Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Crane

Decision Date24 February 1972
Docket Number5 Div. 909
Citation258 So.2d 882,288 Ala. 173
CourtAlabama Supreme Court
PartiesUNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, a California Corporation, et al. v. Clyde Huey CRANE. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, a California Corporation, et al. v. John Paul CRANE. ,-A.

Hill, Hill, Stovall, Carter & Franco and Harry Cole, Montgomery, William O. Walton, Jr., Lafayette, for appellant Union Oil Company of California, J. A. Hines, Lafayette, for appellant Floyd Britt.

Samford, Torbert, Denson & Horsley, Opelika, Hubert Benson, Lanett, for appellees.

HEFLIN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from verdicts and judgments rendered in the consolidated suits of Clyde Huey Crane and his father, John Paul Crane, against Union Oil Company of California, a California corporation, and Floyd Britt, doing business as Britt's Pure Oil Service Station, which said suits involved personal injuries sustained by the son and derivative damages to the father.

The complaints as originally filed named as defendants Jerri Sturkie; Floyd Britt, d/b/a Britt's Pure Oil Service Station; Pure Oil Corporation; Stadevco, Inc.; and numerous fictitious defendants. Union Oil Company of California was substituted by amendment in place of ABC, a fictitious defendant. A stipulation made at the beginning of the trial and testimony developed at the trial indicated Stadevco, Inc., Union Oil Company of California, and Pure Oil Company were really one 'in' the same corporation, and through amendments and dismissals the only corporate defendant at the conclusion of the trial was Union Oil Company of California, a California corporation, doing business as Pure Oil Company, and the only individual defendant remaining was Floyd Britt, doing business as Britt's Pure Oil Service Station.

Floyd Britt, on November 28, 1968, operated a Pure Oil Service Station in Langdale, Alabama. On that date the plaintiff, Clyde Huey Crane, was an invitee in the Britt station having work done on his brother's automobile. An automobile belonging to Miss Jerri Sturkie was driven into the station by a friend of Miss Sturkie, for the purpose of having a brake defect identified and corrected. Miss Sturkie was a passenger in the automobile at the time. After a preliminary examination revealed a leak in a brake line, Floyd Britt, at the request of Miss Sturkie, proceeded to drive the automobile onto a Joyce drive-on hydraulic lift located in a bay in the station building. Britt was unable to stop the automobile, whereupon the front wheels ran over the angled flanges on the back ends of the runners and the front end of the automobile struck the plaintiff, Clyde Huey Crane, breaking his leg.

There was testimony, though disputed, that Floyd Britt requested Clyde Crane to guide the automobile onto the lift. While Crane was standing in front of the lift guiding it on, Mr. Britt drove the Sturkie automobile onto the lift but was unable to stop it when the brakes did not work. Clyde Crane testified that Miss Sturkie asked Mr. Britt to drive the car upon the rack (lift) and to be real careful, whereupon, Mr. Britt responded that he thought there was enough brake fluid to stop it. There was disputed testimony that as Britt approached the rack, the automobile was not going fast enough to drive onto it and Britt allowed it to roll back and then 'kinda scratched off and the car jumped upon the rack.' When Britt applied the brakes, the auto would not stop and it hit Clyde Crane, pinning him between a table and the front of the car. Britt admitted it was dangerous to drive the car upon the ramp of the lift in the automobile's condition. Cylde Crane testified that Britt admitted to him that he (Britt) was at fault and should not have asked Crane to help him guide the auto upon the lift. Mr. Britt denied he ever made such admissions to Clyde Crane.

Union Oil Company contends that its request for the affirmative charge should have been granted and that the motion for a new trial should also have been granted because the evidence in the cases failed to meet the respective requirements of law pertaining to the allowance of a jury determination in the case.

On the other hand, the appellees argue that the case was properly submitted to the jury because of the duty of the owner (Union Oil Company) of the premises or the duty of the landlord (Union Oil Company) to invitees on the premises to maintain the hydraulic lift in a safe condition where the owner or landlord retains the right of maintenance of the lift. In addition to these theories the appellees further argue that the case was properly submitted to the jury since from the evidence in the case the jury could have imposed liability on Union Oil Company through the principle of respondeat superior, if it found that an agency was created by estoppel.

It was admitted by the appellees at the trial that there was probably no evidence of a latent defect in the lift and the trial judge charged out the causes of action dependent upon proof of a latent defect. Therefore under the posture of this case on appeal it is not necessary to consider those counts of the complaint which charged Union Oil Company with a duty based upon latent defects of the hydraulic lift.

All of the other alleged causes of action pertaining to the duty of an owner or of a landlord contained allegations that the lift was imminently or inherently dangerous. A consideration of whether the evidence presented a jury question as to whether the hydraulic lift was imminently or inherently dangerous is necessary. First, it is important to understand that the drive-on hydraulic lift at the time the automobile ran off of it was not up in the air. It was on the floor. Its elevating mechanism had not been activated. The pertinent portions of the hydraulic lift were two metal runners 'wide enough' for the front and back wheels on one side of the car to rest upon that runner, and for the front and back wheels on the other side of the car to rest upon the other runner. At the entrance point of each runner there was a portion of it designed in a ramp fashion to allow the wheels of a motor vehicle to run up on the runners. The elevation of the runners before receiving hydraulic lifting was approximately four (4) inches above the floor. The bottom of the tires of the Ford automobile on the occasion of the accident would have also been approximately four (4) inches above the floor when the automobile was on the lift. At the opposite end of the lift from the entrance end on each runner, there was an angled flange which was approximately eight (8) inches wide and which extended approximately five (5) inches above the runner. The purpose of the flanges was to prevent an automobile from rolling off that end when the lift was elevated. The description of the angles of the flanges varied. Most of the testimony placed the angle at a 30-degree angle. An inspection of the photographs of the lift reveals that the angle of these flanges was approximately thirty degrees.

There was undisputed evidence that similar Joyce drive-on hydraulic lifts were in common use at the time of the accident. In fact there was undisputed testimony that more than 300 similar Joyce drive-on hydraulic lifts were being used in Alabama in Pure Oil (Union Oil) stations at the time of the collision.

The appellees contend that a newer type of lift, known as a rotary frame control lift, had been delivered to the Britt's Service Station premises approximately two weeks prior to the accident and that such newer lift remained there for three or four months after the accident before it was installed. The appellees also contend that a jury issue was made because Mr. Britt testified that the new rotary frame contact lift was safer and better engineered than the Joyce drive-on hydraulic lift. However, we are persuaded that such evidence is insufficient to make a jury issue concerning whether the Joyce drive-on hydraulic lift was imminently or inherently dangerous.

For discussion of imminent and inherently dangerous instrumentalities, see Defore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 105 So.2d 846 and Harnischfeger Corporation v. Harris, 280 Ala. 93, 190 So.2d 286.

The crux of the inquiry is to determine whether or not the angled flanges of the hydraulic lift were designed so that the owner or the landlord knew, or should have known, that the accident in question would occur. It is this Court's opinion that the design of the angled flanges was not such that the injury should have been reasonably anticipated (See: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Morris, 273 Ala. 218, 222, 136 So.2d 883), or the danger of injury could reasonably be expected (See Greyhound Corporation v. Brown, 269 Ala. 520, 526, 113 So.2d 916), or that Union Oil 'had a probable knowledge of danger, or that the nature of the thing would probably cause injury or that it was reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril' (See Defore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 233, 105 So.2d 846, 851).

Next, this Court directs its attention to whether or not the evidence in this case justified the submission to the jury of the issue of whether Union Oil Company was liable for the acts of Floyd Britt in driving the automobile on this occasion and allowing it to strike Clyde Huey Crane. Under the theory that the doctrine of respondeat superior was brought into play by estoppel, the appellees contend that the following facts were sufficient to create a master-servant relationship between Floyd Britt and Union Oil Company by estoppel.

Mr. Britt signed a lease with Pure Oil Company in April of 1959 and continued to operate the station from that date through the time of the accident. Clyde Crane had traded almost exclusively with this station for one and one-half years before the accident. Clyde Crane came on the premises strictly for business. The station had a large sign indicating it was a Pure Oil station, and another sign read 'Britt's Pure Oil...

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