Ultimate Nutrition, Inc. v. Wacker Chemie AG
Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
Docket Number | Opposition 91252073 |
Court | Trademark Trial and Appeal Board |
Parties | Ultimate Nutrition, Inc. v. Wacker Chemie AG |
Before Bergsman, Lynch, and Coggins, Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This case comes before the Board for consideration of Opposer's motion for summary judgment on its sole claim of likelihood of confusion. The motion is contested.
Applicant seeks registration of the standard character mark FERMOPURE for the following goods:
Opposer filed a notice of opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Opposer pleaded ownership of Registration No. 2818237, issued February 24, 2004, for the standard character mark FERMAPURE for "nutritional products, namely dietary supplements" in International Class 5.[2] In its answer, Applicant denied the salient allegations in the notice of opposition.[3]
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating there is no genuine dispute of material fact remaining for trial and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The evidentiary record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy's, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
When a movant sufficiently demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of specific genuinely disputed facts that must be resolved at trial. Freki Corp. N.V. v. Pinnacle Entm't, Inc., 126 U.S.P.Q.2d 1697, 1700 (TTAB 2018); Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy L.P., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1537, 1540 (TTAB 2009). The non-movant may not rest on the mere allegations in its pleadings and arguments by its counsel, but must designate specific portions of the record or produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Freki Corp., 126 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1700. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine only if a reasonable fact finder viewing the entire record could resolve the disputed matter in favor of the non-movant. Olde Tyme Foods, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1544; Venture Out Props. LLC v Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1887, 1890-91 (TTAB 2007).
In support of its motion, Opposer submitted the following evidence through the declaration of its attorney, William C. Wright:
With its brief in opposition to the motion, Applicant submitted the following evidence:
To prevail on summary judgment, Opposer must establish that there is no genuine dispute that (1) it has standing to maintain this proceeding; (2) it owns a registration for, or is the prior user of, its pleaded mark; and (3) the contemporaneous use of the parties' respective marks on their respective goods would be likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or deceive consumers. See Hornblower & Weeks, Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1733, 1735 (TTAB 2001).
Standing is a threshold element that must be proven by the plaintiff in every inter partes case. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., Inc., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Trademark Rule 2.104(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.104(a). Opposer may establish its standing by properly making of record its pleaded registration, if it is the basis for a Section 2(d) claim that is not wholly without merit. Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 U.S.P.Q. 185, 189 (CCPA 1982); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1713, 1727-28 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In addition, where Opposer's pleaded registration is of record, and Applicant has not brought a counterclaim, priority is not at issue as to the mark and goods covered by Opposer's registration. King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 U.S.P.Q. 108, 110 (CCPA 1974); L'Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434, 1436 n.7 (TTAB 2012).
Opposer properly made of record its pleaded Registration No. 2818237 by submitting electronic database records of the Office showing the current status and title of that registration.[13] See Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1). Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Opposer's standing or priority.
Likelihood of confusion depends on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the thirteen factors set forth in In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (CCPA 1973) (the "DuPont factors").[14] See also Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In any likelihood of confusion...
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