U.S. v. Zwego, No. 80-1008

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY and McWILLIAMS; SETH; HOLLOWAY
Citation657 F.2d 248
Decision Date22 September 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-1008
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond W. ZWEGO, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Page 248

657 F.2d 248
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Raymond W. ZWEGO, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 80-1008.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 1, 1980.
Decided June 9, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1981.

Page 249

Paul Anthony White, Gladstone, Mo., for defendant-appellant.

James P. Buchele, U. S. Atty., Douglas B. Comer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Kan., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

SETH, Chief Judge.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 10(e). This cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Defendant-appellant Zwego was charged and convicted of knowingly making material false statements in connection with two applications for loans to a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and interstate transportation of a falsely made and forged security in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311 and 2314.

Appellant telephoned the Westgate State Bank located in Kansas City, Kansas and placed two applications for automobile loans on behalf of two "customers," Mr. Robert Helling and Mr. George Fine. The information that appellant supplied contained false statements regarding the addresses, places of employment, social security numbers, and telephone numbers of these individuals. In addition, Mr. Fine and Mr. Helling did not authorize such applications nor were they ever customers of appellant's business, as represented by appellant to the Bank. The Bank employee transcribed this false information onto "customer statement" forms and submitted both documents for approval to the Bank's vice president. The information was found to be false and the loans were not made.

Appellant was also convicted of interstate transportation of a falsely made and forged security. Appellant had received on consignment a 1977 Dodge van, the title and ownership of which was registered in the name of Jacpad Corp. Financial Service, Inc. with the Kansas Motor Vehicle Division. Appellant executed a forged and falsely notarized application for a duplicate motor vehicle title for this van and sent it from Kansas City, Missouri to the Kansas Department of Revenue Office in Topeka, Kansas without the knowledge or authorization of Jacpad, the registered owner. On the basis of this notarized application the Kansas Department of Revenue issued a duplicate title for the vehicle. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its determination that the forged and falsely notarized application for a duplicate motor vehicle title was a "security" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311 and 2314. The term "security" has been given an expansive definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2311 to include any "instrument or document or writing evidencing ownership of goods, wares, and merchandise."

The pervasive and broad-ranging definition of securities set forth in section 2311 demonstrates the Congressional intent that the term security should be construed

Page 250

broadly and beyond the usual commercial meaning of the term. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.); United States v. Speidel, 562 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir.); United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.).

A state certificate of title for a motor vehicle has been held to be a security under section 2311. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.); United States v. Dickson, 462 F.2d 184 (4th Cir.). In United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794, this court implicitly held that a certificate of title is a security within the meaning of section 2311. We there concluded that the certificate as sent from Washington state was not forged or false in its execution.

In United States v. Dickson, 462 F.2d 184 (4th Cir.), the court held that a statement of source of title of a motor vehicle was a security within the definition of section 2311. A security can be an evidence of a right of ownership. "It is the right or interest apparently represented that has value rather than the document itself." United States v. Speidel, 562 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir.). In the present case the appellant forged an application for a duplicate certificate of title of a motor vehicle. The application does require a notarized statement that the signor owns the vehicle in question and requests a duplicate of true title. Therefore, the application presupposes that the signor is the owner of the vehicle. The clear implication of such document is that a valid title document exists but has been lost or stolen. Once the duplicate certificate of title is issued it has value as evidence of ownership of the vehicle. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Schiller, 226 Kan. 155, 597 P.2d 238.

Thus this forged application while not an actual certificate of title was clearly usable as an intermediate step in obtaining the actual certificate of title. Consequently, we find that the executed application for a duplicate title of a motor vehicle has value to a forger since it enables the possessor to obtain a valid title which evidences ownership. Given the nature and use of the application for duplicate title in motor vehicle transactions we think that an application is a writing evidencing ownership in goods for purposes of section 2311. Thus we agree with the district court that it is indeed a security within...

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26 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Wiles, Nos. 94-1592
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • December 10, 1996
    ...the offense" in this instance. Id. This includes the District of Colorado where the false 10-K was made. See United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1275, 71 L.Ed.2d 460 (1982) (in prosecution for making false statements to federally ......
  • U.S. v. Angotti, No. 94-50216
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • January 28, 1997
    ...all treated § 1014 as a continuing offense. See United States v. Greene, 862 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Angotti, however, contends that proper venue could only lie in the Nor......
  • U.S. v. Wuagneux, No. 80-5763
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • August 23, 1982
    ...either in the district where the false statement is prepared and mailed, or where the statement is received. See United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1275, 71 L.Ed.2d 460 (1982); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.),......
  • United States v. Castellano, No. SSS 84 Cr. 63 (ADS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • June 6, 1985
    ...therefore falls within § 2311's definition), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1456, 79 L.Ed.2d 773 (1984); United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 249-50 (10th Cir.1981) (noting "pervasive and broad-ranging definition of securities set forth in § 2311" and holding that an executed app......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
26 cases
  • U.S. v. Wiles, Nos. 94-1592
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
    • December 10, 1996
    ...the offense" in this instance. Id. This includes the District of Colorado where the false 10-K was made. See United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1275, 71 L.Ed.2d 460 (1982) (in prosecution for making false statements to federally ......
  • U.S. v. Angotti, No. 94-50216
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • January 28, 1997
    ...all treated § 1014 as a continuing offense. See United States v. Greene, 862 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Angotti, however, contends that proper venue could only lie in the Nor......
  • U.S. v. Wuagneux, No. 80-5763
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • August 23, 1982
    ...either in the district where the false statement is prepared and mailed, or where the statement is received. See United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 251 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1275, 71 L.Ed.2d 460 (1982); United States v. Ruehrup, 333 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.),......
  • United States v. Castellano, No. SSS 84 Cr. 63 (ADS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • June 6, 1985
    ...therefore falls within § 2311's definition), cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1456, 79 L.Ed.2d 773 (1984); United States v. Zwego, 657 F.2d 248, 249-50 (10th Cir.1981) (noting "pervasive and broad-ranging definition of securities set forth in § 2311" and holding that an executed app......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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