Ulman v. Boulevard Enterprises, Inc., Civ. No. K-86-644.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
• Writing for the Court: FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior
• Citation: 638 F. Supp. 813
• Docket Number: Civ. No. K-86-644.
• Decision Date: 20 June 1986
• Parties: Joseph ULMAN v. BOULEVARD ENTERPRISES, INC. a/k/a Car Wash City.

638 F. Supp. 813

Joseph ULMAN
v.
BOULEVARD ENTERPRISES, INC. a/k/a Car Wash City.

Civ. No. K-86-644.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

June 20, 1986.

638 F. Supp. 814

Michael H. Simons and Wartzman, Rombro, Omansky, Blibaum & Simons, P.A., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

John F. Wiley, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Joseph Ulman, a citizen of the State of Maryland, has instituted the within suit alleging that on November 3, 1984, he, as a pedestrian, was injured in Richmond, Virginia when he was negligently struck by an automobile operated by one of defendant's employees. Plaintiff seemingly asserts subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, against the single defendant, which is alleged to be "a corporation duly organized and existing under any (sic)¹ by virtue of the laws of Virginia."² Defendant has moved to dismiss,³ alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and venue and, in the alternative, seeking transfer "to the applicable United States District Court for the District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)."⁴ Attached to defendant's motion to dismiss is an affidavit of the president of the corporate defendant stating that defendant is incorporated under the laws of Virginia, operates a single place of business at a named address in Richmond, Virginia, and has no other office or place of business other than the named location in Richmond, Virginia. In response to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff, while contending that both personal jurisdiction and venue are present, seeks, in the alternative, transfer to the "Federal District Court for the District of Virginia."⁵

638 F. Supp. 815

Plaintiff apparently bases its contention concerning the presence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant upon Maryland's long arm statute, Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 6-103(b)(4) (1984 Repl.Vol.), which extends long arm coverage when tortious injury occurs outside the State of Maryland if the defendant "regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State." In the aforementioned affidavit filed by defendant in support of its motion to dismiss, the president of defendant corporation has stated that defendant "does not do any business in Maryland, does not solicit any business in the State of Maryland, does not own or lease any property in the State of Maryland, does not conduct any advertising in the State of Maryland and maintains no bank accounts in the State of Maryland."⁶ Those factual assertions are not controverted by plaintiff. Accordingly, Maryland's long arm statute is not applicable herein and personal jurisdiction over the defendant is absent.

Venue is, however, not so absent since plaintiff is a citizen of Maryland. With regard to defendant, as Judge Pollak has written in Strick Corp. v. A.J.F. Warehouse Distributors, Inc.,

contrary to defendant's contention, in cases based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is available either in the district where "all plaintiffs reside" or where "all defendants reside" or where "the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). In such cases, section 1391(c) does not impose venue requirements more restrictive than the

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