U.S. v. Young, CR 98-2017-MWB.
| Decision Date | 29 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 98-2017-MWB.,CR 98-2017-MWB. |
| Citation | 73 F.Supp.2d 1014 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Leland Duane YOUNG, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Stephanie M. Rose, Asst. U.S. Atty., Cedar Rapids, IA, for U.S.
Alfredo Parrish, Parrish, Krudenier, Moss, Dunn & Montgomery, L.L.P., Des Moines, IA, for Leland Duane Young, Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 1015
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ..................................................... 1017
A. Protections And Waivability Of Rules 11(e)(6) And 410 ........... 1017
B. Did Young Waive The Rules' Protections? ......................... 1018
1. Counsel's conflict of interest ............................... 1018
2. Coercion ..................................................... 1019
3. Ignorance of rights .......................................... 1019
a. Burch and Krilich ......................................... 1019
b. Eighth Circuit guidance ................................... 1022
c. Was any waiver "knowing"? ................................. 1023
III. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 1025
As the Supreme Court recently observed, "A criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution." United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995). Likewise, the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are "presumptively waivable." Id. The question presented here is whether the defendant did indeed "knowingly and voluntarily" waive his protections under Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, thereby allowing the government to present at trial a self-incriminating affidavit the defendant made pursuant to a plea agreement that has since fallen apart.
On July 16, 1998, the United States filed an indictment charging defendant Leland Duane Young, along with others, with drug-trafficking and other offenses. Specifically, in Count I of the indictment, the United States charged Mr. Young with the crime of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine or to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In Counts IV and V of the same indictment, the United States charged this defendant with separate crimes of using a "communication facility" — in this case, a telephone — in causing or facilitating the commission of the crime of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine or to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Trial on these charges was set for September 28, 1999, then reset for October 6, 1998.
Plea negotiations ensued. On the eve of trial, on October 5, 1998, Young accepted a plea agreement under which he agreed to plead guilty to Count I of the indictment. That agreement also provided, inter alia, as follows:
If the defendant does breach this agreement, he faces the following consequences: (1) all testimony and other information he has provided at any time to attorneys, employees or law enforcement officers of the government, to the court, or to the federal grand jury, may and will be used against him in any prosecution or proceeding; (2) the United States will be entitled to reinstate previously dismissed charges and/or pursue additional charges against the defendant and to use any information obtained directly or indirectly from the defendant in those additional prosecutions; and (3) the United States will be released from any obligations, agreements or restrictions imposed upon it under this plea agreement.
Government's Exhibit 1, Hearing on Motion In Limine, October 25, 1999, Plea Agreement of October 5, 1999 (the "Plea Agreement"), ¶ 11. Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, Young also executed an affidavit that included information concerning his own and other persons' criminal activities. Government's Exhibit 2, Hearing on Motion In Limine, October 25, 1999, Affidavit of October 5, 1998 (the "Affidavit"). The government required the Affidavit, in part, to ensure that Young would not back out of the Plea Agreement after obtaining a continuance of the trial and getting a copy of the presentence investigation report.
Performance of the Plea Agreement subsequently fell apart. Therefore, on June 16, 1999, this matter was set for trial on September 27, 1999, on all three charges against Mr. Young. The trial date was later moved to November 1, 1999, then, on October 19, 1999, the trial was rescheduled to begin on October 26, 1999. On June 17, 1999, the day after the first order resetting trial was entered, the government notified defense counsel of its intent to introduce Young's Affidavit at trial. On October 19, 1999, pursuant to a Stipulated Discovery Order, the government again provided notice of its intent to use the Affidavit at trial.
On October 22, 1999, Young filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the Affidavit on the ground that it was signed during plea negotiations, and therefore was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. On October 21, 1999, having received a copy of Young's motion in advance of its formal filing, the government resisted the motion in limine. The government asserted that paragraph 11 of the Plea Agreement specifically authorized the government's use of the Affidavit at trial. The government argued further that the Plea Agreement constituted a valid waiver of Young's rights under Rules 11(e)(6) and 410 not to have the Affidavit admitted at trial. Specifically, the government argued that Young's decision to sign the Plea Agreement, and his execution of the accompanying Affidavit, were done "with full knowledge of the consequences should he later change his mind." Memorandum In Support Of Government's Resistance To Defendant's Motion In Limine (Government's Resistance Brief), p. 4. The government also notified the court, pursuant to a letter dated October 22, 1999, of its intention to seek an interlocutory appeal of this court's ruling on the motion in limine, should the court exclude the Affidavit.
The court held a hearing on Young's motion in limine to exclude the Affidavit on October 25, 1999. At the hearing, the United States was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Stephanie M. Rose of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Defendant Leland Duane Young was represented by Alfredo Parrish of Parrish, Krudenier, Moss, Dunn & Montgomery, L.L.P., in Des Moines, Iowa. At the hearing, Young presented his own testimony, and the United States presented the testimony of Young's counsel at the time the Plea Agreement and Affidavit were executed. The government also submitted as exhibits the Plea Agreement and Affidavit, as well as its letter of June 19, 1999, to defense counsel concerning the government's intention to use the Affidavit at trial, letters from counsel for Young's co-defendants concerning their recollections of the plea negotiations, and the transcript of certain grand jury testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court continued the trial to preserve the government's right to pursue an interlocutory appeal, should the court decide to grant Young's motion in limine. Defendant's motion in limine is now ready for decision.
As the Supreme Court recently explained,
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) (Rules or plea-statement Rules) are substantively identical. Rule 410 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who ... was a participant in the plea discussions: ... (4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty...."
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995). Because the Affidavit at issue here is unquestionably a "statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which d[id] not result in a plea of guilty," see FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6), it unquestionably falls within the general exclusion stated in the plea-statement Rules. The government argues, however, that the protections of these Rules were waived by Young's acceptance of paragraph 11 of the Plea Agreement.
The Supreme Court noted that "these Rules are subject to only two express exceptions, neither of which says anything about waiver," id. (footnote omitted), and neither of which is pertinent here.1 However, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that these Rules were "waiverless." Id. Instead, the Court found that "[t]he provisions of [the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] are presumptively waivable, though an express waiver clause may suggest that Congress intended to occupy the field and to preclude waiver under other, unstated circumstances." Id. at 201, 115 S.Ct. 797. After considering the context of these Rules, the Court declined to "interpret Congress' silence as an implicit rejection of waivability." Id. at 203-04, 115 S.Ct. 797. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that, by providing circumstances in which statements made in the course of plea negotiations could be made, "the plea-statement Rules expressly contemplate a degree of party control that is consonant with the background presumption of waivability." Id. at 206, 115 S.Ct. 797. The Court also rejected the argument that waiver was fundamentally inconsistent with the Rules' goal of encouraging voluntary...
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