Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 91-517

• Decision Date: 17 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-517,91-517
• Citation: 620 A.2d 1039,136 N.H. 624
• Parties: , 21 Media L. Rep. 1222 UNION LEADER CORPORATION v. William W. FENNIMAN, Jr., Chief and Dover Police Department.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1039

620 A.2d 1039

136 N.H. 624, 21 Media L. Rep. 1222

UNION LEADER CORPORATION v. William W. FENNIMAN, Jr., Chief and Dover Police Department.

No. 91-517.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Feb. 17, 1993.

Malloy & Sullivan, P.C., Manchester (Gregory V. Sullivan, on the brief and orally), and Law Office of Donald A. Kennedy, Manchester (Donald A. Kennedy, on the brief), for plaintiff.

George E. Wattendorf, orally and Scott E. Woodman, Dover, for defendants.

H. Bernard Waugh, Jr., Concord, legal counsel, by brief for New Hampshire Municipal Association, as amicus curiae.

Douglas & Douglas, Concord (Charles G. Douglas, III, on the brief), by brief for New Hampshire Police Ass'n, as amicus curiae.

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Daniel J. Mullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), on brief for the State, as amicus curiae.

New Hampshire Association of Chiefs of Police by brief, pro se, as amicus curiae.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This case involves a petition filed by the plaintiff, Union Leader Corporation (Union Leader), under the Right-to-Know Law, RSA chapter 91-A, for access to certain investigatory documents under the control of the defendants, the Dover Police Department (the department) and William W. Fenniman, Jr., the department's chief. The Superior Court (Sullivan, J.) granted the Union Leader's petition, and the defendants appeal. We reverse, holding the documents exempt from disclosure as "[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices," under RSA 91-A:5, IV (Supp.1992).

The documents in question were compiled during an internal investigation of a department lieutenant accused of making harassing phone calls. The department ultimately concluded that the lieutenant made the calls, but without an intent to harass. The department, however, determined that the lieutenant had been dishonest during the investigation and therefore suspended him from duty without pay for six pay periods. Because the department eventually released its "Internal Investigation Disposition Forms" to the Union Leader, detailing the facts related above along with the lieutenant's name, the only documents at issue in this appeal are the department's memoranda and other records compiled during the investigation.

We begin our analysis by examining the words of the statute under which the defendants claim exemption, RSA 91-A:5, IV (Supp.1992). See Chambers v. Geiger, 133 N.H. 149, 152, 573 A.2d 1356, 1357 (1990). The statute provides that "[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices" are not subject to the disclosure requirements of chapter 91-A. This particular portion of RSA 91-A:5, IV (Supp.1992) has not been construed by this court and is neither explained nor defined by the statute. We therefore rely on the plain meaning of the words and turn to the legislative history only if the language is ambiguous. See State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575-76, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991).

Although we generally interpret the exemptions in RSA chapter 91-A restrictively to further the purposes of the Right-to-Know Law, see Mans v. Lebanon School Bd., 112 N.H. 160, 162-63, 290 A.2d 866, 867 (1972), the plain meanings of the words "internal," "personnel," and "practices" are themselves quite broad, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1180, 1687, 1780 (unabridged ed. 1961). The most we can say for the Union Leader's position is that the dictionary does not explicitly include documents such as internal police investigatory files within these definitions. These files plainly "pertain[ ] to internal personnel practices" because they document procedures leading up to internal personnel discipline, a quintessential example of an internal personnel practice.

Moreover, even if the statute could be deemed ambiguous, a look at the relevant legislative history only weakens the Union Leader's case. The legislature's intent with regard to RSA 91-A:5, IV (Supp.1992) is revealed in the history of another statute, RSA 516:36, II (Supp.1992), which states:

"All records, reports, letters, memoranda, and other documents relating to any internal investigation into the conduct of any officer, employee, or agent of any state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency having the powers of a peace officer shall not be admissible in any civil action other than in a disciplinary action between the agency and its officers, agents, or employees."

At the same time the legislature was considering passage of what is now RSA 516:36, II (Supp.1992), it was also overhauling RSA chapter 91-A into its modern form. Compare N.H.H.R.Jour. 615-18 (1986) (discussing judiciary...