Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. Wsdot

• Decision Date: 10 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 27370-9-III.
• Citation: Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. Wsdot, 215 P.3d 257, 152 Wn. App. 199 (Wash. App. 2009)
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: UNION ELEVATOR & WAREHOUSE COMPANY, INC., a Washington Corporation, Appellant, v. The STATE of Washington, by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.

215 P.3d 257

152 Wn. App. 199

UNION ELEVATOR & WAREHOUSE COMPANY, INC., a Washington Corporation, Appellant, v. The STATE of Washington, by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.

No. 27370-9-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

September 10, 2009.

Kevin W. Roberts, Dunn & Black PS, Spokane, WA, for Appellant.

Donna Rae Emmingham, Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

SCHULTHEIS, C.J.

¶ 1 In Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. State, 144 Wash.App. 593, 606, 183 P.3d 1097 (2008) (Union Elevator II), we held that Union Elevator & Warehouse Co., Inc., (Union Elevator) was entitled to relocation assistance benefits under Washington's relocation assistance and real property acquisition policy act (the Relocation Act), chapter 8.26 RCW. On remand, the trial court denied interest on the award of relocation benefits. We reverse the trial court's decision, concluding that the State is liable for interest on damages under the Relocation Act. However, we affirm the trial court's limitation of attorney fees to the statutory maximum under the equal access to justice act (EAJA), RCW 4.84.350.

FACTS

¶ 2 For a third time, we are asked to review a dispute between Union Elevator and the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT). In Union Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. State, 96 Wash.App. 288, 980 P.2d 779 (1999) (Union Elevator I), we reversed the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of Union Elevator's inverse condemnation claim and remanded for trial on the issue of damages. In Union Elevator II, 144 Wash.App. at 606, 183 P.3d 1097, we reversed the trial court's denial of Union Elevator's request for reimbursement under the Relocation Act for the cost of substitute machinery and equipment at its new site.

¶ 3 On remand, Union Elevator requested (1) interest on the award of relocation benefits, (2) attorney fees and costs under the EAJA, and (3) the remaining attorney fees and costs of $93,025 under RCW 8.25.070 and RCW 8.25.075. As to the question of interest, Union Elevator pointed out that the legislative intent behind the Relocation Act is to make a property owner whole and that this purpose was frustrated by WSDOT's withholding of funds that belonged to Union Elevator for seven years. It also argued that due to WSDOT's delays, it was forced to incur attorney fees between March 2001 and July 2008 that exceeded the EAJA's cap of $25,000. In the alternative, Union Elevator argued that it was entitled to attorney fees under equity because WSDOT acted in bad faith. WSDOT countered that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred interest on the award of relocation benefits. It conceded that Union Elevator was entitled to attorney fees under the EAJA, but argued that the provisions for attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070 and .075 did not apply to proceedings involving relocation benefits.

¶ 4 The trial court denied interest on the award of relocation benefits, stating "I don't believe the current status of the law allows the Court to award those, those amounts, based upon what has been presented to me." Report of Proceedings at 27. The trial court awarded Union Elevator $25,000 in attorney fees under the EAJA, but denied attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070 and .075, finding the latter statutes did not apply to the Relocation Act. The court also denied attorney fees on equitable grounds, finding the facts of the case did not support a bad faith claim.

¶ 5 Union Elevator appeals.

ANALYSIS

Interest on Award of Relocation Assistance Benefits

¶ 6 The first issue is whether Union Elevator is entitled to interest on its award of relocation assistance benefits under the Relocation Act. Union Elevator contends that "the Legislature waived the State's sovereign immunity by specifically including relocation assistance as part of Washington's Eminent Domain Law." Br. of Appellant at 10. It also argues that interest on relocation benefits furthers the legislative goal of "mak[ing] . . . whole" citizens whose property has been taken by the government. Id. at 10-11. Finally, Union Elevator argues that "interest is an extension of the damages WSDOT caused by taking Union Elevator's property" and therefore it is entitled to interest on the award that WSDOT withheld for seven years. Id. at 11.

¶ 7 The State responds that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the government in the absence of a waiver of sovereign immunity, pointing out "there are no statutes providing that the State is liable for interest on a claim for relocation assistance when the State's decision to deny that claim is overturned on appeal." Br. of Resp't at 15-16.

¶ 8 Whether the State is liable for interest upon a judgment under the Relocation Act is an issue of first impression that requires statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998).

¶ 9 The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wash.2d 801, 813, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). If the statute's meaning is plain, then we give effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). We first look to the language of the statute, as well as its context, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. We must give meaning to every word in a statute and presume the legislature did not use any superfluous words. In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d 756, 767, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000). Further, "The power of eminent domain is strictly construed against the government." State v. Costich, 117 Wash.App. 491, 499, 72 P.3d 190 (2003), rev'd on other grounds, 152 Wash.2d 463, 98 P.3d 795 (2004).

¶ 10 Generally, the State is not liable for interest unless it has expressly, or impliedly, placed itself in a position of liability. State v. Hallauer, 28 Wash.App. 453, 624 P.2d 736 (1981). It is well settled in Washington that the State has expressly waived immunity from interest in condemnation proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 455, 624 P.2d 736 (enumerating the statutes that subject the State to liability for interest in eminent domain proceedings); In re Petition of City of Anacortes, 81 Wash.2d 166, 169, 500 P.2d 546 (1972) ("`the condemnee should be allowed interest upon the compensation and damages awarded'") (quoting Indep. Sch. Dist. v. C.B. Lauch Constr. Co., 78 Idaho 485, 493, 305 P.2d 1077 (1957)).

¶ 11 In Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash.2d 640, 656, 935 P.2d 555 (1997), the Washington Supreme Court explained that interest is necessary in condemnation proceedings to compensate the owner for the loss of the use of the monetary value of the taking from the time of the taking until just compensation is paid. It reasoned that such interest is "part of the damages and is required as part of just compensation." Id. at 657, 935 P.2d 555. It further noted,

We assume a person who received the money value of his or her property as of the date of the taking has a beneficial use available for these funds. Interest in this context is not an award of prejudgment interest on a liquidated sum in the traditional sense, but is a measure of the rate of return on the property owner's money had there been no delay in payment.

Id. at 656, 935 P.2d 555 (citation omitted).

¶ 12 While there is no question that the State has waived immunity from interest for damages in condemnation proceedings, it is not clear whether the legislature intended this waiver to extend to awards under the Relocation Act. To resolve this issue, we first turn to the interest provisions in the eminent domain statute, chapter 8.04 RCW. First, RCW 8.04.092 provides:

The amount paid into court shall constitute just compensation paid for the taking of such property: PROVIDED, That respondents may, in the same action, request a trial for the purpose of assessing the amount of compensation to be made and the amount of damages arising from the taking. . . . If, pursuant to such hearing, the verdict of the jury . . . or decision of the court, awards respondents an amount in excess of the tender, the court shall order the excess paid to respondents with interest.

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 13 Next, RCW 8.28.040, "Miscellaneous Provisions," provides:

Whenever in any eminent domain proceeding . . . instituted for the taking or damaging of private property, a verdict shall have been returned . . . fixing the amount to be paid as compensation for the property so to be taken or damaged, such verdict shall bear interest at the maximum rate of interest permitted.

¶ 14 Bearing in mind that these provisions of the eminent domain statute must be harmonized with the chapter on relocation assistance, we next turn to the history and purpose of the Relocation Act. The Relocation Act, which substantially parallels the federal relocation assistance act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655, states that its purpose is:

To establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a direct result of public works programs . . . in order that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries . . . and to minimize the hardship of displacement on such persons.

RCW 8.26.010(1)(a). Recognizing that damages resulting from condemnation proceedings may include more than the fair market value of the property, the legislature provided a broad range of financial assistance in condemnation cases, including moving costs, reestablishment expenses, and reimbursement for the purchase of substitute equipment. RCW 8.26.035(1)(a)-(d), .065.

¶ 15 A federal takings case noted that in passing the federal act, Congress indicated a willingness to depart from traditional methods of evaluating damages in condemnation cases. Pou Pacheco v. Soler Aquino, 833 F.2d 392, 396 (1st Cir.1987). The Pou Pacheco court stated, "`it [has become] increasingly...