Union Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Hines

• Decision Date: 19 October 1900
• Citation: 58 N.E. 405,187 Ill. 109
• Parties: UNION NAT. BANK OF CHICAGO v. HINES.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

187 Ill. 109

58 N.E. 405

UNION NAT. BANK OF CHICAGO

v.HINES.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1900.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Bill by Edward Hines against the Union National Bank of Chicago. From a judgment of the appellate court (88 Ill.App. 245) affirming a decree in favor of complainant, defendant bank appeals. Affirmed.

1. Plaintiff sued for the return of certain stock certificates deposited with a bank as collateral security for his nonnegotiable note, of which the bank was assignee. He alleged as a set-off certain notes paid by him for his payee on a guaranty, and prayed that on his payment of any excess due on his note, after allowing the set-off claimed, the stock certificates should be returned. On the reversal of a decree against him, the lower court was directed to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of his bill. It was accordingly decreed that on payment or tender of the sum found to remain due from complainant after allowing his set-off, the bank should return the stock. On appeal from this decree, the bank contended that it did not conform to the judgment of reversal, because the legal availability of certain defenses to the set-off had been determined in its favor on the former appeal. Held that, as the lower court had no discretion under the mandate of reversal to open the case for further hearing, its entry of a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill was not error.

2. Complainant sued for the return of certain stock certificates deposited as collateral security with a bank which was the assignee of his nonnegotiable note. He alleged as a set-off to this note certain notes paid by him for his payee on a guaranty. The bank answered that complainant had not paid the face of the notes sought to be set off, and that part of the consideration for them had failed before his payment. A decree against complainant was reversed on appeal, and the lower court directed to enter a decree for him in accordance with the prayer of his bill. On appeal from the decree so entered, the bank contended that, the legal availability of its defense having been determined in its favor on the former appeal, it should have been allowed to present them on the remand of the case. Held that, as its defenses had been fully presented on the first appeal, and also on petition for rehearing, the former decision was res judicata, and hence the lower court committed no error in entering the second decree.

Tenney, McConnell, Coffeen & Harding, for appellant. Moran, Mayer & Meyer, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J.

This case has been before this court before, and is reported as Bank v. Hines, 177 Ill. 417, 53 N.E. 83. A reference to that decision will show what the facts in the case are without repeating them. The decision of this court upon the former hearing of the cause resulted in affirming the judgment of the appellate court, which was then brought before us for review. In Bank v. Hines, supra, we said: “We are satisfied there is no error in the judgment of the appellate court in reversing the decree below, the allegations of the bill being substantially proven upon the hearing.” The superior court had rendered a decree finding that the guaranty of the present appellee, as set forth in his letter to McElwee & Carney, dated March 22, 1893, was executed for the fraudulent purpose of creating evidence of an apparent defense to the note of $15,000, executed by appellee on June 27, 1892, and payable on or before May 1, 1895, to the order of S.B. Barker. This decree of the superior court was reversed by the appellate court, and this court affirmed the action of the appellate court in so reversing the decree. The affirmance of the judgment of the appellate court by this court left nothing further to be done, except to carry into effect the mandate of the appellate court. The judgment of the appellate court, which was here for review upon the former appeal, ordered that “the decree of the superior court of Cook county in this behalf rendered be reversed, annulled, set aside, and wholly for nothing esteemed, with directions to the superior court of Cook county to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the original bill filed by appellant.” When the case went back to the superior court, it was the duty of that court, under the judgment of the appellate court, “to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the original bill filed by appellant,” the appellant there being the present appellee. In accordance with this direction of the appellate court, the superior court entered a decree on April 26, 1899. The present appellant, the Union National Bank of Chicago, prayed an appeal from this latter decree to the appellate court, and the appellate court has affirmed said decree. The present appeal is prosecuted from this judgment of affirmance.

The only question in the case is whether the decree of the superior court obeys the mandate of the appellate court embodied in the judgment rendered by the latter court, which was affirmed by this court. The present appellant, the Union National Bank of Chicago, was the holder of the note for $15,000, made by the present appellee to Barker's order on June 27, 1892; and it held, for the purpose of securing the payment of that note, certain shares of the capital stock of the Edward Hines Lumber Company. Under the letter of March 22, 1893, written by appellee to McElwee & Carney, appellee had guarantied the payment of certain notes executed by S.B. Barker & Co. to the order of McElwee & Carney, dated March 16, 1893, and given for the purchase of lumber. The four of these notes, mentioned and described in the original bill in this cause, amounted in the aggregate to $16,426.06. There was another note for about $5,000, which was transferred to one...