Underwood v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1994
• Citation: 892 S.W.2d 423
• Parties: Frances UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF TENNESSEE, INC., d/b/a Donelson Hospital, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 423

892 S.W.2d 423

Frances UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF TENNESSEE, INC., d/b/a Donelson

Hospital, Defendant/Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section.

Sept. 21, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1994.

Application for Permission to Appeal

Denied by Supreme Court

Jan. 30, 1995.

Charles Galbreath, Nashville, for appellant.

C.J. Gideon, Jr., Linda Gibbons Willis, Gideon & Wiseman, Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal involves a hospital visitor who was injured by a falling cover on a self-service ice dispenser in the hospital's cafeteria. The visitor filed suit against the hospital in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging that her injuries were caused by the hospital's negligent maintenance of the ice dispenser. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the visitor's proof. The visitor asserts on this appeal that she made out a prima facie case of the hospital's negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We affirm the directed verdict.

I.

Frances Underwood was self-employed as a care-giver to four homebound persons. On October 16, 1990, she accompanied one of her charges to HCA Donelson Hospital for a doctor's appointment and medical tests. While waiting for the tests to begin, Ms. Underwood went to the hospital cafeteria to obtain a glass of ice water to enable her companion to take her medication. While Ms. Underwood was obtaining ice from a self-service ice dispenser, the top of the dispenser somehow became dislodged and fell, hitting Ms. Underwood on the right upper arm, forearm, and wrist.

No one observed Ms. Underwood while she was using the ice dispenser. Shortly before the incident, a cafeteria employee working close by heard noises like "someone was banging up against the ice machine ... [t]o get the ice to come out." Ms. Underwood, however, insists that she did not strike the dispenser. The employee went to investigate when she heard Ms. Underwood's cries and found Ms. Underwood near the ice dispenser holding her arm. Ms. Underwood told the employee that something had fallen and hit her. The employee summoned her supervisor who escorted Ms. Underwood to the hospital's emergency room.

An emergency room physician observed a small bruise on Ms. Underwood's right wrist with minimal swelling but did not observe bony tenderness in the wrist or upper arm. He advised Ms. Underwood to take an over-the-counter analgesic and to ice down her arm and wrist. Ms. Underwood returned to the emergency room the next day after experiencing pain throughout the night. On this occasion, a physician noted tenderness and slight swelling and bruising on her upper right arm and forearm. He prescribed an ace bandage, ice packs, and pain medication and recommended that she have a follow-up examination within one week.

Ms. Underwood did not return to the hospital. Instead, she retained an attorney who arranged an appointment for her with a Nashville orthopaedic surgeon. The record is silent concerning this physician's diagnosis and treatment of Ms. Underwood except that he released her to resume her normal activities on December 27, 1990. ¹

Ms. Underwood filed suit against the hospital in February 1991, alleging that she had been seriously injured by the hospital's negligent failure to maintain the ice dispenser in a safe condition. A jury trial commenced on October 12, 1992. Ms. Underwood's evidence focused primarily on her many ailments since October 1990 and shed little light on the incident or the ice dispenser itself. On October 13, 1992, the trial court granted the hospital's motion for a directed verdict following the close of Ms. Underwood's case-in-chief.

II.

This is an appeal from a directed verdict. Accordingly, the appeal involves a question of law concerning whether the evidence is sufficient to create an issue for the jury to decide. Norman v. Southern Ry., 119 Tenn. 401, 422, 104 S.W. 1088, 1093-94 (1907); Toole v. Levitt, 492 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972); Wilkes v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 7 Tenn.App. 36, 41-42 (1927). The standards for reviewing these motions are the same in both the trial and the appellate courts.

Courts reviewing a motion for directed verdict may not weigh the evidence, Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tenn.1992); Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn.1977), or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Benson v. Tennessee Valley Elec. Coop., 868 S.W.2d 630, 638-39 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993); Grady v. Bryant, 506 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Tenn.Ct.App.1973). Instead, they must review the evidence most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made; they must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence; and they must also disregard all evidence contrary to that party's position. Goode v. Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc., 783 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tenn.1989); Gann v. International Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tenn.1986); Crain v. Brown, 823 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991).

A directed verdict is proper only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion. Williams v. Brown, 860 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tenn.1993); Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn.1980); Smith v. Inman Realty Co., 846 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992). A case should go to the jury, even if the facts are undisputed, if reasonable persons could draw conflicting inferences from the facts. Sauls v. Evans, 635 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tenn.1982); Long v. Mattingly, 797 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990).

The range of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence depends upon the unique facts of each case. An inference is reasonable and legitimate only when the evidence makes the existence of the fact to be inferred more probable than the nonexistence of the fact. Hollingsworth v. Queen Carpet, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); Benson v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Franklin v. Collins Chapel Connectional Hosp., 696 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). Any lesser test would permit the jury to rest its verdict on impermissible speculation and conjecture. See 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2528, at 565 (1971); Law v. Louisville & N.R.R., 179 Tenn. 687, 694, 170 S.W.2d 360, 362 (1943); Daniels v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Stokes v. Leung, 651 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Tenn.Ct.App.1982).

III.

Ms. Underwood presented very little evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding her injury, the hospital's maintenance of the ice dispenser, or the ice dispenser itself. Instead, she relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish her premises liability claim against the hospital. Since the trial court directed a verdict at the close of Ms. Underwood's case-in-chief, we must determine whether her evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

A.

Evidence of an injury is not, by itself, sufficient to prove that the injury was caused by someone's negligence. Williams v. Jordan, 208 Tenn. 456, 464, 346 S.W.2d 583, 586 (1961). The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, however, permits a fact-finder to infer that a defendant was negligent when the circumstances surrounding the injury would cause a reasonable person to conclude that the injury would not have occurred had it not been for the defendant's negligence. Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 662, 355 S.W.2d 436, 446 (1962); Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 196-97, 7 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1927); Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); Ford v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 60 Tenn.App. 495, 501, 448 S.W.2d 433, 436 (1969).

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is simply a specialized vehicle for considering circumstantial evidence in negligence cases. Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. Long, 190 Tenn. 434, 442-43, 230 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1950); Summitt Hill Assocs. v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 667 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983). It is based on everyday experience, Memphis St. Ry. v. Stockton, 143 Tenn. 201, 206-07, 226 S.W. 187, 189 (1920); Stinnett v. Wright, 59 Tenn.App. 118, 125, 438 S.W.2d 357, 361 (1968), and it requires nothing more than the common sense appraisal of the strength of the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence. Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 438, 192 S.W.2d 992, 996 (1946); Davis v. Sparkman, 55 Tenn.App. 65, 70, 396 S.W.2d 91, 93 (1964); Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works, 32 Tenn.App. 508, 522, 222 S.W.2d 889, 896 (1949).

Plaintiffs relying on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine need not prove specific acts of negligence. Summitt Hill Assocs. v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 667 S.W.2d at 96; Parker v. Warren, 503 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn.Ct.App.1973). Their evidence must, however, be sufficient to enable the fact-finder to conclude that the injury was caused, more probably than not, by the defendant's negligence rather than by any other cause. Stinnett v. Wright, 59 Tenn.App. at 126, 438 S.W.2d at 361; Roberts v. Ray, 45 Tenn.App. 280, 284, 322 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1958).

The strength of the plaintiff's evidence will vary with the facts of each case, and the strength of the inference of the defendant's negligence will likewise vary from reasonable probability to practical certainty. Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn.App. 469, 477, 258 S.W.2d 782, 785 (1953). The balance of the probabilities must, however, enable the fact-finder to make more than a sheer leap of faith. 4 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 19.5, at 25 (2d ed. 1986).

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply in cases where reasonable persons could not conclude that the defendant's negligence, more probably than not, caused the plaintiff's injury. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 248 (5th ed. 1984). Accordingly, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply in cases where the plaintiff's injury could reasonably have occurred even...