U.S. v. Zamudio
Decision Date | 31 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 02-4006.,02-4006. |
Citation | 314 F.3d 517 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nicholas ZAMUDIO, aka Martin Avila, Alejandro Ortiz Avila, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, and Wayne T. Dance, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, UT, filed briefs for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Edward K. Brass of Salt Lake City, UT, filed a brief for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
The United States brings this appeal challenging the district court's sentence of Nicholas Zamudio. The government alleges the district court erred by not subjecting Mr. Zamudio to a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). We reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
Mr. Zamudio pled guilty to a charge of illegal re-entry into the United States as a deported alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Under the sentencing guidelines, a defendant who illegally enters the United States who "previously was deported after a criminal conviction ... [and] the conviction was for an aggravated felony," is subject to a sixteen-level sentencing increase to his base offense level for the illegal re-entry charge. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2000).1
Two years prior to the illegal re-entry charge, Mr. Zamudio had been deported from the United States after pleading guilty in Utah state court to distributing marijuana. His state plea was detailed in a signed "Plea in Abeyance" which outlined that he was required to pay a fine of $1,000 over a six month period. If he complied with the terms of the abeyance, his offense would be reduced to a misdemeanor. At his sentencing for the current offense, the government contended Mr. Zamudio's base offense should be increased by sixteen levels because his Utah plea in abeyance qualified as a conviction for an aggravated felony under the guideline.
The district court did not apply the enhancement. The government filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Mr. Zamudio's plea in abeyance satisfied the definition of conviction laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), thereby qualifying him for the sentencing enhancement provisions in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The district court agreed, determining that the sentence it initially imposed on Mr. Zamudio was erroneous. Because the government's motion to reconsider fell outside the time frame in which the court could modify Mr. Zamudio's sentence, however, the district court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to review and correct its ruling. The government appeals.
We first address Mr. Zamudio's assertion that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the government failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). Section 3742(b) permits the government to file a notice of appeal for a sentence it believes "was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines." Id. However, "[t]he Government may not further prosecute such appeal without the personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General." Id.
Mr. Zamudio's sentence was entered on November 28, 2001, and the government timely filed its notice of appeal thirty days later, thereby establishing our jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 On January 14, 2002, the government obtained approval from the Solicitor General to further prosecute this appeal. The government filed its opening brief on April 11, 2002, and upon Mr. Zamudio's assertion that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the government's appeal for its failure to comply with § 3742(b), the government provided a copy of the Solicitor General's approval in its reply brief. See Aplt. reply br., attach. A. The government contends that its late submission of proof of approval from the Solicitor General does not deprive us of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We agree.
Our sister circuits have examined the manner and timing by which the government must prove its compliance with § 3742(b) and have concluded that the prior approval portion of the statute is not jurisdictional in nature. See United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1290 n. 1 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 74, 154 L.Ed.2d 16 (2002) ( ); United States v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n. 1. (7th Cir.1994) (court not divested of jurisdiction even if government failed to secure approval to bring appeal); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1101-02 (2d Cir.1992) ( ); United States v. Long, 911 F.2d 1482, 1483-85 (11th Cir.1990) ( ); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.1990) (, )superceded by statute on other grounds as noted by United States v. Mercer, 22 Fed. Appx. 415 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Gurgiolo, 894 F.2d 56, n. 1 (3rd Cir.1990) ( ).
Section 3742(b) was designed to allow the government to appeal sentences falling below the appropriate guideline range by focusing "the appellate courts' attention on those sentences for which review is crucial to the proper functioning of the sentencing guidelines and to provide a means to correct erroneous and clearly unreasonable sentences." Long, 911 F.2d at 1484 ( ). Congress was persuaded that allowing the government to appeal sentences would permit "reviewing courts to correct the injustice arising from a sentence that [is] patently too lenient." S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.2d Sess., at 151, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3334. Congress enacted the statute's prior approval requirement to "assure that such appeals are not routinely filed for every sentence below the guidelines." Id. at 154, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3337. See also Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1102; Long, 911 F.2d at 1484. While "it is undisputed that Congress intended that such permission be obtained,... proof of the personal approval is not of jurisdictional dimensions in the sense that a timely notice of appeal in a criminal case is jurisdictional." Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328; see also Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1102 ( ); Long, 911 F.2d at 1484 (same).
Moreover, the statute's semantic structure indicates the government's receipt of prior approval for appeal from the Attorney General or his designates is not jurisdictionally predictive. Section 3742(b) begins by stating "[t]he government may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence...." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). After listing the different grounds upon which the government may file its notice of appeal, the statute then provides that the government must obtain approval from the appropriate official before it further prosecutes the appeal. Id. Hence, it is the government's filing of the notice of appeal which establishes this court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, rather than the government's obtaining of approval. See Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1102 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)).3
Here, the government obtained permission from the Solicitor General and produced a copy of such approval in its reply brief. Such proof satisfies § 3472(b). See United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945, 955 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 1072, 121 S.Ct. 2230, 150 L.Ed.2d 221 (2001) ( ); United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1446 n. 9 (9th Cir.1992) (same). The government's appeal is properly before this court.
The government maintains the district court erred when it did not increase Mr. Zamudio's base offense level by sixteen in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)4 and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).5 Specifically, the government contends the district court should have found that Mr. Zamudio's plea in abeyance constituted a conviction as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), thereby triggering the enhancement provisions of § 1326(b)(2) and the sentencing guidelines. On appeal, "[w]e review de novo the district court's interpretation of a criminal statute." United States v. Valenzuela-Escalante, 130 F.3d 944, 945 (10th Cir.1997).
When interpreting a statute, we begin by examining its plain language. "If the statutory language is clear, our analysis ordinarily ends." United States v. Jackson, 248 F.3d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 534 U.S. 929, 122 S.Ct. 291, 151 L.Ed.2d 215 (2001). The courts have "consistently held that whether a particular disposition counts as a `conviction' in the context of a federal statute is a matter of federal determination." United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778, 780 (1st Cir.1996). See also Wilson v. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 211, 214-15 (5th Cir.1995) ( ); White v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir.1994) ( ).
Mr. Zamudio's plea in abeyance satisfies the definition of conviction laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
The term "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a...
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