Ulrich v. City of St. Louis

Citation20 S.W. 466,112 Mo. 138
PartiesULRICH v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al.
Decision Date14 November 1892
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

imposed for violating one of defendant's ordinances, (St. Louis City Charter, art. 3, § 26, par. 10,) and that while at work he was kicked by a mule which the superintendent of the workhouse had ordered him to harness, whereby he received the injuries complained of. Held, that defendant was not liable for such injuries, though the superintendent knew that the mule was vicious, since defendant, in maintaining the workhouse and committing offenders in satisfaction of fines imposed, was exercising its governmental functions. Black, J., dissenting.

In banc. Error to St. Louis circuit court.

Action for damages by Adolph C. Ulrich against the city of St. Louis and others. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

C. P. & J. D. Johnson and J. S. Laurie, for plaintiff in error. W. C. Marshall, for defendants in error.

THOMAS, J.

SHERWOOD, C. J., made a statement and delivered the opinion of division No. 1 of this court in this case, as follows:

"Action for damages for injuries received by plaintiff while he was imprisoned and employed in the workhouse, in satisfaction of a fine imposed for the infraction of a city ordinance. The petition is as follows: `Plaintiff states that the city of St. Louis, defendant herein, is, and was at the dates hereinafter mentioned, a municipal corporation; that on the day of ___ plaintiff was arraigned before the police court of the city for breach of city ordinance, and fined in the sum of $___; that in pursuance of said judgment and fine, and in order to collect and realize the amount thereof by his services and labor in behalf of the city, said city, by its agents, thereupon at once delivered and committed plaintiff to its workhouse, an establishment which it was authorized by law to maintain; that defendants Joseph Geller and John Bungertner were superintendents of said workhouse, and were the agents or employes of said city; that by the terms of his sentence plaintiff was required to serve the city 45 days in said workhouse, and to do and perform such service and labor as was required of him; that, while so confined and employed, he was ordered and directed by defendants to hitch to a vehicle a certain pair of mules, and was required to obey, and, while attempting so to do, he was, without fault of his, violently kicked in the breast by one of said mules, whereby three of his ribs were broken, and he was occasioned great pain and anguish, and is disabled for life. Plaintiff states that said mule was of a vicious and dangerous disposition, wholly unfit for use, and unmanageable, so that it was dangerous to approach or attempt to handle the same; that said animal was owned by the city of St. Louis, and had for a long time been employed by it; and that said city, and its agents and superintendents likewise, well knew the dangerous character of said animal, as aforesaid, and that it was consequently unsafe to attempt to use it for any purpose. Plaintiff states that, by reason of the premises, he has sustained damages in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, for which he prays judgment and for costs.' The defendants demurred generally, and were successful in so doing, and, the plaintiff failing to plead further, final judgment was given on the demurrer, and plaintiff brings error.

"By paragraph 10, § 26, art. 3, of the charter of the city of St. Louis, the mayor and municipal assembly are given power `to impose, collect, and enforce fines, forfeitures, and penalties for the breach of any city ordinance. Any offender who shall neglect or refuse to pay any fine, penalty, and cost that may have been imposed upon him or her shall be committed to the workhouse, or, in case of women, in such place as for them may be provided, until such fine, penalty, and costs be fully paid: provided, that no such imprisonment shall exceed six months for any one offense. Every person so committed to the workhouse, or such other place, aforesaid, shall be required to work for the city at such labor as his or her health and strength will permit, within or without said workhouse or other place, not exceeding ten hours each working day; and for such work the person so employed shall be allowed, exclusive of his or her board, fifty cents per day for each day's work, on account of said fine and costs.' Under this charter provision of the defendant city, there can be no doubt of its power to enforce its ordinances by imprisonment, and this is true, notwithstanding that such ordinances are not strictly penal. Whenever the law confers a right or power, it gives the enforcement of that right or power as an incident; everything necessary to making that power or right effectual, or requisite to obtain the end, is implied. Parker v. Way, 15 N. H. 45; 1 Kent, Comm. 464; Moulton v. Reid, 54 Ala. 320; 9 Bac. Abr. 219, 220; People v. Eddy, 57 Barb. 593. The origin and reason of such power are given in a standard work on Municipal Corporations, the learned author expressing himself on this subject thus: `Since an ordinance or by-law without a penalty would be nugatory, municipal corporations have an implied power to provide for their enforcement by reasonable and proper fines against those who break them. So the right to make by-laws gives to the corporation, without any express grant of power, the incidental right to enforce them by reasonable pecuniary penalties. What is reasonable depends upon the nature of the offense and the circumstances.' Dill. Mun. Corp. § 338. `In this country it is not unusual to provide, in the organic act of municipal corporations, that, if fines for violation of by-law or ordinances are not paid, the offender may be committed to prison for a limited period; and in respect to some offenses, public in their character, the power to imprison in the first instance is often conferred,' etc. Id. § 353. The rule of law is well settled in this state that a municipal corporation is not answerable in damages for the negligent acts of its officers in the execution of such powers as are conferred on the corporation or its officers for the public good. Murtaugh v. City of St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479; Hannon v St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313; Armstrong v. City of Brunswick, 79 Mo. 319; Kiley v. City of Kansas, 87 Mo. 103; Carrington v. City of St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1 S. W. Rep. 240; Keating v. City of Kansas, 84 Mo. 415. See, also, section 965a, 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) The same author says: `The police regulations of a city are not made and enforced in the interest of the city in its corporate capacity, but in the interest of the public. A city is not liable, therefore, for the acts of its officers in attempting to enforce such regulations, (Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa, 687, 2 N. W. Rep. 614; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495; Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 559; Elliot v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. St. 347; McKay v. Buffalo, 74 N. Y. 619, carelessly wounding plaintiff,) nor will it be liable by ratifying torts of police officers.' Id. § 975, p. 1197, note 1. The city defendant, in conducting its workhouse, cannot be regarded as doing so as a means of profit or private municipal gain or revenue. It is obvious beyond question that the workhouse in this case was erected and...

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