Unan v. Lyon
| Decision Date | 11 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:14-cv-13470 |
| Parties | AELEN UNAN and PATRICIA QUINTINO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NICK LYON, in his official capacity as DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH and DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI
These matters are before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment and on Defendant's motion to strike. Plaintiffs Aelen Unan and Patricia Quintino seek an order of summary judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 70). Meanwhile, Defendant Nick Lyon, Director of the Michigan Department of Community Health and the Michigan Department of Human Services, seeks summary judgment and dismissal of the case. (Doc. 69). Additionally, he seeks to strike Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with the page limitation. (Doc. 73). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, DENIES Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and STRIKES Exhibit A from Plaintiffs' motion. As the Court's decision renders moot two additional motions that are currently pending, namely, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 3) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4), the Court DISMISSES these two motions.
Named plaintiffs Aelen Unan and Patricia Quintino are a lawfully immigrated refugee and a permanent resident alien, respectively. Both applied to receive Medicaid benefits in April and May of 2014, and both received Health Care Coverage Determination Notices approving them for Emergency Services Only ("ESO") but not for comprehensive Medicaid coverage. These notices did not explicitly state that comprehensive coverage had been denied, only that Plaintiffs were eligible for ESO benefits. ESO Medicaid does not provide coverage for general or preventative treatment such as checkups, physicals, and treatment for chronic conditions. Rather, it provides coverage only for emergency room treatment for life threatening conditions. Therefore, at least for a time, both Plaintiffs went without regular medical treatment. Plaintiffs allege that they were entitled to receive comprehensive Medicaid coverage, as individuals attesting on their applications to be "qualified aliens" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(b)(1) and 1641 are entitled to receive full Medicaid benefits for 90 days, pending verification of their immigration status. Accordingly, Ms. Unan and Ms. Quintino seek to represent a class of similarly situated individuals who were also erroneously denied comprehensive Medicaid benefits.
Defendant admits that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") caused defects in the computer system that processes Medicaid applications, potentially affecting tens of thousands of applications. It is undisputed that beginning in January 2014, many Medicaid applicants were erroneously assigned to or reverted to ESO Medicaid. By April 14, 2014, the Michigan Department of Human Services ("DHS") had identified the problem and had begun working on a solution. DHS invited the Center for Civil Justice ("CCJ"), Plaintiffs' counsel, to refer misassigned applications to them for correction on a case-by-case basis. For example, after the CCJ initiated the present suit on September 8, 2014, DHS restored Ms. Unan and Ms. Quintino to full Medicaid benefits. Individuals found to have been eligible were given full benefits, retroactive to their application dates. Additionally, over the remainder of 2014, DHS implemented a series of corrections to its system and ultimately re-processed thousands of individuals who had been assigned to ESO benefits since January. By the end of December 2014, DHS reports that it had reprocessed through the computer system over 16,400 cases, affecting 38,000 individuals, that had not already been reviewed and corrected manually. Presently, it is DHS's position that it has successfully eliminated any systemic misclassification problems, attributing any further errors to worker error. However, Plaintiffs insist that there continue to be systemic problems and that many Medicaid applicants erroneously assigned to ESO benefits remain unidentified.
As previously mentioned, on September 8, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a complaint (Doc. 1), as well as a Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 3) and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 4). The relief sought in the Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunctionprimarily requests: (i) declaratory judgment that Defendants have wrongfully denied comprehensive Medicaid; (ii) to enjoin Defendants from denying comprehensive Medicaid to the named Plaintiffs and to the putative class members; (iii) to enjoin Defendants from failing to identify individuals entitled to comprehensive benefits without following the appropriate administrative and federal procedures for processing applications; and (iv) to enjoin Defendants from assigning applicants to ESO Medicaid without adequate notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Summary judgment is appropriately rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The evidence and all reasonable inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Where the movant establishes the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden of demonstrating the existence of such an issue shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). That is, the party opposing amotion for summary judgment must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence and must "designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing 'evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Brown v. Scott, 329 F. Supp. 2d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 2004). In order to fulfill this burden, the non-moving party need only demonstrate the minimal standard that a jury could ostensibly find in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). However, mere allegations or denials in the non-movant's pleadings will not satisfy this burden, nor will a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 251.
Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because Plaintiffs included as Exhibit A a 16-page statement of uncontested facts. When combined with its 31-page brief, this document far exceeds the 35-page limit stipulated to by the parties. (See Doc. 71). By including a statement of facts as an exhibit, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs are essentially attempting to circumvent the page limit. Plaintiffs deny that Exhibit A was an attempt to circumvent the page limit and explain that it was merely intended as a convenient compilation of facts.
The body of Plaintiffs' brief contains a short factual statement, and the Court is very familiar with the facts of this case. Many of the uncontested facts contained in Exhibit A are reiterative of what is already contained in the Complaint and other documents before the Court. Therefore, although the Court declines to grantDefendant's motion by striking Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, Exhibit A is hereby stricken.
Defendant requests that pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943), this Court abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Burford permits a court to decline to hear a case over which it would otherwise have jurisdiction when, in its equitable discretion, it determines that it would serve the public interest for a state government to carry out its domestic policy. Id. Where timely and adequate state court review is available, a federal court should decline jurisdiction in two circumstances:
(1) [W]hen there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."
Adrian Energy Assocs. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 481 F.3d 414, 423 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1943)). The Burford doctrine is applied only sparingly and "represents a narrow and extraordinary exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,...
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