Ulwick v. DeChristopher
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Writing for the Court | Before LIACOS; GREANEY; LYNCH |
Citation | 582 N.E.2d 954,411 Mass. 401 |
Parties | Wayne R. ULWICK v. Matthew DeCHRISTOPHER. |
Decision Date | 16 December 1991 |
Page 954
v.
Matthew DeCHRISTOPHER.
Middlesex.
Decided Dec. 16, 1991.
James N. Esdaile, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.
James J. Ronan, Boston, for defendant.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.
GREANEY, Justice.
This case raises the issue whether a social host may be held liable in tort for injuries caused to a third person by an intoxicated guest at the host's party where it appears that the host neither served nor provided liquor to [411 Mass. 402] the guest. A judge of the Superior Court concluded, as matter of law, that there was no liability on the part
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of the social host, the defendant, Matthew DeChristopher, and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 1 The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the judgment.The relevant facts established for summary judgment purposes by statements, affidavits, depositions and other materials in the record are as follows. In setting out the facts, we resolve any conflicts in the summary judgment materials, and we make all logically permissible inferences, in the plaintiff's favor. Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17, 445 N.E.2d 136 (1983).
In the early evening of September 26, 1986, Jeffrey Salvatore and two of his friends, all under the age of twenty-one, started drinking vodka at the Melrose home of one of the friends. Salvatore had at least one drink of vodka. The three traveled to a liquor store where they paid $5 to a passerby to purchase a bottle of vodka for their consumption. They then drove to a party at the home of the defendant (then age eighteen), who had informed some of his friends (although not Salvatore) that he planned to have a party that evening.
The party was by-and-large a "B.Y.O.B." ("Bring Your Own Booze") drinking party. It was not a dancing party, but hard rock music was playing in the background. The defendant was the sole host. His mother and stepfather were out of town, and no one else had been requested to supervise the defendant during his parents' absence. Many of the guests came to the party by automobile and parked their cars in the defendant's driveway and on the street in front of his home.
[411 Mass. 403] At least forty to fifty people attended the party, many of them underage students or recent graduates of Melrose High School. The guests drank and played drinking games in the defendant's living room. During the party the defendant left the door to his house open so that others could enter without having to knock or ring. According to an affidavit in the record: "The kids went to these private drinking parties to avoid the risk of being arrested by police for drinking in the park and the golf course. Private parties were a safe place to drink."
The defendant also made space available in his kitchen refrigerator for beer brought by his guests. The refrigerator contained juice for mixing drinks, including pineapple juice, trays of ice and purchased bags of ice. Bottles of rum and vodka stood on the kitchen counter. Glasses were available in the kitchen cabinets. By 9 P.M., there were empty bottles and beer cans scattered all over the kitchen and living room. According to one account, approximately one-third of the people who came to the party were intoxicated.
Salvatore brought his own vodka to the kitchen, mixed it with juice, and drank at least one glass of vodka, at the party. The defendant did not serve or provide any alcohol to Salvatore, and the parties stipulated, for purposes of the present summary judgment motion, "that the only alcohol ... Salvatore consumed [at] the [defendant's] home was alcohol that Salvatore, or others who were with him, brought to the home." Indeed, the liquor in the defendant's home was kept in a locked cabinet which was never unlocked during the evening.
The defendant circulated throughout the house during the party, beer in hand, socializing with his guests including Salvatore. He did not tell anyone to stop drinking. The defendant spoke briefly with Salvatore in the kitchen, while Salvatore was stirring a pitcher of vodka with a little pineapple juice. The two young men had gone to the same high school and knew of one another, but they were not friends.
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Salvatore was unsteady on his feet and visibly intoxicated, but the [411 Mass. 404] defendant said nothing to Salvatore about his drinking or his ability to drive.Salvatore stayed at the party for up to an hour and a half before leaving in his Chevrolet Camaro Iroc Z-28 automobile at about 10 P.M. Salvatore accelerated to over sixty miles per hour, crossed the center line, entered the oncoming lane, and hit the plaintiff, an on-duty police officer operating a police motorcycle in an area which was known for teenage drinking and driving. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered severe and permanent physical injuries.
1. The plaintiff claims that these circumstances impose a common law duty in negligence on the defendant for the protection of travelers on the highways. The question whether the defendant owed a duty to travelers who might be injured by the negligent driving of an intoxicated guest who had been at the defendant's party presents "a question of law [which is] to be determined by reference to existing social values and customs and appropriate social policy." Wallace v. Wilson, 411 Mass. 8, 12, 575 N.E.2d 1134 (1991), and cases cited. As both parties recognize, our decision in McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 496 N.E.2d 141 (1986), has direct relevance to whether a duty should be imposed in this case. We disagree with the plaintiff (as did the judge below) that McGuiggan provides a basis to establish such a duty.
In McGuiggan, adult hosts held a graduation party for their son. The hosts furnished alcoholic beverages which were both served directly to the guests and made available so guests could serve themselves. An eighteen year old male guest at the party became intoxicated, and, subsequently, as a result of his intoxication, negligently operated a car causing a death. 2 McGuiggan, supra at 153-155, 496 N.E.2d 141. We upheld the allowance of summary judgment for the hosts (on an issue not involved in this case), because there was no indication that the hosts knew the guest was intoxicated while at their [411 Mass. 405] home, or that he was intoxicated at any relevant time. Id. at 161-162, 496 N.E.2d 141.
In deciding McGuiggan, we took the opportunity to review and discuss the existing law elsewhere pertaining...
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Commerce Ins. v. Ultimate Livery Service, SJC-10149
...materials, and we make all logically permissible inferences, in favor of the plaintiffs in the tort actions. Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 402, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991). During the evening of August 11, 2001, Powers was part of a group of men who rented a vehicle from Ultimate for th......
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Jupin v. Kask
...is required to control the actual use of property that a third person has brought into the home. Contrast Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 406, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991) ("The ability effectively to control a guest's excessive drinking is not present when the liquor belongs to the guest"......
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Juliano v. Simpson , SJC–10843.
...to support a claim of tort liability. See, e.g., Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 295, 612 N.E.2d 1183 (1993); Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 408, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991). Because a violation of G.L. c. 138, § 34, would not itself establish that Jessica committed a breach of a duty ......
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Taupier v. Davol, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-10184-KAR
...Inc. , 889 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd, 740 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2014) (footnote omitted) (citing Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 582 N.E.2d 954, 958 (1991) ; Beaver v. Costin, 352 Mass. 624, 227 N.E.2d 344, 345-46 (1967) ; Scott v. Thompson, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 372, 363 N.E......
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Juliano v. Simpson , SJC–10843.
...to support a claim of tort liability. See, e.g., Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 295, 612 N.E.2d 1183 (1993); Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 408, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991). Because a violation of G.L. c. 138, § 34, would not itself establish that Jessica committed a breach of a duty ......
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Taupier v. Davol, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-10184-KAR
...Inc. , 889 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd, 740 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2014) (footnote omitted) (citing Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 582 N.E.2d 954, 958 (1991) ; Beaver v. Costin, 352 Mass. 624, 227 N.E.2d 344, 345-46 (1967) ; Scott v. Thompson, 5 Mass.App.Ct. 372, 363 N.E......
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Commerce Ins. v. Ultimate Livery Service, SJC-10149
...materials, and we make all logically permissible inferences, in favor of the plaintiffs in the tort actions. Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 402, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991). During the evening of August 11, 2001, Powers was part of a group of men who rented a vehicle from Ultimate for th......
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Jupin v. Kask
...is required to control the actual use of property that a third person has brought into the home. Contrast Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 406, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991) ("The ability effectively to control a guest's excessive drinking is not present when the liquor belongs to the guest"......