Unemployment Compensation Commission v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Citation: Unemployment Compensation Commission v. J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 15 S.E.2d 4, 219 N.C. 709 (N.C. 1941)
• Decision Date: 31 May 1941
• Docket Number: 739.
• Parties: UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION v. J. M. WILLIS BARBER & BEAUTY SHOP et al.

15 S.E.2d 4

219 N.C. 709

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION v. J. M. WILLIS BARBER & BEAUTY SHOP et al.

No. 739.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 31, 1941

This was a proceeding under the Unemployment Compensation Law to determine the liability of the defendant J. M. Willis for taxation as an employer under the statute. In accord with the procedure prescribed by the Act (Chap. 1, Extra Session 1936), amended by Chap. 27, Public Laws, 1939), the facts in relation thereto were found by the Unemployment Compensation Commission, and upon the facts so found it was concluded as a matter of law that three employing units were controlled by the defendant, and that he was responsible for contributions to the Unemployment Compensation fund with respect to wages payable for employment therein.

Exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law were duly noted and appeal taken to the Superior Court. In the Superior Court defendant demanded trial de novo by the court and jury at term time, upon issues raised by his exceptions. Motions to this effect were denied. The court held that the findings of fact by the Unemployment Compensation Commission were supported by competent evidence, and adjudged that these findings, as well as the conclusions of law thereon, be in all respects approved and affirmed.

Defendant appealed to this court, assigning errors.

Adrian J. Newton, Ralph Moody, and W. D. Holoman, all of Raleigh for plaintiff, appellee.

Winfield Blackwell, Jr., and Gilbert L. Shermer, both of Winston-Salem, for defendant, appellant.

DEVIN Justice.

Upon investigation, conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Unemployment Compensation statute, and from the testimony thereby obtained, it was found as a fact by the Unemployment Compensation Commission that defendant J. M Willis was proprietor of three employing units, "J. M Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 124 Burke Street," "J. M. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 114 Reynolds Building," and "Reynolds Building Barber Shop," all in the city of Winston-Salem, and that in these places, where the business indicated was carried on under the ownership or control of the defendant, more than a sufficient number of persons were regularly employed to require contributions under the Unemployment Compensation statute.

The first question presented by the appeal, and the one chiefly debated in the argument, is whether the findings of fact made by the Unemployment Compensation Commission, in determining the liability of the defendant under the Unemployment Compensation law, were conclusive on appeal, or whether, upon exceptions to the findings of fact, duly noted and brought forward on appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant was entitled to a trial of the issues by the court and jury de novo.

The provisions of the statute which relate to appeals from the Commission and the procedure thereon are contained in sec. 11(m) and (n), the pertinent portions of which we quote as follows:

"(m) The Commission after due notice shall have the right and power to hold and conduct hearings for the purpose of determining the rights, status and liabilities of any 'employing unit' or 'employer' as said terms are defined by Section nineteen (e) and Section nineteen (f) and subsections thereunder of this Act. The Commission shall have the power and authority to determine any and all questions and issues of fact or questions of Law that may arise under the Unemployment Compensation Law that may affect the rights, liabilities and status of any employing unit or employer as heretofore defined by the Unemployment Compensation Law including the right to determine the amount of contributions, if any, which may be due the Commission by any employer. All hearings shall be conducted and held at the office of the Commission and shall be open to the public and shall be stenographically reported and the Commission shall provide for the preparation of a record of all hearings and other proceedings. The Commission may provide for the taking of evidence by a deputy in which event he shall swear or cause the witnesses to be sworn and shall transmit all testimony to the Commission for its determination. From all decisions or determinations made by the Commission any party affected thereby shall be entitled to an appeal to the Superior Court. *** When an exception is made to the facts as found by the Commission, the appeal shall be to the Superior Court in Term Time but the decision or determination of the Commission upon such review in the Superior Court shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact supported by any competent evidence. ***. As amended by Pub.Laws 1939, c. 209.

"(n) The cause shall be entitled 'State of North Carolina on Relationship of the Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina against (here insert name of appellant),' and if there are exceptions to any facts found by the Commission it shall be placed on the civil issue docket of such Court and shall have precedence over other civil actions except those described in Section 14(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, and such cause shall be tried under such rules and regulations as are prescribed for the trial of other civil causes."

It is contended that the language of subsection (n) implies a trial by jury when exceptions are noted to findings of fact, since the cause is required to be placed on the "civil issue docket," and tried under the rules "prescribed for the trial of other civil causes."

On the other hand, it should be said that, while placing a case on the civil issue docket usually indicates a trial by jury of issues of fact, this does not necessarily follow, nor compel the conclusion that the Legislature so intended, as there may be, and frequently are, issues of law and questions of fact, triable by the Judge, which properly find their way to this docket. C. S. §§ 562, 952. Hence, we think the mandatory provisions in subsection (m) immediately preceding must be held controlling, and that the trial in the Superior Court on appeal must be subject to the limitation that the decision or determination of the Commission upon such review in the Superior Court "shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact supported by any competent evidence." In sec. 6(i) of the Act, Pub.Laws 1936, Ex. Sess., c. 1, there is a similar provision, declaring that "the findings of the commission as to the facts, if there is evidence to support it, and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law." The question of the power of the court to review findings of jurisdictional facts is not presented by this appeal.

The effort to invoke the rule of procedure prescribed for appeals from the Utilities Commission is unavailing. The statutes, C.S. §§ 1097 and 1098, providing appeal from that administrative agency, while expressed in language similar to that used in subsections (m) and (n), do not contain the provision that the findings of fact by the Utilities Commission shall be conclusive on appeal. Hence, the procedure approved in Utilities Comm. v. Carolina Scenic Coach Co., 218 N.C. 233, 10 S.E.2d 824, and Corporation Comm. v. Southern R. R. Co., 196 N.C. 190, 145 S.E. 19, may not be held applicable here.

The validity of the provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act making the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission conclusive on appeal, when supported by competent evidence, has been uniformly upheld by this court. Buchanan v. State Highway Comm., 217 N.C. 173, 7 S.E.2d 382. Jury trials in cases arising under that Act have been eliminated. True, the Workmen's Compensation Act, proceeds upon the assumption that the employer and the employee have accepted its provisions, Heavner v. Lincolnton, 202 N.C. 400, 162 S.E. 909, but it was also held in that case that the constitutionality of the Act on the ground of denial of trial by jury could not be successfully assailed, and that power was conferred by the Legislature upon the Commission to administer all the provisions of the Act in accord with its terms. In Hagler v. Mecklenburg Highway Comm., 200 N.C. 733, 158 S.E. 383, 384, it was said: "Under this act trial by jury is not a constitutional right."

In Cowles v. Brittain, 9 N.C. 204, in an opinion written for the Court by Chief Justice Taylor, it was said: "There is a tacit condition annexed to the ownership of property, that it shall contribute to the public revenue in such mode and proportion as the legislative will shall direct; and if the officers intrusted with the execution of the laws transcend their powers to the injury of an individual, the Common Law entitles him to redress. But to pursue every delinquent liable to pay taxes, through the forms of process and a Jury trial, would materially impede, if not wholly obstruct, the collection of the revenue; and it is not believed that such a mode was contemplated by the Constitution." A hundred years later, in Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568, 570, Adams, J., speaking to a similar question, used this language: "That a state cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law does not necessarily imply that all trials in the state courts shall be by a jury composed of twelve men. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. [581] 603, 20 S.Ct. 448, 494, 44 L.Ed. 597; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. [90], 92, 23 L.Ed. 678. Nor is the contention of the defendants necessarily determined in their favor by Article 1, § 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina. The right to a trial by jury which is provided in this section applies only to cases in which the prerogative existed at common law, or was procured by statute at the time the Constitution was adopted, and not to...