UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'FUND v. Danner

• Decision Date: 07 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 110,110
• Citation: 882 A.2d 271,388 Md. 649
• Parties: UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND v. Gerald E. DANNER.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

882 A.2d 271

388 Md. 649

UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND v. Gerald E. DANNER.

No. 110, September Term, 2004.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

September 7, 2005.

James W. Himes, Asst. Atty. General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. General, Towson) on brief, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.

Frederick William Miller (Susan S. Miller, Baltimore) on brief, for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

HARRELL, Judge.

Gerald E. Danner was injured in Baltimore City while performing carpentry services at the behest of his employer, Timothy Stivers ("Stivers"). Danner lost the use of his left hand and was unable to work. He filed for workers' compensation benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission").

On 14 June 2002 the Commission ordered Stivers to pay workers' compensation benefits to Danner. Stivers, who did not carry workers' compensation insurance, did not make the advanced payments. Accordingly, Danner requested payment from the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("the Fund"), initially in a letter dated 17 July 2002 and thereafter in letters dated 23 August 2002 and 25 September 2002. The Fund refused to pay Danner. Danner petitioned the Commission for relief and it ordered the Fund to pay, in addition to the earlier ordered benefits, a 40% penalty on all monies due Danner and a $500 attorney's fee.

The Fund sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The Circuit Court granted Danner's motion for summary judgment and denied the Fund's cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Fund appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court, although holding that the Fund had an obligation to pay compensation to Danner pursuant to the Commission's 14 June 2002 order, reversed on the penalty and attorney's fee awards because it believed the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act did not permit the imposition of such sanctions against the Fund.

The Fund petitioned this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to consider the order to pay compensation to Danner. Danner petitioned us regarding the intermediate appellate court's reversal of the award of the penalty and attorney's fee. We granted both petitions, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004), to consider the following questions, which we reword for clarity:

I. Whether the Commission erred by ordering the UEF to pay workers' compensation benefits when the Fund had no duty to pay the award while the issue of the possible statutory employer was awaiting resolution by the Commission and the ultimate rejection of that issue was before the Circuit Court in the judicial review action;¹

II. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by reversing the judgment imposing penalties and attorney's fee for failure to pay workers' compensation benefits to Danner upon default in payment by an uninsured employer under the 14 June 2002 award?

We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals regarding the Fund's obligation to pay workers' compensation benefits and the penalty to Danner, but shall reverse with regard to the attorney's fee award.

I.

On 16 February 2001, Danner was working as a carpenter on the 2nd floor of the Wentworth Building on 300 Cathedral Street in Baltimore. His employer was Timothy Stivers, who had no workers' compensation insurance at the time. One of Danner's responsibilities while performing wood and trim work was to operate a band saw. He lacerated his left arm when his sweatshirt sleeve became ensnared in the saw blade, pulling his left arm into the blade. As a result, Danner lost substantial use of that arm and hand.

Danner filed with the Commission a timely claim for workers' compensation benefits. On 6 June 2002,² a Commission hearing on Danner's claim was attended by Danner and the Fund.³ In a 14 June 2002 order, the Commission awarded compensation benefits to Danner, deciding, among other things, the following:

1. Danner sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment on 16 February 2001;

2. Danner's disability resulted from that accidental personal injury;

3. Danner be paid temporary total disability at the rate of $400.00, payable weekly beginning 16 February 2001 and continuing as long as the claimant remains temporarily totally disabled;

4. the correct name of the employer to be Timothy Stivers;

5. Timothy Stivers was uninsured at the time of the accidental injury....

The Commission, at the request of the Fund,⁴ deferred a decision on an issue raised by the Fund as to whether an entity identified as "NWJ" was Danner's statutory employer pursuant to § 9-508 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code. (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.).⁵ Neither the Fund nor Stivers sought immediate judicial review of the Commission's 14 June 2002 Award of Compensation.⁶

Danner promptly sent Stivers a copy of the award and demanded payment. Nonetheless, Stivers did not pay the award. On 17 July 2002, Danner notified the Fund of Stivers's non-payment and requested payment from the Fund. The Fund refused.

On 13 September 2002 the Commission decided that NWJ was not Danner's statutory employer. On the same day, the Fund filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for judicial review regarding the Commission's decision as to NWJ's status.⁷ The Fund did not seek in that action review of the 14 June 2002 award of benefits to Danner.

Contemporaneous with the filing of the Fund's initial judicial review petition, Danner filed a complaint with the Commission that the order to pay him workers' compensation benefits remained unfulfilled. On 26 November 2002 the Commission held a hearing to determine whether Danner was entitled to sanctions against the Fund for its failure to pay the compensation benefits as ordered. On 11 December 2002, the Commission found as follows, in pertinent part:

The Commission finds on the issue presented that the answer is "YES"; and finds that the Fund shall pay unto Frederick W. Miller, Esquire, counsel for [Danner], a counsel fee in the amount of $500.00; and shall pay unto the claimant a 40% penalty on all moneys due the claimant beginning February 16, 2001 and ending November 12, 2001.

The Fund sought judicial review on the record in the Circuit Court of the sanctions order. After oral argument, the court granted Danner's motion for summary judgment and denied the Fund's cross-motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court directed the Fund to pay Danner the benefits that he was awarded on 14 June 2002 and left undisturbed the Commission's order for payment of the penalty and attorney's fee.

On 14 August 2003, the Fund appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. It alleged first that workers' compensation benefits were not owed by the Fund to Danner because the Fund's legal obligation to pay under the Workers' Compensation Act had not been triggered. Second, the Fund alleged that it could not be ordered, as a matter of law, to pay a penalty or an attorney's fee. As to the first contention, the intermediate appellate court answered that the pendency following the Commission's 14 June order of the question of whether NWJ was Danner's statutory employer did not operate to defer the Fund's legal obligation to pay the unappealed 14 June 2002 compensation award following Stivers's failure to pay. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Danner, 158 Md.App. 502, 514, 857 A.2d 615, 622 (2004). To the second point, the Court of Special Appeals found that the penalty and attorney's fee were not authorized by law to be imposed against the Fund. Id. at 515, 518, 857 A.2d at 623, 624-25.

II.

The issues framed by the parties in this case are solely legal ones. We must decide: (a) whether the Fund's obligation to pay a claimant when the employer is in default is suspended by operation of § 9-1002; (b) whether, as a matter of law, a penalty may be assessed against the Fund; and, (c) whether, as a matter of law, an attorney's fee may be assessed against the Fund. Because this case was decided in the Circuit Court by the grant of summary judgment where cross-motions were filed, our appellate review begins with the question of whether the Circuit Court, in reviewing the Commission's decision, properly determined that there was no genuine dispute as to a material fact. Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook § 17.7 at 348 (2d ed.1993). We then review the resultant questions of law de novo. Md. Rule 2-501(a); Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 5-6, 874 A.2d 439, 442 (2005) (holding that the standard of review in a workers' compensation claim disposed of at summary judgment by the Circuit Court is de novo).

A.

In interpreting a statute, the overarching objective is to ascertain the legislative intent. Shah v. Howard County, 337 Md. 248, 254, 653 A.2d 425, 427 (1995). The primary source from which to determine legislative intent is the plain meaning of the statutory language. Pelican Nat. Bank v. Provident Bank of Maryland, 381 Md. 327, 336, 849 A.2d 475, 480 (2004). "When the plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry ordinarily is at an end." Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998). If, after considering the plain language in its ordinary and common sense meaning, two or more equally plausible interpretations arise, however, then the general purpose, legislative history, and language of the act as a whole is examined in an effort to clarify the ambiguity. Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471, 667 A.2d 179, 183 (1995). We will "neither add nor delete words in order to give the statute a meaning. . . ." Harris v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 375 Md. 21, 31, 825 A.2d 365, 371 (2003) (citations omitted). Because this case involves the Workers' Compensation Act, we also endeavor to interpret its...