U.S. v. Young
Decision Date | 27 May 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 07-13626.,07-13626. |
Citation | 528 F.3d 1294 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Freddie Dale YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Thomas E. Drake, II, Law Offices of Thomas E. Drake, II, Cullman, AL, for Young.
Ramona C. Albin, Joyce White Vance, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, AL, for U.S.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.
Freddie Dale Young appeals from his conviction for possession of an unregistered silencer, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and from his sentence of imprisonment for ninety-seven months for (1) possessing an unregistered silencer, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); (2) conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846; (3) manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and (4) possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of or addict to a controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). On appeal, Young argues that the count charging possession of an unregistered silencer should have been dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and that his sentence is unreasonable.
Young was originally arraigned on a one-count indictment for possessing an unregistered silencer. Approximately two months later, a federal grand jury returned a five-count superseding indictment against Young, which included four counts in addition to the first count charged in the original indictment.1 From the face of the superseding indictment, the additional charges relate to a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and are unrelated to the original charge for possession of an unregistered silencer. Several days before trial, Young moved the district court to dismiss the first count of the superseding indictment, arguing that more than seventy non-excludable days had passed since his original indictment on the charge, and that he had therefore been denied a speedy trial. The district court denied Young's motion and proceeded to trial. Young now appeals from the denial of his claim under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, and we review his claim de novo. United States v. Schier, 438 F.3d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir.2006). The government concedes that more than seventy non-excludable days passed between the original indictment and trial, but argues that the filing of the superseding indictment for other charges against Young reset the speedy-trial clock with respect to the first count, which was contained in the original indictment. We hold that the filing of the superseding indictment did not reset the clock as to this charge.
The Speedy Trial Act requires that criminal defendants be tried within seventy days of the later of indictment or arraignment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Certain periods of time are excluded from the calculation, however, such as any period of delay "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," id. § 3161(h)(1), or resulting from a continuance granted by the judge to serve the "ends of justice," id. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The consequences for failure to try a defendant within seventy non-excludable days are severe, and include dismissal with prejudice of the charges against the defendant. Id. § 3162(a)(2). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not speak to whether the filing of a superseding indictment resets the speedy-trial clock with respect to charges contained in previous indictments, the language of a particular exclusion under the Act is instructive.
Section 3161(h)(6) provides that the time between the dismissal of an indictment and any subsequent charge for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, is excluded from the speedy-trial calculation. Thus, if the government indicts a defendant for a particular crime, dismisses that charge, and indicts the defendant once again for the same offense, the speedy-trial calculation begins with the initial indictment or arraignment but excludes the time between the dismissal and subsequent re-indictment. Under this provision, if the original indictment filed against Young had been dismissed and a new indictment filed on the same day, his speedy-trial clock would have concededly run. The government implicitly argues, however, that there is a difference between the filing of a superseding indictment, which is at issue here, and the dismissal of an indictment followed by a new indictment. That distinction is the only basis for the government's contention that § 3161(h)(6) does not apply. But we rejected that distinction in United States v. McKay, wherein we stated explicitly that "[f]iling a superseding indictment has the same effect as dismissing an original indictment and filing a new indictment; so both events should be treated equally under the Act." 30 F.3d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1994).
Therefore, neither the filing of a superseding indictment, nor the dismissal of an original indictment followed by the filing of a new indictment, resets the speedy-trial clock. Indeed, the exclusion of the period of time between the dismissal of an indictment and the filing of a new indictment under § 3161(h)(6), as well as the Speedy Trial Act more generally, would make little sense if the government could reset the speedy-trial clock at will and effectively "circumvent[ ] the speedy trial guarantee through the simple expedient of obtaining superseding indictments with minor corrections." United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1567 (5th Cir.1994).
This concern underlies the conclusions of our sister circuits that have likewise held that the filing of a superseding indictment does not reset the speedy-trial clock for offenses charged, or required to be joined with those charged, in the original indictment. See e.g., United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir.1983) (); United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir.1986) (); United States v. Roman, 822 F.2d 261, 263-64 (2d Cir.1987) (); United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1275 n. 4 (8th Cir.1990) (); United States v. Marshall, 935 F.2d 1298, 1302 (D.C.Cir.1991) (); United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir.1990) (); United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1091 n. 10 (9th Cir.2004) (); see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239, 106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ().2
We note that this result is consistent with our holding in United States v. Puett, 735 F.2d 1331 (11th Cir.1984), to which the government draws our attention. In Puett, we considered "whether the time elapsing between the dismissal of the initial complaint and return of the indictment should be included for...
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