Underwood v. Capital Transit Co., 10265.

• Decision Date: 29 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 10265.,10265.
• Citation: 183 F.2d 822,87 US App. DC 68
• Parties: UNDERWOOD v. CAPITAL TRANSIT CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

87 US App. DC 68, 183 F.2d 822 (1950)

UNDERWOOD v. CAPITAL TRANSIT CO.

No. 10265.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 8, 1950.

Decided May 29, 1950.

Mr. Foster Wood, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Howard J. McGrath, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Frank F. Roberson, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. George D. Horning, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before CLARK, WASHINGTON, and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Underwood, plaintiff below, was a passenger on appellee's street car on the 28th of May, 1945, when it collided with the rear of another street car which had stopped to unload passengers. Appellant claimed that she was thrown down and that as a result of this accident she had sustained certain serious injuries which have incapacitated her. Her story was that there was a crash; that she was thrown over against a window and down; that the crash of glass was heard from the other street car; and that the conductor of the car on which she was riding helped her up. One of appellant's witnesses, the operator of the street car which was hit, however, testified that there was only a "bump", and that there was no broken glass. When the appellee presented its defense, the conductor of the car on which appellant was a passenger was produced as a witness. He testified that there was only a "little bit of a bump" which was of insufficient force to throw him off balance; that to his knowledge none of the passengers were thrown to the floor or in any way discommoded or hurt; and that he made no offer of any assistance to any of them.¹ Another witness for appellee testified that he inspected the cars involved in the accident and that the only damage that he could find "was just the paint slightly scratched on each bumper." Appellant's case was submitted to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and with the evidence in this posture on the question of liability vel non, the jury returned a verdict for appellee.

Appellant has launched a two pronged attack on the results of the proceedings below. In the first place she claims that no evidence was offered by appellee that would warrant the jury denying plaintiff the right to recover. This proposition is predicated in a misunderstanding of the function of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this jurisdiction. In Safeway Stores v. West² we made our most recent pronouncement of the role it plays in a given case when we reiterated:

"`Where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable, it means no more than that the party claiming damages has produced proof of a fact, or a series of related facts, which warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference.'"

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, does no more than establish a prima facie case based on an inference by virtue of which the plaintiff is enabled to escape the possibility of having the court direct a verdict against him. But the mere fact that the inference exists in contemplation of law as a mechanical device to take the case to the jury does not compel its acceptance by the triers of fact. They are at liberty to decide for themselves whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff even where there is no evidence to countervail the inference.³ The situation is much stronger in the instant case. There is ample evidence of record from which a jury would have been entitled to find non-liability on the part of the defendant. There is no error here.

Appellant's second attack is aimed at the ruling of the court below excluding from the jury's consideration evidence pertaining to a painful back condition and other classic symptoms which indicated a ruptured...