Underwood v. City of Starkville

• Decision Date: 11 May 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00085-GHD-DAS
• Parties: John UNDERWOOD and Joseph Underwood, d/b/a Starkville Athletic Club, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF STARKVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

538 F.Supp.3d 667

John UNDERWOOD and Joseph Underwood, d/b/a Starkville Athletic Club, Plaintiffs

v.CITY OF STARKVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00085-GHD-DAS

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Aberdeen Division.

Signed May 11, 2021

Jim D. Waide, III, Waide & Associates, PA, Tupelo, MS, for Plaintiffs.

Charles E. Winfield, Ashlyn Brown Matthews, The Winfield Law Firm, P.A., Starkville, MS, Christopher James Latimer, Mitchell McNutt & Sams, Columbus, MS, for Defendant.

OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

GLEN H. DAVIDSON, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the issue of standing [10], in response to the Plaintiff's claims alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteen Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and a violation of Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution [1]. Upon due consideration, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court hereby grants the Defendant's motion.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff John Underwood, doing business as Starkville Athletic Club, is the owner of the Starkville Athletic Club (the "Club"), a fitness center and gymnasium in Starkville, Mississippi, located in Oktibbeha County [1, at ¶ 1]. Plaintiff Joseph Underwood is the manager of the Starkville Athletic Club [Id. ] The Defendant is a political subdivision chartered and located in the State of Mississippi [Id. , at 2]. This case stems from the COVID-19 pandemic, a global health crisis that has impacted the lives of Mississippi residents as well as people across both the country and the globe. To combat the spread of this deadly disease, Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves issued Executive Order No. 1463 on March 24, 2020; this Order limited social and nonessential gatherings to groups less than 10 people but did not apply to "Essential Business[es] or Operation[s] as determined by and identified" in the Order [1-1, at 1(a)]. The term "Essential Business or Operation" was defined to include: government functions such as public safety workers, law enforcement, fire prevention and response, courts and court personnel, and the military; essential healthcare workers; infrastructure workers like those at power generation facilities, telecommunications facilities, water treatment facilities, transportation and roadway/waterway/airway operations, automotive services and repair, and hotels and lodging; manufacturing and food processing facilities and operations; agricultural operations and farms; retail operations like supermarkets, gas stations, and hardware stores; trash collection operations; media enterprises; educational institutions and schools; and banks and other financial institutions [Id. , at ¶ 3(c)]. On April 1, 2020, Gov. Reeves issued Executive Order 1466 [1-2]. This Order mandated "Shelter-in-Place" protocols, effective from April 3, 2020, to April 20, 2020, that required residents to stay at home or at their place of residence [Id. , at 1 (a)-(b)(i)]. The Order also mandated a social-distancing rule ordering residents to maintain a minimum of six feet of distance between each other and to avoid gatherings of more than ten people [Id. , at ¶ 1 (b)(iii)]. This Order also required all businesses except for Essential Businesses or Operations as identified by Executive Order 1463 to cease operation and all activities except for Minimum Operations, defined by the Order as "those activities necessary for the business or operation to maintain the condition of facilities, premises and equipment, value of business inventory, payroll, employee benefits, security, and to facilitate employees of the business or operation to continue to work remotely from their residences" [Id. , at ¶ 1(d)]. Notably, the Order excluded fitness and exercise gyms from the "Essential Healthcare Operations" category, as well as other similarly situated enterprises like dance studios, spas, salons, and barber shops. The Governor issued Executive Order 1473 extending the Shelter-in-Place protocols to April 27, 2020 [1-3, at 1]. He then issued Executive Order 1477, known as the Safer at Home Order, which was to remain in effect from April 27, 2020, to May 11, 2020 [Id. , at ¶ 1(a)]. This Order encouraged residents to stay at home or in their place of residence [Id. , at ¶ 1(b)]. It also prohibited public and private social and other non-essential gatherings in groups of more than ten people in a single space where people are in close proximity to one another [Id. , at ¶ 1(d)]. As with the previous order, Order 1477 mandated that fitness and exercise gyms were to remain closed to the public, as were other personal care and grooming facilities and other similarly situated businesses [Id. , at ¶ 1(h)(ix)]. On April 7, 2020, Starkville Mayor D. Lynn Spruill and the Board of Aldermen of the City of Starkville adopted the Second Resolution of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Starkville, Mississippi, for the Control of Contagious and Infectious Diseases and for the Protection of Public Health and Welfare and for Related Purposes [1-4]. This Resolution, in line with national and state measures to combat the pandemic, adopted the Governor's 1463 and 1466 Orders [Id. , at 4]. Similarly, on March 20, 2020, the Mayor and Aldermen enacted Ordinance 2020-01, which related to punitive actions that can be taken against those who violate a local order, rule, or resolution pertaining to the prevention of contagious or infectious diseases [1-5].

The Plaintiffs allege that Starkville's Ordinance 2020-01 amounts to a "taking" of the Plaintiffs’ property, under the constitutional meaning of the term, and argue that the Defendant's actions violate the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the relevant section of the Mississippi Constitution [1, at ¶ 14]. On May 8, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint seeking damages for this allegedly uncompensated taking and seeking actual damages for lost income and attorneys’ fees [1]. On September 2, 2020, the Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss, arguing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) that the Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law [10]. The Plaintiffs filed their Response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on October 7, 2020 [17]. The Defendant filed its Reply on October 14, 2020 [19]. The matter is now ready for review.

II. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) claim, the Court is limited by the allegations in the complaint itself, along with any documents attached to the complaint.

Walker v. Webco Indus. , Inc., 562 F. App'x 215, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA , 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004) ). The complaint must contain facts that, if accepted as true, would support a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Phillips v. City of Dallas, Tex. , 781 F.3d 772, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when the facts underlying the claim allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). However, "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss," Webb v. Morella , 522 F. App'x 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n , 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dismissal is warranted when a plaintiff fails to present sufficient facts to support the elements of the causes of actions articulated in the Complaint, and has thereby failed to advance their complaint beyond mere speculation. Emesowum v. Houston Police Dep't , 561 F. App'x 372, 372 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 ).

III. Analysis

A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the State's Power to Prevent the Spread of Disease

i. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts: The Prototypical Approach to Restrictions During Health Crises

The cornerstone case in this area of the law is Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts , 197 U.S. 11, 11, 25 S.Ct. , 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905). The case involved Chapter 75, Section 137 of the Revised Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which stated that "the board of health of a city or town, if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination

and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit $5." Id. at 12, 25 S.Ct. 358. Under the aegis of this statute, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, adopted a regulation requiring vaccination against smallpox. Id. The Plaintiff in that case, Mr. Henning Jacobson, refused to be vaccinated, and was charged with violating the regulation. Id. at 13, 25 S.Ct. 358. At his trial, Jacobson asked for a jury instruction stating that the statute "was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 14, 25 S.Ct. 358. The trial court refused his request, and Jacobson was found guilty. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts sustained the trial court's denial of the jury instruction, upheld the verdict, ordered Jacobson to pay his $5 fine, and had him imprisoned until the fine was paid. Ibid. The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which first assumed "for the purposes of the present inquiry, that [the statute's] provisions require, at least as a general rule,...