Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 88-3905

Decision Date26 October 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-3905,88-3905
Citation884 F.2d 936
Parties132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 112 Lab.Cas. P 11,426, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1269 Harry ULRICH, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Sidney C. Foster, Jr. (argued), John W. Solomon, Brouse & McDowell, Akron, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees.

T. William Konstantacos, Edward C. Kaminski (argued), Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Akron, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.

Before MERRITT and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, and TODD, District Judge *.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

Defendant, the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., appeals the order of the District Court dismissing plaintiffs' breach of employment contract claims without prejudice. Goodyear asserts that the District Court erred in holding that plaintiffs' claims that Goodyear breached its employment contract did not depend upon the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") and were, therefore, not preempted by federal law. Rather than dismissing plaintiffs' claims without prejudice so that they could be refiled in state court, Goodyear asserts, the District Court should have dismissed the claims with prejudice. We conclude that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the CBA, but we remand the cause for further proceedings on certain claims not yet adjudicated.

I.

The plaintiffs are all ex-employees of the Motor Wheel Corp., a subsidiary of Goodyear. All were formerly bargaining unit employees who were transferred to jobs outside the bargaining unit. Plaintiffs were considered inactive members of the union and paid no dues while in these non-bargaining unit positions.

Goodyear entered negotiations to sell the Motor Wheel Corp. in October, 1986, to avoid a hostile takeover attempt. Plaintiffs attempted to preserve their positions with Goodyear by returning to the bargaining unit. They requested that Goodyear transfer them back to positions in the bargaining unit relying on the following provisions of the CBA:

If an employee in a supervisory or other position outside of the bargaining unit returns to a job within the bargaining unit as a result of a reduction in production requirements or job elimination he shall be credited with his total seniority and the privileges that accrue thereto. If he returns for reasons other than those stated above he will be restricted to his service in the bargaining unit for bargaining unit seniority purposes....

CBA, Art. X, Sec. 1(d)(3), Plaintiffs' Ex. 9, J.A. at 81-82.

Plaintiffs claim that under Art. X, Sec. 1(d)(3) of the CBA, it was common practice for employees to go back and forth from bargaining unit to salaried positions. Plaintiffs further claim that each only left the unit in reliance on verbal assurances by Goodyear representatives that they were free to return to bargaining unit positions at any time.

Goodyear did not act on these requests. Instead it did not allow the transfers so that the subsidiary could be sold intact. In response, plaintiffs filed a grievance with the union. The grievance alleged that Goodyear denied plaintiffs the right, granted by the CBA, to transfer back to the bargaining unit. The union refused to process the grievance, finding that plaintiffs were not bargaining unit employees and, therefore, not represented by the union. The union took this position in reliance on a prior arbitration award involving an allegedly similar situation at another Goodyear plant.

The sale was eventually completed. Upon completion, plaintiffs became employees of the new owner, not Goodyear. Most are still employed by the purchaser, although a few have been laid off and one has accepted a position with another employer.

Plaintiffs, twenty-six ex-Goodyear employees, filed a two count complaint alleging a Sec. 301 violation against the company and the union and a state breach of employment contract and promissory estoppel claim against the company.

At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendants moved the court for dismissal under Rule 41(b). The District Court granted the motion with respect to the Sec. 301 claim but declined to rule on the merits of the state claim, instead dismissing it without prejudice.

The District Court based its ruling on the Sec. 301 claim on two grounds: first, the union had no duty to represent the plaintiffs because they were not a part of the bargaining unit; second, even if the union did have a duty to represent the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of that duty because they made no showing of bad faith or intentional discrimination by the union.

On the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claim, the District Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims did not involve interpretation of the CBA. The CBA dealt with the computation of seniority if an employee returns from a salaried position to a bargaining unit position. The CBA did not create or grant the right to return to a bargaining unit position but left the employer free to exercise its discretion. Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, therefore, was not covered by the CBA and as such created not a federal cause of action but a state one, over which the Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction.

Goodyear moved to amend the District Court's judgment to indicate dismissal of the entire case on the ground of federal preemption. This motion was denied. Goodyear now appeals only the order of dismissal of the contract and...

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    ...the practices and customs of a work-place whose conditions are governed by a CBA." Jones, 939 F.2d at 383; Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 884 F.2d 936, 938 (6th Cir.1989); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352,......
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    ...agreement with the Ninth Circuit, as expressed in Maushund v. Earl C. Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 589 (6th Cir.1986); Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 884 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.1989); and Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir.1990). Defendant is correct that Maushund takes the posi......
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    • United States
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    ...upon the existence of a separate, individual employment contract giving rise to state law claims." (citing Ulrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 884 F.2d 936, 938 (6th Cir.1989))); see also Darden v. United States Steel Corp., 830 F.2d 1116, 1120 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that individual ora......
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