Union Fraternal League v. Sweeney

Decision Date04 February 1916
Docket NumberNo. 22804.,22804.
Citation111 N.E. 305,184 Ind. 378
PartiesUNION FRATERNAL LEAGUE v. SWEENEY.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clark County; Harry C. Montgomery, Judge.

Action by Katie B. Sweeney against the Union Fraternal League. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under section 1405, Burns 1914. Affirmed.

T. J. Brock and James L. Bottorff, both of Jeffersonville, for appellant. James W. Fortune, of Jeffersonville, for appellee.

MORRIS, C. J.

Action by appellee against appellant on a policy of insurance for $1,000 issued by appellant on the life of appellee's husband and payable to appellee. Appellant answered the complaint in three paragraphs, the first of which was a general denial. The second and third denied liability because of alleged fraud in procuring the policy. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment for appellee. Appellant assigns error on the overruling of its motion for judgment on the jury's answers to interrogatories submitted and overruling its motion for a new trial. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the general verdict and the facts specially found.

[1] Appellant contends that there is reversible error disclosed by the court's instructions to the jury. The complaint alleges in general terms that appellee performed all the conditions of the contract which were therein required of her to be performed, but makes no reference therein of the waiver by appellant of the performance of any condition. One of appellant's rules constituting a part of the contract, reads as follows:

“All claims for death benefits shall require the affidavits of the claimant, attending or family physician, undertaker, friends or such others (or such, of them) as are clearly necessary to establish the claim, and said affidavits shall be upon the forms of blanks furnished by the board of trustees, and are required to be fully answered, and until full proof be received as required, the order shall not be bound to take any action upon the claim, until said blanks, duly verified, as required, are received, no action shall be taken upon the claim.”

The evidence shows that there was not a strict compliance with the above condition. The proof submitted to appellant contained neither an affidavit by appellee nor one by the attending physician. Before the filing of appellant's answers it denied liability on the policy and tendered to appellee the full amount of assessments or premiums paid. The tender was refused, and thereupon appellant paid the sum tendered to the clerk of the circuit court for appellee's benefit.

By its requested instruction No. 4 appellant requested the court to inform the jury that the provisions of the rule we have set out must be fully complied with, and that, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there was such compliance, appellee could not recover. The court refused to give the instruction as requested, but modified it so as to inform the jury that there could be no recovery unless a compliance or waiver was shown. As modified, the instruction was given.

Appellant earnestly contends that, as no waiver was pleaded, and full performance was averred, a recovery cannot stand on proof of waiver of a condition precedent. Section 376 of Burns' Stat. 1914 reads as follows:

“In pleading the performance of a condition precedent in a contract, it shall be sufficient to allege, generally, that the party performed all the conditions on his part. If the allegation be denied, the facts showing a performance must be proved on the trial.”

The question here presented has been considered by various courts, and, while the holdings are not entirely harmonious, we believe the greater weight of authority supports the proposition that under a declaration of performance proof of waiver by defendant is competent, and will be deemed as the equivalent of proof of performance. West Rockingham Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sheets (1875) 26 Grat. (Va.) 854;Taunton Bank v. Richardson (1827) 5 Pick. (22 Mass.) 436, 444, citing 2 Starkie, Ev. 274; Butterworth v. Western Assurance Co. (1882) 132 Mass. 489;Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1898) 121 Cal. 451, 53 Pac. 922;Am. L. Ins. Co. v. Mahone (1878) 56 Miss. 180;Eureka F. & M. Co. v. Baldwin (1898) 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 143;Nickell v. Phœnix Ins. Co. (1898) 144 Mo. 420, 46 S. W. 435;Burgess v. Mercantile,...

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