Union Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Frohard

• Decision Date: 31 October 1890
• Citation: 134 Ill. 228,25 N.E. 642
• Parties: UNION MUT. ACC. ASS'N v. FROHARD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

134 Ill. 228

25 N.E. 642

UNION MUT. ACC. ASS'N

v.FROHARD.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 31, 1890.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.John M. Hamilton, (Charles C. Gilbert, of counsel,) for appellant.

Hamline & Scott, for appellee.

BAKER, J.

On the 1st day of September, 1885, one John Frohard was accepted as a member of the Union Mutual Accident Association, and a certificate of insurance was issued to him. On January 26, 1887, while hunting with a gun, he accidentally shot and killed himself. The appellee, Minna Frohard, who is his widow, and the beneficiary named in the certificate, filed this bill in equity against the corporation, for the purpose of compelling it to levy an assessment of $2 for each member of the association liable at the date of the accident, for the purpose of paying the amount of $5,000, specified in the certificate, or such part thereof as might be collected on the assessment; and praying, also, for general relief, and that, in the event there was a deficiency in the amount collected on the assessment, the corporation and its officers be decreed to pay the difference between the amount so collected and $5,000. Answer and replication having been filed, the cause was heard in the circuit court of Cook county, and that court found the allegations of the bill of complaint to be true, and entered a decree in conformity with the special prayers thereof. The decree was affirmed, on appeal, in the appellate court of the first district; and the record was brought to this court by a further appeal.

Section 2 of article 10 of the by-laws of appellant is as follows: ‘Sec. 2. Any member, who shall change his occupation to any other more hazardous than the one in which he was classified when insured, shall immediately notify the secretary of such change; and any member, receiving an injury while engaged temporarily, or otherwise, in another occupation more hazardous than the one in which he was engaged when insured, he, of his beneficiary, shall be entitled to receive only such indemnity as provided for in the class or occupation in which he is engaged at the time of the injury; and such shall be payment in full upon the part of the company.’ Article 14 of the by-laws classified certificates of insurance against accidents, and placed them in six divisions, designated, respectively, as ‘A,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ ‘D,’ ‘E,’ and ‘F.’ This classification purported to be and was solely upon the basis of occupations, the least hazardous occupations being placed in division A, the extrahazardous occupations in division F, and other occupations in one or another of the intermediate divisions. It was provided in said article that, in the event of the death by accident of a member in division A, a sum not exceeding $5,000 should be paid, and that in the event of such death of a member of division E, which was designated therein as ‘hazardous,’ a sum not exceeding $1,000 should be paid. Merchants were placed in division A, and hunters in division E. A claim is also made by appellant that, subsequent to the issuance of the certificate here in controversy, and prior to the death of John Frohard, a change was made in its by-laws, whereby the amount to be paid to a beneficiary, in case of the death by accident of a member in division E, was reduced from $1,000 to $500. The certificate or policy of insurance which was issued to John Frohard provided, among other things, as follows: ‘That John Frohard, by occupation, profession, or employment, a merchant, residing at Sparta, state of Illinois, is accepted as a member in division A of said association, subject to all the requirements, and entitled to all the benefits, thereof, as provided in the by-laws, and that said member, in case of death occurring through external, violent, and accidental injuries, is entitled to participate in the mortuary or relief fund of the association, not to exceed the amount of $5,000, which sum, or such a part thereof as may be collected for that purpose by the payment of one regular assessment of two dollars ($2) for each member of the association, liable at the date of the accident, shall within sixty (60) days after sufficient proofs have been received, be paid to his wife, Minna, if surviving. * * * It is expressly stipulated and agreed that in the event of the member being either fatally injured, or otherwise disabled, while engaged temporarily, or otherwise, in any act or occupation classed as more hazardous than the one in which he is accepted, according to the classification given by the rates and by-laws of this association, (or if not specially mentioned, approximating thereto,) then an amount shall be paid equal to the rate of the occupation in which the member is engaged when receiving the injury, and such amount shall be payment in full upon the part of the association. * * * It is expressly stipulated and agreed that this certificate is issued and accepted, subject to all the provisions, conditions, limitations, and exceptions herein contained, or referred to.’

The principal contention of appellant is that the deceased was killed while engaged temporarily in an act or occupation classed as more hazardous than the one in which he was accepted, and that appellee is therefore entitled to recover only the amount provided for such hazardous risk and occupation. The contention of appellee is that there was no change of occupation, within the meaning of the bylaws and certificate of insurance. The deceased was a hardware merchant. He did not follow the occupation of a hunter for hire or profit. He was killed while engaged in the act of hunting as a recreation, and it does not appear that he had hunted with a gun on any occasion since the issuance of the policy other than that upon which the accident occurred. In our examination of the provisions of the by-laws and contract of insurance, we will first ascertain the proper construction to be placed upon the former. The language of section 2, as we have heretofore seen, is: ‘Any member receiving an injury while engaged temporarily, or otherwise, in an occupation more hazardous than the one in which he was engaged when insured,’ etc. ‘Occupation’ is defined by lexicographers to mean ‘that which occupies or engages the time or attention; the principal business of one's life; vocation; employment; calling; trade.’ The classification of hazards in article 14 of the by-laws is made upon the basis of occupations. Merchants, and those following other like vocations are placed in division A; grain-measurers and others in division B; paperhangers and others in division C; teamsters and others in division D; and boatmen and others in division E. The by-laws in question must receive a reasonable construction. It would be unreasonable and absurd to hold that the merchant, who at one time measured a few bushels of grain, at another hung a few rolls of wall-paper upon his own premises, at another drove a team of horses in a carriage or wagon, and at still another rowed a skiff for exercise or recreation, became, within the true intent and meaning of these by-laws, at these several times, a grain measurer, a paper-hanger, a teamster, and a boatman, respectively. The word ‘occupation,’ as found in these by-laws, must be held to have reference to the vocation, profession, trade, or calling, which the assured is engaged in for hire, or for profit, and not as precluding him from the performance of acts and duties which are simply incidents connected with the daily life of men in any or all occupations; or from engaging in mere acts of exercise, diversion, or recreation. This view is not subversive of the word ‘temporarily’ found in said section 2, for...