Ulysse v. Stokes

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 1:19-cv-01465 (CJN)
• Parties: HUGUETTE ULYSSE, Plaintiff, v. METRO TRANSIT POLICE OFFICER DERRICK STOKES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

HUGUETTE ULYSSE, Plaintiff,
v.
METRO TRANSIT POLICE OFFICER DERRICK STOKES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01465 (CJN)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARL J. NICHOLS, United States District Judge

On the morning of May 21, 2018, Huguette Ulysse boarded the Metrorail at the Greenbelt Station and rode it to Fort Totten. When Ulysse exited the station, Washington Metropolitan Transit Officer Derrick Stokes believed he observed Ulysse evade her transit fee by engaging in so-called “piggy-backing.” Officer Stokes's attempt to talk to and then arrest Ulysse escalated into a physical altercation. Video cameras captured much of what unfolded, including a second Officer, Nadim Al-Hinawi, responding to the scene and numerous onlookers crowding around. Ulysse alleges that both Officers violated her federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed various torts under District law. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1. The Officers have moved for summary judgment on all claims. See generally Defs.' s Motion for Summ. J. (“Defs.' s Mot.”), ECF No. 32-1. The Court grants the Officers' Motion in part and denies it in part for reasons that follow.

I. Background

On the morning of May 21, 2018, Ulysse boarded a Metro railcar at the Greenbelt Station wearing “a tube top secured by a tight elastic band around the top.” See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 15. She

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rode the rail to the Fort Totten Metro Stop. Id. ¶ 6. Upon exiting the railcar, Ulysse headed for the lone operative turnstile to make her way out of the station. Id. ¶ 10.

Stokes was on patrol at Fort Totten that morning. See Defs.'s Statement of Material Facts (“Defs.'s SMF”), ECF No. 32-3 at 2. Stokes is a fourteen-year veteran of the Washington Metropolitan Transit Police Department and has experience with fare evaders. Id. Stokes claims that he watched Ulysse engage in so-called “piggy-backing, ” which occurs when someone avoids paying the transit fee by trailing close behind an individual who has swiped her transit card, enabling both riders to exit the fare gates on “one cycle.” Id.

Believing that he observed Ulysse piggy-back her way through the only working turnstile that morning, Stokes walked toward her and attempted to get her attention. Id. at 3. According to Ulysse, she could not hear Stokes because she had headphones on. Compl. ¶ 13. Stokes also asked to see Ulysse's SmarTrip card to verify that she had paid her fare. Defs.'s SMF at 4. Stokes asserts that Ulysse glanced his way, dismissed his verbal command, ignored his raised right arm, and continued to proceed toward the exits. Id. This initial interaction was captured on station surveillance cameras, but without audio.

Disagreement abounds over what happened next even though video footage captures much of what unfolded. In Ulysse's view, Stokes “grabbed her and forced her to the ground” within seconds of demanding her SmarTrip card. Compl. ¶ 14. Stokes, by contrast, claims that Ulysse “forcefully pulled against his grasp of her arm, ” which caused him to become “off-balance” leading both to fall to the ground. Defs.'s SMF at 5.

Ulysse alleges that, once on the ground, Stokes knelt on her person, twisted her hands behind her back, pushed down on her shoulder, and pinned her to the concrete. Compl. ¶ 14. She also contends that Stokes “restrained her in such a way that made her [tube top] come off, ”

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exposing her breasts to onlookers. Id. ¶ 15. The experience of having her breasts exposed and pressed against the concrete left her humiliated. Id. ¶ 17. Under Stokes's version of events, he informed Ulysse that she was under arrest; she nevertheless resisted his command. Defs.'s SMF at 6. He also posits that any exposure of her breasts resulted from Ulysse's decision to resist arrest and her tube top inadvertently sliding down her torso. Id.

Bystanders observed the incident. According to Ulysse's account, onlookers pleaded with Stokes to calm down and to let Ulysse cover her exposed breasts. Compl. ¶ 18. Stokes perceived the situation differently, claiming that he heard “multiple people cursing, ” and that one person wearing a white T-shirt stood over him yelling at him in a threatening tone. Defs.'s SMF at 6. Stokes states that he feared for his own safety because of the hostile crowd, and for that reason he unholstered his taser. Id. at 7.

Ulysse claims that because she was pinned to the ground “she could not determine from her position on the ground whether it was a taser or a gun.” Compl. ¶ 19. She also asserts that for the remainder of the time she laid prone on the concrete, “Officer Stokes kept the taser in his hand, poised above Ulysse or aimed at bystanders. Id. From the time Stokes drew the taser and throughout the interaction, Ulysse feared for her life. Id. Stokes, by contrast, claims that he kept the taser at “low ready, ” never pointed it at Ulysse, and monitored what he considered a hostile crowd until support arrived. Defs.'s SMF at 7.

Officer Nadim Al-Hinawi is also a seasoned veteran of the Washington Metropolitan Transit Police Department. He arrived on the scene while Stokes was in the process of subduing Ulysse. Compl. ¶ 22. Al-Hinawi knelt next to Stokes to assist with placing Ulysse under arrest. Id. ¶ 21. Ulysse claims that Al-Hinawi threatened her, “telling her that he had a gun and would shoot her if she said or ‘tried' anything.” Id. ¶ 22. Ulysse also asserts that Al-Hinawi twisted her

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arm behind her back until she cried out in pain, id. ¶ 24, and Hinawi proceeded to handcuff her, applying the cuffs so tightly that she suffered bruises and abrasions. Id. ¶ 25. Al-Hinawi disputes that he ever threatened Ulysse, and he claims that he applied a reasonable amount of force. Defs.' s SMF at 9.

Once the Officers had Ulysse subdued, a female placed a shirt over Ulysse's exposed breasts. Id. at 10. The police proceeded to escort Ulysse to Providence Hospital to receive treatment for her injuries. Compl. ¶ 31. A doctor diagnosed Ulysse with muscle strain in her torso and shoulder, abrasions on her wrists, and prescribed her a muscle relaxant. Id. ¶ 32.

Ulysse raises a number of claims against both Officers for subjecting her to excessive force, exposing her breasts to the public, threatening her with a taser, and arresting her without probable cause. Id. ¶ 1. In particular, she seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under District law for assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. Id.

II. The Summary Judgment Standard

A court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A “genuine” dispute about a material fact does not exist unless “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). If the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Though the Court “may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment, ” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656

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(2014) (citation omitted), the nonmoving party must show more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of its position, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the nonmoving party].” Id.

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Yet “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). And when the “nonmovant's account of the facts is ‘utterly discredited' by the clear evidence provided by a videorecording, the Court has instructed . . . not to rely on a ‘visible fiction but rather ‘view [ ] the facts in the light depicted by' the video record.” Lash v. Lemke, 786 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81). In other words, when videotape footage exists, the reviewing court need not credit the version of a party who asserts facts contradicted by the videotape; rather it should view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape while taking into consideration the reality that “even a video can give a distorted view of a disputed scene.” Smith v. United States, 843 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

III. Unlawful Arrest Claims

In Count One, Ulysse claims that the Officers violated her federal right to be free from unreasonable seizures when they arrested her without probable cause. See Compl. ¶¶ 40-43.

Under the Fourth Amendment, the people are “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person acting under color

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of state law for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] An arrest made “without probable cause violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Generally speaking,...