Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Brown
• Citation: Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 26 S.W. 982 (Tex. 1894)
• Decision Date: 10 May 1894
• Parties: UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO. v. CHOWNING.

26 S.W. 982

UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO. v. CHOWNING.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 10, 1894.

Certified questions from court of civil appeals of fifth supreme judicial district.

Action by Sallie L. Chowning against the Union Central Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the court of civil appeals. On questions certified to the supreme court by the court of civil appeals.

Bassett, Seay & Muse and Ramsey, Maxwell & Ramsey, for appellant. Leake, Shepard & Miller, for appellee.

BROWN, J.

The court of civil appeals for the fifth supreme judicial district has certified to this court the following questions and statement: "In the above-entitled cause the following issues of law arise, which this court deems advisable to present to the supreme court of the state of Texas for adjudication, to wit: Question 1. Article 2953, Rev. St. provides as follows: `Penalty for Failure to Pay Loss. In all cases where a loss occurs and the life or health insurance company liable therefor shall fail to pay the same within the time specified in the policy, after demand made therefor, such company shall be liable to pay the holder of such policy, in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve per cent. damages on the amount of such loss, together with all reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss.' Is this statute, in providing for recovery of damages or attorney's fees, violative of the constitution of this state or the constitution of the United States, or is it valid and legitimate legislation? Question 2. The first, second, and third assignments of error in this case are as follows: `First assignment of error: The court erred in its several rulings upon the issue of alleged waiver by the defendant of the forfeiture of the policy sued on: (1) In overruling the defendant's exceptions to the plaintiff's first supplemental petition, alleging such waiver, and setting up defendant's alleged custom of dealing with its policy holders; (2) in refusing the several special charges requested by the defendant numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10, relating to that issue, and in submitting the same to the jury, as was done in the general charge, and in the second special charge given at the plaintiff's request; (3) in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial, based on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict in that respect. Second assignment of error: The court erred in its several rulings touching the alleged agreement between the defendant and Reeves & Chowning and A. C. Reeves, by which they were to act as agents of the defendant in making loans and soliciting insurance, and the alleged services rendered by them under said agreement, (1) in overruling the defendant's exceptions to the plaintiff's supplemental petition alleging said agreement and services; and (2) in admitting evidence, over defendant's objections, relating thereto, as shown by defendant's bill of exceptions in that behalf. Third assignment of error: The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by the defendant in its fourteenth special charge, relating to the effect of Chowning's alleged agreement to surrender the policy, and his alleged determination not to pay the premium notes, and its fifteenth and sixteenth special charges, relating to the alleged tender of the premium by the witness Williams, and instructing the jury as was done in the court's charge in chief and in the special charges given at plaintiff's request in relation to said several matters.'"

For appellant it is claimed that article 2953, Rev. St., denies to the class of corporations embraced in its provisions the equal protection of the law, contrary to the prohibition contained in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and is therefore void. The reason assigned in support of this contention is that all corporations engaged in the business of insurance are not embraced in the terms of the law; but is not claimed that all corporations embraced in the classes named are not affected alike by its provisions. In 1891 the legislature of this state enacted a law defining who are and who are not fellow servants, which related only to employes of railroad companies. In Campbell v. Cook (decided by this court at its present term) 26 S. W. 486, that law was under consideration with the same objection made to it, and based upon the same reasons, as are here urged against the article of the statutes now in question; and this court held that the act was not liable to the objection, quoting from Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 209, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, as follows: "When legislation applies to particular bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities, it is not open to the objection that it denies to them equal protection of the laws, if all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same conditions." Pembina Con. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 189, 8 Sup. Ct. 737; Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 353, 12 Sup. Ct. 250; Railroad Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 391, 12 Sup. Ct. 255; People v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175, 12 Sup. Ct. 880. This rule is equally applicable to the defendant in this case and to the law under consideration. All persons of its class are treated alike under like conditions. The article of the statutes is not liable to the objection that it denies to appellant the equal protection of the law.

Appellant's counsel assert that the article in question is in conflict with article 1, § 3, of the constitution of the state of Texas, which is in these words: "All free men when they form a social compact are entitled to equal rights, and no man, nor set of men, is entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges but in consideration of public services." It is not shown just how the law violates this section, and, indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how a corporation which has no natural rights could be said to be entitled to such rights and privileges as grow out of the formation of a social compact. It is the creature of law, and entitled to just such rights as the law grants to it. When granted, such rights are protected from invasion the same as the rights of any natural person. Section 13 reads as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law." The contention is that the exacting of an attorney's fee in case judgment shall be recovered against the insurance company prevents the free resort to the courts. We are referred to Dillingham v. Putnam (Tex. Sup.) 14 S. W. 303, as...