Umbarger v. Watts

• Citation: 66 Va. 167
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Decision Date: 24 June 1874
• Parties: UMBARGER & wife & als. v. WATTS & als.

66 Va. 167

UMBARGER & wife & als. v. WATTS & als.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 24, 1874

1. A judgment creditor brings a suit in equity to subject his debtor's land to satisfy his judgment; and other judgment creditors of the same debtor come into the cause by their petitions, to subject the same land. None of these judgments amount to $500. Upon a decree against them, dismissing the bill, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to allow or hear an appeal from the decree, either on the ground that the united judgments amount to more than $500, or that the suit concerns the title or bounds of land.

2. In such case the decree is to be considered as several as to each creditor.

3. The matter in controversy, in reference to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, is that which is the essence and substance of the judgment, and by which the party may discharge himself.

This was a suit in equity, brought in February 1871, in the County court of Tazewell, against Sterling F. Watts and Jane M. his wife, and R. C. Fudge, her trustee, to subject the life estate of said Watts in certain lands mentioned in the bill to satisfy a judgment confessed in the clerk's office of said court by Watts at the suit of the plaintiffs, for $394 with interest from the 9th of January, 1871, till paid, and costs $6.03.

The defendants answered the bill, and insisted that the life interest of Watts in the land had been conveyed to the trustee for the benefit of Mrs. Watts, in consideration of several conveyances of her own land by Watts and herself to third parties, to enable him to pay his debts; and that this deed was executed, and, as they insisted, left with the clerk, to be recorded before the plaintiffs obtained their judgment.

In the progress of the cause, several judgment creditors of Watts filed their petitions in the cause, and asked to be permitted to come in and have their judgments satisfied out of the fund. These judgments were prior to the deed, but neither of them amounted, principal and interest, to $500.

When the cause came on to be heard in the County court, that court held that the life estate of Watts in the land was liable to the satisfaction of the judgments, and made a decree appointing special commissioners to sell the said life estate in the land. From this decree Mrs. Watts applied to the judge of the Circuit court of Tazewell county for an appeal, which was allowed. The cause came on to be heard in that court on the 11th of May, 1872, when the court held that the preë xisting equities of Mrs. Watts were superior to the lien claimed by Umbarger and wife; and that the deed should be considered as a recorded deed, and dismissed the bill with costs. And further held that the petitioning creditors having tacked their fate to the fate of the bill, their petitions must be dismissed, but without prejudice. And, thereupon Umbarger and wife, and two of the petitioning creditors obtained an appeal to this court.

After the appeal had been allowed and perfected, the appellees moved the court to dismiss it, on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction of the cause.

Richardson and J. W. & J. P. Sheffey, for the motion.

Crockett & Blair, against the motion.

OPINION

CHRISTIAN, J.

The first question we have to decide in this case is whether this court has jurisdiction.

The bill was filed in the County court of Tazewell by Umbarger and wife, for the purpose of subjecting the life estate of Sterling F. Watts in certain real estate to the lien of a judgment which had been confessed in their favor by him for the sum of $394, with interest from the 9th day of January 1871, and upon which an execution had been issued and returned " no property." During the progress of the cause, and before any decree was rendered, other judgment creditors of Watts filed their petition, in which they exhibit copies of judgments in favor of each of them, respectively, and assert their right to subject to the lien of their judgments whatever interest in real estate the said Watts may be entitled to. Neither of these claims amount to the sum of $500, the largest being below that sum.

The bill of Umbarger and wife is answered by Watts and wife and also by Fudge, trustee of Mrs. Watts, in which several answers it is claimed that before the recovery of the judgment by Umbarger and wife the land sought to be charged with the lien of their judgment had been, for a valuable and lawful consideration, conveyed to Fudge, trustee, for the sole use and benefit of Mrs. Watts; and that the deed conveying said land had been put upon record before the judgment in favor of Umbarger and wife was confessed by Watts.

Much evidence was taken as to the fact of the recordation of the deed, which it is not necessary here to notice. The County court rendered a decree declaring that " the land in the bill and proceedings mentioned were liable to the liens of the several judgments, inasmuch as the trust deed for the benefit of the female defendant was not admitted to record until after the rendition of said judgments." It was accordingly decreed that Sterling F. Watts pay to the several judgment creditors the amounts of their several judgments, and, in default thereof, commissioners appointed by the court were directed to sell the lands for that purpose.

From this decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit court of Tazewell county; which court reversed the decree of the County court, dismissed the bill of Umbarger and wife, and also dismissed the petition of the other judgment creditors, but without prejudice to the latter to institute new proceedings. From the decree of the Circuit court an appeal was allowed to this court.

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked upon two grounds: 1st. That, although no one of the several claims of the appellants amount to the sum of $500, yet the aggregate sum of all amount to more than that sum, and that having a joint interest in subjecting the land to the payment of their several judgments, the aggregate amount ought to be considered in this court as the amount in controversy.

2d. But if the aggregate amount is not to be considered the amount in controversy, but each claim is to be considered as several and independent, still this court may take jurisdiction, because the matters in controversy are concerning " the title or bounds of lands," which the constitution recognizes as a proper subject of jurisdiction.

As to the first proposition, it is clear that the claims of the appellants are several, and independent of each other. They are founded upon different contracts, upon judgments obtained at different times. The allowance or rejection of one in no manner affects the others. There is neither a joint interest nor a community of interests among them. All that can be said is, that they are pursuing the same debtor, and are seeking to subject the same property. Nor have they a common interest in that property. If the property they are seeking to subject to the liens of their several judgments was declared to be so liable, their interest would not be a common interest, but each independent of the other; for the proceeds would not be distributed pro rata, but according to the priorities of their several judgments. So that, in fact, their interests are diverse and antagonistic, instead of joint and common. They do not sue as co-plaintiffs, because they have a joint and common interest; but for convenience, and to save a multiplicity of suits, other creditors are permitted to come in by petition in a suit already commenced by one creditor. But though the proceeding by petition be in the same suit, these several demands are as distinct and independent of each other as if they were pursuing the same debtor in different and independent suits. The decree of the court is not joint, but several, decreeing the several amounts due to them respectively, according to their several judgments. If one of the creditors is aggrieved by the decree, it is to the extent that his claim is not paid, and not because other creditors are not paid: and if his claim be less than $500, he cannot successfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court by uniting his claim to that of another creditor, in order to swell the amount to $500. These positions are fully sustained by the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellees.

The case of Oliver v. Alexander, 6 Peters' R. 143, was a suit in which several seamen united, as was permitted by act of congress and practice in admiralty in a libel, seeking to subject a certain fund to the payment of their several demands. The sum decreed to the libellants in no case amounted to $2,000 (that being the amount which gives jurisdiction to the Supreme court of the United States), most of the claims being less than $500. It was held that the matter in controversy was several with each libellant; and that inasmuch as no one claim amounted to $2,000, though all combined exceeded that sum, the court had no jurisdiction.

Mr Justice Story delivering the opinion of the court says: " The decree assigns to each seaman severally the amount to which he is entitled, and dismisses the libel as to those who have maintained no right to the interposition of the court in their favor. The whole proceeding, therefore, though it assumes the form of a joint suit, is, in reality, a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by distinct parties, growing out of the same contract. * * * It is obvious that the claim of each seaman is distinct and several, and the decree upon each claim is distinct and several. One seaman cannot...