Unemployment Ins. Tax Contribution, Pioneer Baseball League v. Friedrichs, 88-131

Decision Date22 September 1988
Docket NumberNo. 88-131,88-131
Citation760 P.2d 93,233 Mont. 384,45 St.Rep. 1573
PartiesIn the Matter of UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAX CONTRIBUTION, PIONEER BASEBALL LEAGUE, Employer and Appellant, v. James FRIEDRICHS, Claimant and Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Richard J. Carstensen, Billings, for employer and appellant.

Melanie A. Symons, Dept. of Labor & Industry, Helena, for claimant and respondent.

McDONOUGH, Justice.

Pioneer Baseball League (the League) appeals from the order of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. The order affirmed the decision of the Board of Labor Appeals that the $300 per month plus expense allowance paid to League umpires constitutes employment subject to the unemployment insurance law. We affirm.

The League presents two issues for our review:

1. What is the burden of proof for determining whether services are subject to the unemployment insurance law?

2. Is the compensation paid to League umpires subject to the unemployment insurance law?

The League is a professional, minor-league baseball league with teams in Montana, Idaho, Utah and Canada. Its headquarters are in Billings, Montana. The League obtains umpires for its games from the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. The League and the umpires enter into a Uniform Umpire Contract provided by the National Association, which sets forth the terms of employment. James L. Friedrichs entered into such a contract with the League on June 18, 1985.

The contract provided that Friedrichs would be employed to render skilled services as an umpire. He was paid $300 per month, with an allowance of $1,050.00 per month for travel, lodging and other expenses. The contract could be assigned by the League, or terminated by the League at any time upon giving Friedrichs notice. The contract also provided that Friedrichs could not perform services as an umpire for any party other than the League unless he obtained the League's consent.

In 1986 when he no longer worked for the League, Friedrichs filed an unemployment claim. In his total of claimed employment, he included time spent as an umpire for the League. Subsequent proceedings led to a January 6, 1987, decision by a Labor Department Appeals Referee that the services rendered to the League by Friedrichs constituted employment subject to the unemployment insurance law. On March 7, 1987, the Board of Labor Appeals adopted the referee's decision, and on December 9, 1987, the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District affirmed the Board's decision. This appeal followed.

The main issue in this appeal is whether Friedrichs was an "employee" of the League for purposes of unemployment insurance contributions. The standard of review in cases appealed from the Board of Labor Appeals is controlled by § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, which states in relevant part:

In any judicial proceeding under 39-51-2406 through 39-51-2410, the findings of the board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law.

The operation of this section has been discussed previously by this Court, most recently in Zimmer-Jackson Assoc. v. Dept. of Labor (Mont.1988), 752 P.2d 1095, 1097, 45 St.Rep. 679, 681:

When reviewing a decision of the Board of Labor Appeals, the District Court must treat the findings of the Board as conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence and are absent fraud.

[citations] This Court is held to the same standard when reviewing a Board of Labor Appeals decision. [citation].

The facts found by the Board were adopted as conclusive by the District Court, and are not disputed in this appeal. As it appears from the record that the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, "[w]e must determine whether the District Court committed an abuse of discretion by affirming the Board's decision. [citation]." Zimmer, 752 P.2d at 1097.

I.

The League first seeks definition of the burden of proof required for a showing that the unemployment insurance law is inapplicable to a particular employment arrangement. The League has sought to show that Friedrichs was an independent contractor, and the League was therefore not required to make unemployment insurance contributions based on his compensation. The League argues that § 39-51-203(4), MCA, fails to give an adequate definition of employment that is subject to the law. However, the League's brief on this point misstates the applicable version of the statute. The events at issue here took place in 1985 and are governed by the version of the statute in force at that time:

Employment Defined ...

(4) Service performed by an individual for wages is considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that:

(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services, both under his contract and in fact;

(b) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service is performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed; and

(...

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