Uckun v. State Bd. of Med. Practice
| Decision Date | 26 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. A06-1365.,A06-1365. |
| Citation | 733 N.W.2d 778 |
| Parties | Fatih M. UCKUN, M.D., Appellant, v. MINNESOTA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Stuart T. Williams, Alan C. Eidsness, Henson & Efron, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John S. Garry, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge; and HUDSON, Judge.
Appellant Fatih M. Uckun, M.D., challenges procedures followed by respondent Minnesota Board of Medical Practice in temporarily suspending his medical license. The district court granted respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's claims and denied appellant's motion for partial summary judgment on several of his claims. Because (1) appellant's due process rights were not violated when respondent applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in its proceedings to temporarily suspend appellant's medical license, (2) appellant failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and did not show that exhaustion of such remedies would be futile, and (3) respondent did not violate the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act or the Medical Practice Act when it published appellant's temporary suspension order on its website, we affirm.
Appellant, a medical doctor, was licensed in 1993 by respondent to practice medicine and surgery in Minnesota. In 1997, appellant became the director of Parker Hughes Clinics, a position which he held until 2005. Appellant remains employed by Parker Hughes Clinics.
After a two-year investigation by the Minnesota Attorney General's Office into patient-care complaints, respondent's Complaint Review Committee filed a petition in November 2005 seeking to have appellant's license temporarily suspended. In January 2006, respondent held a hearing on the petition during which appellant was given 20 minutes to make an oral presentation but was not allowed to present live testimony, cross-examine witnesses, or supplement the record. On January 27, 2006, respondent made findings and conclusions and issued an order temporarily suspending appellant's license pending a final decision after a contested case hearing. Respondent found that appellant's continued practice would create a serious risk of harm to others. Respondent published the temporary suspension order on its website, including appellant's name and business address, the nature of the misconduct, and the action taken by respondent.
On February 3, 2006, appellant filed a complaint against respondent in district court, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that respondent's use of the probable cause and/or preponderance of the evidence standards of proof rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in proceedings to temporarily suspend appellant's medical license violated his due process rights; (2) an injunction prohibiting respondent from using the probable cause and/or preponderance of the evidence standard in seeking to permanently suspend appellant's medical license and instead requiring respondent to use the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in future proceedings, and an injunction ordering respondent to rescind the temporary suspension order and reinstate appellant's license; (3) a declaratory judgment that respondent's publication of the temporary suspension order on its website violated both the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn.Stat. §§ 13.01-13.90 (2006), and the Medical Practice Act (MPA), Minn.Stat. §§ 147.001-147.37 (2006); (4) an injunction prohibiting respondent from publicly disclosing or revealing any disciplinary proceedings related to appellant; and (5) damages, including costs and attorney fees, for violations of the MGDPA and MPA.
Respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, and appellant moved for partial summary judgment on several claims. The district court issued an order granting respondent's motion to dismiss and denying appellant's motion for partial summary judgment. With regard to appellant's claims that respondent had applied the wrong standard of proof and had improperly published the temporary suspension order, the district court concluded that the complaint did not allege a claim on which relief could be granted.
1. Did respondent violate appellant's due-process rights by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in the proceeding to temporarily suspend appellant's medical license?
2. Did appellant exhaust his administrative remedies, and if not, did appellant show that exhaustion would be futile?
3. Did respondent violate the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act and the Medical Practice Act when it published appellant's temporary suspension order on its website?
In reviewing cases dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the only question before the reviewing court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1997). Thus, the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.2003). "Where . . . the [district] court is itself acting as an appellate tribunal with respect to the agency decision, this court will independently review the agency's record." In re Hutchinson, 440 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 1989).
Appellant argues that respondent violated his due-process rights by improperly applying the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in its proceedings to temporarily suspend his medical license rather than applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.1 We disagree.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). A three-part test set out in Mathews guides the determination of the minimum standard of proof necessary to satisfy due process: 1) the private interest affected, 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest, and 3) the government's interest including any additional burdens it would incur. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. "`The function of a standard of proof . . . is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (quotation omitted). "The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." Id.
First, Minnesota law supports our conclusion that respondent properly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in its temporary suspension of appellant's license. Respondent is authorized to temporarily suspend the license of a physician without a hearing if the board finds that "the physician has violated a statute or rule which the board is empowered to enforce and continued practice by the physician would create a serious risk of harm to the public." Minn. Stat. § 147.091, subd. 4 (2006). Minnesota rules provide the standard of proof applicable in administrative proceedings, including license revocation proceedings. The preponderance of the evidence standard applies "unless the substantive law provides a different burden or standard." Minn. R. 1400.7300, subp. 5 (2005). Minnesota statutory law does not provide a different standard for respondent's discipline of medical doctors. Minn.Stat. § 147.091 (2006).
Furthermore, to date, Minnesota case law has not addressed the specific question of the correct standard to be applied in temporary suspensions of physician licenses pending contested case hearings. Minnesota law, however, does not support the higher clear and convincing evidence standard at this stage of the disciplinary hearings, as Minnesota has rejected application of the higher clear and convincing evidence standard at the contested case hearings for both dentists and physicians. In re Wang, 441 N.W.2d 488, 489 (Minn. 1989) (); In re Friedenson, 574 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn.App.1998) (), review denied (Minn. Apr. 30, 1998).2
Appellant contends that both his property and liberty interests were significantly impacted by respondent's decision to temporarily suspend his medical license and that application of the three-part Mathews test mandates use of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in temporary suspension proceedings. We conclude there is no legal basis to support appellant's argument because the Mathews factors do not weigh in appellant's favor, particularly at this stage of the disciplinary proceedings.
With regard to the private interest affected, we recognize that appellant has a significant interest in his medical license and that depriving appellant of such license may result in a monetary loss as well as a loss of professional reputation. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Wang the seriousness of "attacking a person's professional and personal reputation and character and seeking to impose disciplinary sanctions," stating that "in all professional disciplinary matters, the finder of fact, bearing in mind the gravity of the decision to be made, will be persuaded only by...
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