Umphress v. Hall

• Decision Date: 14 August 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00253-P
• Citation: 479 F.Supp.3d 344
• Parties: Brian Keith UMPHRESS, Plaintiff, v. David C. HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

479 F.Supp.3d 344

Brian Keith UMPHRESS, Plaintiff,

v.David C. HALL, in his official capacity as Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00253-P

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division.

Signed August 14, 2020

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, TX, Charles W. Fillmore, H. Dustin Fillmore, III, The Fillmore Law Firm LLP, Fort Worth, TX, David Lee Spiller, Mason Spiller, Reid Spiller, Spiller & Spiller, Jacksboro, TX, Michael Dan Berry, First Liberty Institute, Plano, TX, for Plaintiff.

John J. McKetta, III, Graves Dougherty Hearon & Moody, Austin, TX, David R. Schleicher, Schleicher Law Firm PLLC, Waco, TX, Roland K. Johnson, Harris Finley & Bogle, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Mark T. Pittman, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants David C. Hall, in his official capacity as Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct; Ronald E. Bunch, in his official capacity as Vice-Chair of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct; David M. Patronella; Darrick L. McGill; Sujeeth B. Draksharam; Ruben G. Reyes; Valerie Ertz; Frederick C. Tate; Steve Fischer; Janis Holt; M. Patrick Maguire; and David Schenck, each in their official capacities as Members of the State Commission ("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Based on Improper Venue ("Motion"). See ECF No. 7. Having reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff Brian Keith Umphress's Response (ECF No. 10), and Defendants’ Reply (ECF No. 11), the Court finds that the Motion should be and is hereby DENIED .

BACKGROUND

On November 12, 2019, the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct ("Commission") issued a public warning to Judge Dianne Hensley, a Justice of the Peace in McLennan County, Texas. Pl.’s First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-1. The Commission concluded that Hensley needed to be publicly warned that her decision not to officiate same-sex weddings on the basis of her conscience and religion while still officiating traditional weddings cast doubt on "her capacity to act impartially to all persons appearing before her as a judge due to the person's sexual orientation in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct."¹ Id. Hensley subsequently filed a lawsuit ("Hensley Lawsuit") against the Commission and its commissioners in the 170th District Court of McClennan County, Texas. Mt. to Dismiss or Transfer, Declaration of Jacqueline Habersham ("Habersham Decl.") at ¶ 3, ECF No. 7-1. Hensley's lawsuit remains pending. Id. at ¶ 6.

Plaintiff Brian Keith Umphress is currently a county judge in Jack County, Texas. FAC at 2. He asserts that he engages in numerous extrajudicial activities—namely, being a member and supporter of a Bible-believing church that "adheres to longstanding Christian teaching that marriage exists only between one man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct of any sort is immoral and contrary to Holy Scripture"—that expose Plaintiff to discipline under the Commission's interpretation of Canon 4A(1) as expressed in Hensley's case. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that although he does officiate traditional weddings, he refuses to officiate same-sex weddings on the basis of his Christian faith and his contention that same-sex marriage remains illegal under Texas law. Id. Plaintiff contends that because he is running for reelection in 2022 on the platform that Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) was wrongly decided, and because he intends to continue officiating traditional but not same-sex weddings, he is susceptible to discipline from the Commission. FAC at ¶ 26.

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on March 18, 2020.² ECF No. 1. He seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. FAC at ¶ 77. Specifically, Plaintiff wants the Court to enter a declaratory judgment that: (1) Obergefell and the United States Constitution do not require state-licensed officiants to perform same-sex ceremonies; (2) the First Amendment protects Plaintiff's right to engage in extrajudicial activities that disapprove of same-sex marriage and homosexual conduct; (3) Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, as currently interpreted by the Commission, is unconstitutionally vague; (4) the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Commission from investigating or disciplining a judge who refuses to officiate same-sex marriages on the basis of sincere religious belief; and (5) it is far from clear that the current Supreme Court would "endorse" Obergefell . Id. at ¶¶ 37, 44, 54, 63, 74, 77.

Defendants filed a 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss or Transfer this case to the Western District of Texas. MTD at 1, ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 10), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 11). The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for review.³

APPLICABLE LAW

"[I]t is little debated that a venue determination in a federal question case is properly a matter of federal law." Kipperman v. McCone , 422 F. Supp. 860, 877 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (citing Murphree v. Miss. Pub. Corp. , 149 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1945) ). The general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs "all civil actions brought in the district courts of the United States" unless "otherwise provided by law." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Section 1391 provides that an action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ...; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Id. § 1391(b).

A party moving to dismiss based on improper venue does so pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). In determining whether venue is proper, "the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and resolve all conflicts in favor of the plaintiff." Braspetro Oil Servs. v. Modec (USA), Inc. , 240 F. App'x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the Court may consider evidence in the record beyond the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, including affidavits or evidence submitted by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss, or by Plaintiff in response to the motion. Ginter ex rel. Ballard v. Belcher, Prendergast & Laporte , 536 F.3d 439, 449 (5th Cir. 2008). When it is determined a case is filed in a division or district of improper venue, the district court may either dismiss the case or transfer it to any district or division of proper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

Courts are divided on which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for improper venue on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, but district courts in the Fifth Circuit have often imposed the burden of proving that venue is proper on the plaintiff once a defendant has objected to the plaintiff's chosen forum. See e.g. , Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Plano Encryption Techns., LLC , 173 F. Supp. 3d 469, 473 & n.2 (W.D. Tex. 2016) ; Graham v. Dyncorp Intern., Inc. , 973 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (S.D. Tex. 2013) ; Asevedo v. NBC Universal Media, LLC , 921 F. Supp. 2d 573, 589 (E.D. La 2013) ; EnviroGLAS Products, Inc. v. EnviroGLAS Products, LLC , 705 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Fish, J.); ATEN Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Emine Techn. Co., Ltd. , 261 F.R.D. 112, 120 (E.D. Tex. 2009). The Court agrees with this line of cases placing the burden on the plaintiff "because ‘[t]o hold otherwise would circumvent the purpose of the venue statutes—it would give plaintiffs an improper incentive to attempt to initiate actions in a forum favorable to them but improper as to venue.’ " Seariver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena , 952 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting Delta Airlines, Inc. v. W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund , 722 F. Supp. 725, 727 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ).

ANALYSIS

A. Section 1391(b)(1) : The official-capacity Defendants’ personal "residence" does not determine venue in an official capacity suit.

Plaintiff first asserts that venue is proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1) because several of the Defendants reside in the Northern District. Resp. at 2–7.⁴ Attached to Plaintiff's Response is a stipulation in which several of the defendants confirm that they are personally domiciled in the Northern District of Texas. ECF No. 10-1. That is, Commissioners Ertz, Reyes, Schenck, and Tate affirm that they are "domiciled in the Northern District of Texas, which means that their personal (but not official) residences are located in the Northern District of Texas and they intend to continue living there." Id. The dispute is whether these Defendants as parties in their official capacities "reside" within the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(b)(1) provides that a civil action may be brought in "a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Section 1391(c) defines "residency" for all venue purposes, in part, as follows: "[A] natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled." Id. § 1391(c)(1). Plaintiff argues that Section 1391(c)(1) ’s definition of residency supports that state government officers fall within the definition of "natural person" regardless of whether they are parties in their individual or official capacities. Resp. at 3–4. Thus, Plaintiff contends that venue is proper here because several defendants personally reside in this district. Plaintiff relies primarily on a New Mexico District Court case, which held that for venue purposes federal...