Ulibarri v. Jesionowski
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38029 |
| Parties | FELIBERTO ULIBARRI, in his capacity as Trustee of the FELIBERTO AND DOMITILIA ULIBARRI REVOCABLE TRUST, and RONALD ULIBARRI, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. JEFFERY JESIONOWSKI, YOLANDA M. CANO f/k/a YOLANDA M. MONTANO; KATHERINE LECKRONE; ELENA LAVICTOIRE; TONY ESQUIBEL; CATHERINE ESQUIBEL; CHRISTINA ESQUIBEL; and PAUL ESQUIBEL, Defendants-Appellees, and SJS INVESTMENTS, LLC, a New Mexico limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
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APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RIO ARRIBA COUNTY David K Thomson, District Judge.
Sommer, Udall, Hardwick & Jones, P.A. Jack N. Hardwick Santa Fe, NM for Appellants.
Moses Dunn, Farmer & Tuthill, P.C. Joseph L. Werntz Albuquerque, NM for Appellee SJS Investment, LLC.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, JUDGE, retired, sitting by designation.
{¶1} This case presents vexing, but not unusual, issues arising from a dispute between neighboring landowners in rural northern New Mexico. Plaintiffs below (the Ulibarris) claimed that they had easements rights to cross Defendants SJS Investments, LLC's (SJS) property over four dirt trails described as "Roads."[1] The district court tried the matter in a bifurcated proceeding. A jury found that the Ulibarris have prescriptive easements over the four Roads. After the jury trial, the district court held a bench trial to determine the scope of use allowable under the easements. The district court's final judgment adopted the jury verdict as its own regarding the existence of prescriptive easements over the four Roads, described limits on the Ulibarris' use of the Roads, and concluded that, in addition to the prescriptive rights found by the jury, the Ulibarris have easements by estoppel over Roads 1 and 2, and easements by necessity over Roads 3 and 4.
{¶2} The Ulibarris appeal, challenging the limits placed on their use of Road 2. SJS cross-appeals, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support finding a prescriptive easement as to Road 1; (2) the district court erred in refusing a jury instruction explaining implied permission in the context of easement law; (3) the district court erred as a matter of law in finding an easement by estoppel as to Roads 1 and 2; and (4) the district court erred in finding prescriptive easements as to Roads 3 and 4. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Procedural Background
Parties and Property Ownership
{¶3} The Ulibarris include Feliberto and Domitilia Ulibarri, their sons Ronald and Teodoro, and the Feliberto and Domitilia Revocable Trust (the Trust). Between them in various combinations, the Ulibarris own the Ranch headquarters and the Winter Pasture depicted on Appendix A. The Ranch Headquarters-owned by the Ulibarri family since the "late 1800s"-is currently owned by the Trust. The Trust also shares ownership of the southern half of the Winter Pasture with Ronald and Teodoro. Feliberto and Domitilia own the northern half of the Winter Pasture.
{¶4} SJS is a New Mexico limited liability company. SJS is the only one of the defendants below actively participating in this appeal. SJS purchased the land located between the Ranch Headquarters and the Winter Pasture (the Roybal Property) in August 2013. SJS also entered into a real estate contract to purchase the Leckrone-LaVictoire property in 2013.
{¶5}Yolanda Cano was named as a defendant below because Road 3 crosses her property at its intersection with U.S. Highway 84. Cano is not participating in this appeal, but it is necessary to include information about her property in order to discuss the merits of the easement by necessity issue raised by SJS.
{¶6} The properties involved in this case were at one time owned by the United States and passed into private ownership by patent at various times starting in 1891. All of the patents were issued pursuant to the Homestead Act. See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 177 (1926)) (allowing a homesteader to purchase up to 160 acres of cultivated public lands for a minimal price). A summary of the alienation history of the properties is attached to this opinion as Appendix B. Translated to a narrative format, it reveals the following history.
{¶7} Private ownership of the northern half of the Winter Pasture originated with a patent from the United States to Juan A. Ulibarri in 1939. Feliberto's mother-Juan's widow-deeded the property to him in 1958. Private ownership of the southern half of the Winter Pasture originated with a patent from the United States to Medardo Sanchez in 1962. Mr. Sanchez's son conveyed the property to Feliberto, Ronald, and Teodoro in 2006. {¶8} Private ownership of the Roybal Property originated with three separate patents issued by the United States: the first issued in 1907 to Epifanio Miera, the second issued to Stan Roybal in 1960, and the third issued to Stan Roybal in 1962.
{¶9} Private ownership of the Leckrone-LaVictoire property derived from a patent issued by the United States in 1921. Private ownership of the Cano property derived from a patent issued in 1891.
Litigation Proceedings
{¶10} The Ulibarris filed their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, quiet title, and damages less than a year after SJS purchased the Roybal and Leckrone-LaVictoire properties. The complaint alleged that since the 1930s, the Ulibarris have operated a cattle business on the Ranch Headquarters, the Winter Pasture, and on public lands located to the east of their deeded properties, using the Roads to move cattle and equipment as needed to maintain and develop the business. The complaint asserted that their use of the Roads was "adverse, open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted . . . with the knowledge or imputed knowledge of the owners of the property," and that no one other than SJS and its managing member "ever interfered with, or threatened to interfere with," the Ulibarris' use of the Roads. And the complaint alleged that SJS had locked the gates on Roads 1, 2, and 4 and had "threatened to prevent the Ulibarris from using Roads 1, 2, 3, and 4, in the manner in which [they] have historically used those roads." The complaint asked for entry of a declaratory judgment that the Ulibarris have "easements by prescription, estoppel, implication, and necessity to use" the Roads. The complaint also requested injunctive relief, quiet title, and damages for trespass and interference.
{¶11} Nine days after the complaint was filed, the Ulibarris filed a motion for preliminary injunction prohibiting SJS and the other defendants from interfering with the Ulibarris' access to and use of Roads 3 and 4. The motion was assertedly prompted by the placement of a lock on the gate leading to Road 3 at its juncture with U.S. Highway 84. SJS and Cano filed their own motion for preliminary injunction, asking the district court to order the Ulibarris to stop cutting the locks on the gates to Roads 3 and 4. Following limited discovery, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the Ulibarris' motion and, in October 2014 entered an order granting their motion for preliminary injunction and denying SJS's and Cano's motions. That order appears to have remained in place through the end of the proceedings in the district court.
{¶12} Litigation in the district court thereafter followed what can be described as the normal course, with the exchange of discovery and battling motions for summary disposition of various aspects of the case. The district court appears to have denied all of the dispositive motions, and thus they do not merit attention here.[2]
{¶13} SJS's motion requesting that the district court conduct a bench trial before submitting any issues to a jury does merit attention because the decision to conduct the jury trial first affected the course of the litigation thereafter, including the district court's final judgment. The case was first set for trial by jury in a scheduling order entered in December 2014. That setting was confirmed in an order entered in May 2015. In November 2015, SJS filed its motion asking the district court to hold a bench trial first, arguing that the Ulibarris' claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and quiet title were all equitable claims with no right to a trial by jury. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the underlying issue as to whether an easement exists presents factual and legal questions most appropriately decided by a jury in the first instance. See Blea v. Fields, 2005-NMSC-029, ¶ 5, 138 N.M. 348, 120 P.3d 430. The district court indicated that, once the jury ruled, it would hold a bench trial "regarding relief relating" to the easements.
{¶14} The pleadings filed leading up to the jury trial reflect the district court's order. The pretrial order included mention of the Ulibarris' claim to easements by prescription, estoppel, and necessity in its claims of the parties section. And, the contested issues of fact section alluded to factual questions relevant to the same three varieties of easement. In addition, the parties' trial memorandums included their legal arguments as to each of the types of easement. Further, the parties' requested jury instructions included language about each of the three types of easements.
{¶15} Notably, the instructions given to the jury contained no reference to the claims for easement by estoppel or necessity. The two issues were nonetheless...
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