Uhlman v. Panares

• Decision Date: 30 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 45A05-0812-CV-698.,45A05-0812-CV-698.
• Citation: 908 N.E.2d 650
• Parties: Helene C. UHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Rodrigo R. PANARES, M.D., Individually and in his capacity as Health Officer, and the Hammond Health Department Board of the City of Hammond, Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

908 N.E.2d 650

Helene C. UHLMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Rodrigo R. PANARES, M.D., Individually and in his capacity as Health Officer, and the Hammond Health Department Board of the City of Hammond, Indiana, Appellees-Defendants.

No. 45A05-0812-CV-698.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 30, 2009.

Jeffrey F. Gunning, Pinkerton and Friedman, P.C., Munster, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Paul A. Rake, John M. McCrum, Michael D. Karras, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Helene C. Uhlman appeals from partial summary judgment in favor of Rodrigo R. Pan ares, M.D., individually and in his capacity as Health Officer; the Hammond Health Department ("the Department"); the Hammond Board of Health ("the Board"); and the City of Hammond, Indiana,¹ (collectively "Defendants") on Uhlman's complaint filed under the Open Door Law alleging, in relevant part, wrongful termination. Uhlman presents the following issues for review:²

1. Whether Uhlman was an at-will employee as Administrator of the Hammond Health Department.

2. Whether Dr. Pan ares, as Health Officer of the Hammond Health Department, had authority to terminate Uhlman's employment without the approval of the Hammond Board of Health.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY³

In July 2004, the Hammond Board of Health appointed Dr. Pan ares to be the Health Officer of the Hammond Health Department. At that time, Uhlman was serving as Administrator of the Department, having been employed or appointed by the Board to that position approximately twelve years earlier. On October 4, 2005, Dr. Pan ares sent a letter as Health Officer, asking Uhlman to resign her position, but Uhlman refused. On October 13, Dr. Pan ares sent a second letter to Uhlman, advising her that she was "terminated immediately." Appellant's App. at 46. Uhlman ignored that letter and continued in her position as Administrator of the Department.

On March 2, 2006, Dr. Pan ares sent Uhlman a letter stating that, "[d]ue to budgetary restraints and departmental reorganization the position of Health Department Administrator will be eliminated. . . . Please accept this as notice of your termination as of this date." Appellant's App. at 30 (emphasis in original). On March 30, a majority of the Board members signed a letter to corporation counsel for the City of Hammond, stating:

Please be advised that the Hammond Board of Health affirms that Dr. Rodrigo R. Pan ares, M.D.[,] is the duly appointed Health Officer of the Hammond Health Department and is, in fact, the Health Officer-Administrator of the Health Department.

We concur with his decision to reorganize the Health Department including the termination of Helene Uhlman as Administrator.

Appellant's App. at 60. At a meeting of the Board on April 12, Dr. Pan ares "offered" that letter, which was "entered into the record and approved by the Health Board." Id. at 59.

On April 5, 2006, Uhlman filed her Complaint on Open Door Law Violation, alleging in relevant part as follows:

2. Until March 2, 2006, [Uhlman] was the Health Department Administrator of the Hammond Health Department of the City of Hammond, Indiana [sic].

* * *

4. Pursuant to law, the Health Board is responsible for the Department's budget, appropriations, salaries, expenses, Department Management and organization, offices and facilities pursuant to [Indiana] Code [Chapters] 26-20-l[,] 16-20-2 and [ ]16-20-4 and the Board must confirm employment and appointments in hiring and firing generally (pursuant to I.C. 16-20-1-14) and specifically the position held by [Uhlman] (see I.C. 16-20-4-23).

5. On March 2, 2006, [Uhlman] was informed that the Board approved an Amendment to the 2006 budget, a departmental reorganization and terminated her employment as shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit "B". . . .

6. . . . Dr. Pan ares acted in a manner in which he is not authorized by law to act without Board consent and did so willfully, knowingly, recklessly, and in a malicious manner exceeding the authority granted his position by law.

* * *

8. On information and belief, [Uhlman] alleges that the Board which made these decisions may not be the true or duly constituted and lawful Board of the Health Department of the City of Hammond, Indiana and these acts are ultra vires.

9. On information and belief, [Uhlman] alleges that Dr. Pan ares may not be the duly appointed, acting, authorized or legitimate Health Officer of the City Health Department and his acts are ultra vires.

* * *

WHEREFORE, [Uhlman] prays that the Court find for [her] and against the Defendant[s] in the following particulars:

A. . . . to void the termination of [Uhlman's] employment as the Administration of the Hammond Health Department;

B. to reinstate [Uhlman's] employment as the legitimate Administrator of the Hammond Health Department and award damages as appropriate. . . .

Id. at 26-28.⁴

On June 2, 2006, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment

on the ground[ ] that there [was] no genuine issue of material fact that [Uhlman], an at-will employee of the Hammond Health Department, was terminated properly by the defendant, Rodrigo R. Pan ares, M.D., in his capacity as health officer and executive officer of the Hammond Health Department, without the necessity of a board meeting[.]

Id. at 33. Following several continuances of a hearing set for the motion, on October 20, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants as follows:⁵

After review of the Memoranda, supporting documentation, statutory and case law, the Court now Grants the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding [Uhlman's] claim that she was improperly fired as Health Administrator. The Court finds she was an at[-]will employee[ ] and subject to being terminated at any time by Dr. Pan ares[,] and his decision on her termination was not subject to the Health Board's confirmation. (Even though they did in fact confirm said termination). [sic]

Id. at 23.

On July 2, 2008, Defendants filed a motion for entry of a final and appealable order as to the Order granting partial summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion on July 3, 2008.⁶ On August 4, Uhlman filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. Uhlman now appeals the entry of partial summary judgment.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

When reviewing summary judgment, this court views the same matters and issues that were before the trial court and follows the same process. Estate of Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Muncie Med. Investors, L.P., 727 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind.Ct. App.2000), trans. denied. We construe all facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in favor of the non-moving party. Jesse v. Am. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co., 725 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate when the designated evidence demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no material factual dispute and which can be resolved as a matter of law. Zawistoski v. Gene B. Glick Co., 727 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

Issue One: At-Will Employee

Uhlman contends that a question of material fact exists as to whether she was an at-will employee as Administrator of the Health Department.⁷ Indiana law provides that if there is no definite or ascertainable term of employment, then the employment is at-will, and is presumptively terminable at any time, with or without cause. Coutee v. Lafayette Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 792 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citing Markley Enters. v. Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 564 (Ind.Ct. App.1999), trans. denied). Our Supreme Court has recognized only three exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Of relevance, if an employee establishes that "adequate independent consideration" supports the employment contract, then the parties are considered to have intended to establish a relationship in which the employer may terminate the employee only for good cause. Id. (citing Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Ind.1997)).⁸ An employee handbook bearing or accompanied by disclaimers that the handbook is not a contract, generally, as a matter of law, does not create a unilateral contract, particularly when the employee has signed the disclaimers. Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 721. Whether employment is at-will is a determination of law for the court. Bee Window, Inc. v. Turman, 716 N.E.2d 498, 500 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Eck & Assoc. v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.

Uhlman's argument regarding the nature of her employment is difficult to discern from her Appellant's Brief. She refers to Defendants' reliance on Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712 (Ind.1997), and appears to argue that that case applies only in the private sector:

Finally, [Defendants'] Reply Memo submitted to the trial court highlights Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712 (Ind.1997)[,] and states that Orr makes it clear that written employment policies and employee hand books [sic] do not constitute unilateral contracts which subplant [sic] the at-will doctrine. Yet Uhlman never had a hearing to respond that Orr involved a private sector employee-employer relationship and involved an employee handbook.

Appellant's Brief at 8-9 (citation omitted). In her reply brief, she clarifies that "she was not an at[-]will employee and was exempted by the Board of Health by the custom and practice and by the Personnel Policies." Reply Brief at 11. We cannot agree with Uhlman's contentions.

In Orr, our Supreme Court maintained the necessity of independent consideration from the employee in exchange for the employment contract: "We...