sentenced Wynn to a total of 57 months in jail, with some of the 34 sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. In addition, it imposed special assessments of $25 for one of the section 5324 convictions and $50 for each of the other 33 convictions and required Wynn to serve three years of supervised release following his prison term. Wynn challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that underlies all 34 convictions.
When reviewing a guilty verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and must affirm the verdict if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). We do not act as a "second jury weighing the evidence anew," United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C.Cir.1990), nor do we require that the evidence "exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence or lead inexorably to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty." United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1993). We require, however, that a jury's verdict be based upon more than "mere speculation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wynn was convicted on 30 counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988). That statute provides, in relevant part:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity--
. . . . .
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part--
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; ...
. . . . .
shall be sentenced....
Id. In applying the statute to this case, the Government was required to prove four elements in order to convict Wynn of any given count: (1) that Wynn conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction, (2) that the transaction involved the proceeds of a statutorily specified unlawful activity, (3) that Wynn knew the proceeds were from some form of illegal activity, and (4) that Wynn knew a purpose of the transaction was to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds. It is undisputed that all of the transactions underlying the section 1956 charges constituted "financial transactions" and that narcotics trafficking is a statutorily defined "specified unlawful activity." See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(c)(7)(B) (1988).
Wynn's challenge to the sufficiency of the Government's proof concerning the Linea Pitti clothing sales charges focuses on the statute's two scienter requirements. He contends that the Government presented no evidence that he knew Edmond and Lewis earned their income through drug distribution; and further, because the purchases were handled as ordinary commercial transactions, there is no evidence that he knew they were designed to conceal the nature of the funds.
By the terms of the statute, the Government must prove that Wynn knew Edmond and Lewis derived their money from some form of illegal activity, but it need not prove that Wynn knew the precise activity in which the two were engaged. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Such evidence, however, cannot alone sustain a conviction because section 1956 prohibits the laundering of money, not merely the spending of money obtained illegally. See United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1472-73 (10th Cir.1991) (). Thus, the Government must prove that Edmond and Lewis were motivated by a desire to conceal or disguise the source or the ownership of the money they spent at Linea Pitti and that Wynn knew of this design. As other circuits have observed, the language of the statute requires only that Edmond and Lewis--not Wynn--be motivated by a desire to conceal. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857-58 (4th Cir.1992) (); accord United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1424-25 (11th Cir.1992).
The concealment of illegal proceeds, however, need have been only one of Edmond's and Lewis's purposes in purchasing the clothing; it need not have been their sole purpose. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859; Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1472. "The conversion of cash into goods and services as a way of concealing or disguising the wellspring of the cash is a central concern of the money laundering statute." United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir.1991). A requirement that concealment be the sole motivating factor...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. White
...instruction. To support a conspiracy conviction, a defendant must have knowingly participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 578, 133 L.Ed.2d 501 (1995); see also United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 707 (D.C......
-
U.S. v. Thomas
...affirm the judgments of conviction. 1 The jury also acquitted a sixth defendant, Steve Williams, of all charges.2 See United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 923 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 578, 133 L.Ed.2d 501 (1995); United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 772 (D.C.Cir.......
-
U.S. v. Aramony
...of a rational reason to hold differently in the context of § 1957, which is "the sister provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1956." United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 578, 133 L.Ed.2d 501 (1995). Accordingly, we hold a de minimis effect on interst......
-
U.S. v. Wilson
...committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1518 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 928-29 (D.C.Cir.1995). The existence of an agreement is the sine qua non of the statutory crime of conspiracy. See United States v. Treadwel......
-
Money Laundering
...actual control—is sufficient to prove a violation of § 1957). 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 40. Id. § 1957(a). 41. See United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Due to the omission of a ‘design to conceal’ element, section 1957 prohibits a wider range of activity than money ‘l......
-
Money laundering.
...of [section] 1957 to reach almost any bank transaction conducted by a defendant); Allen, 129 F.3d at 1165 (same); United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Section 1957 prohibits a wider range of activity than money 'laundering' as traditionally understood."); see also Eliz......
-
Money laundering.
...of [section] 1957 to reach almost any bank transaction conducted by a defendant); Allen, 129 F.3d at 1165 (same); United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Section 1957 prohibits a wider range of activity than money 'laundering' as traditionally understood."); see also Eliz......
-
Money laundering.
...of [section] 1957 to reach almost any bank transaction conducted by a defendant); Allen, 129 F.3d at 1165 (same); United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921,927 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Section 1957 prohibits a wider range of activity than money 'laundering' as traditionally understood."); see also Eliza......