Union Oil Co. of California v. Colglazier

• Decision Date: 21 July 1978
• Citation: 360 So.2d 965
• Parties: UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation v. Jane Ellen COLGLAZIER, etc., et al. 77-332.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 965

360 So.2d 965

UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation v. Jane Ellen COLGLAZIER, etc., et al.

77-332.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 21, 1978.

Rae M. Crowe and Charles J. Fleming, Mobile, for appellant.

Edwin J. Curran, Jr. of Vickers, Riis, Murray & Curran, Mobile, for appellees: Jane Ellen Colglazier, as Trustee, The First Nat. Bank of Mobile and Jay P. Altmayer, as Trustees under the will of Marvin C. Altmayer, deceased, Harry H. Riddick, Kenneth R. Giddens, Zelma K. Giddens, and The First Nat. Bank of Mobile, as Trustee under the Giddens Land and Mineral Trust.

Norton Brooker, Jr. of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, Mobile, for appellee, South Ala. Pulpwood, Inc.

BLOODWORTH, Justice.

Union Oil Company (Union) appeals from the grant of a summary judgment for plaintiffs, Colglazier, et al., and the denial of its own motion for summary judgment, in a declaratory judgment action in which plaintiffs were found to own an undivided one-half interest in and to all the oil, gas and minerals in a tract of land in Mobile County, free and clear of an oil, gas and mineral lease held by the defendant, Union. We affirm.

Plaintiffs are grantees of Conservation & Land Company (Conservation), which originally owned both the surface and minerals of the land in question, the Northwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 2 South, Range 2 West, Mobile County, Alabama. Conservation conveyed this land to one C. C. Huxford, "excepting, however, all oil, gas and minerals in and under said lands." This deed was recorded. Huxford then conveyed the land to one G. C. Coggin Company, Inc., stating that all oil, gas and mineral rights to this tract and to some other parcels conveyed in the same instrument "are excepted, these rights having been reserved in previous conveyances." This deed is also of record. Coggin Company conveyed the land back to Conservation along with several other parcels, subject to the following reservation:

"The grantor expressly reserves to itself, and unto its successors and assigns, an undivided one-half interest in whatever interest it now owns in the oil, gas and minerals lying in, under or upon said lands."

It is undisputed that Coggin Company never owned any mineral rights in the land in question. This deed also was recorded.

Following the conveyance from Coggin Company, Conservation once again owned both the surface and the minerals of the subject parcel. It then conveyed this land and several other tracts to Celeste Land Company (Celeste), a new corporation with the same shareholders as Conservation. This deed, the interpretation of which is the subject of this suit, is a "statutory warranty deed" conveying the land "subject to all of the easements, reservations and restrictive covenants, if any, lawfully existing with respect thereto." This deed was also recorded. Included in the description of the land conveyed was this provision: "All of Section Twelve (12), except the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4), and except as hereinafter expressly set forth." Following the description of the tracts conveyed was this language:

"2. There are expressly excepted from the real property described under Paragraph 1 hereinabove the following:

(c) An undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to the oil, gas and minerals lying in, under or upon the Northwest Quarter (NW 1/4) of Section Twelve (12), Township Two South, Range Two West (T2S, R2W), same having been reserved to G. C. Coggin Company, Inc., in the certain deed dated December 22, 1950, recorded in Deed Book 520, page 86, of said Probate Records. . . ."

The question to be decided is whether through this deed Celeste obtained title to all of the oil, gas and minerals or whether title to an undivided one-half interest remained in Conservation.

Plaintiffs claim title through subsequent conveyances from Conservation, each claiming to own a certain fractional part of the undivided one-half mineral interest. They brought a declaratory judgment action, alleging that Union claimed that the entire mineral interest was under lease to it by virtue of an oil, gas and mineral lease executed by Celeste, purporting to cover all of the mineral interest without exception or reservation. Both plaintiffs and Union moved for summary judgment. The court granted plaintiffs' motion and denied Union's, holding that the deed from Conservation to Celeste conveyed only an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and minerals and that the plaintiffs owned their fractional interests free and clear of Union's lease. Union appealed.

The significant language in the Conservation-to-Celeste deed is "same having been reserved to G. C. Coggin Company, Inc."

Union's position is that this phrase made the conveyance subject to a mineral interest erroneously thought to be in a third party who had no such interest, and that this erroneous reference did not withhold the mineral interest from the conveyance as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs contend that there was a clear exception ¹ from the conveyance of an undivided one-half interest in the minerals and that the quoted language is merely a recital of an erroneous reason for the exception which does not avoid the effect of the exception. The trial court was correct in finding for the plaintiffs.

The basic objective in construing the terms of a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially the grantor, and if that intention can be found from the entire instrument, arbitrary rules of construction need not be used. Financial Investment Corp. v. Tukabatchee Area Council, Inc., 353 So.2d 1389, 1391 (Ala.1977).

A starting point is provided by § 35-4-2 (Code 1975), which states as follows:

"Every estate in lands is to be taken as a fee simple, although the words necessary to create an estate of inheritance are not used, unless it clearly appears that a less estate was intended."

Upon consideration of the entire deed, when it clearly appears that the grantor intended to reserve or except mineral rights, the reservation or exception will be good, even though the granting or habendum clause contains words of inheritance. Holmes v. Compton, 273 Ala. 554, 142 So.2d 697 (1962).

We find that the deed in question, taken as a whole, is not ambiguous and clearly expresses an intention to except from the grant an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and minerals. The clause referring to the prior reservation is merely an erroneous recitation of fact, and does not operate to void the exception or pass the entire fee interest.

Our conclusion finds support in cases from other jurisdictions involving similar situations. In Wilson v. Gerard, 213 Miss. 177, 56 So.2d 471 (1952), the grantor conveyed certain tracts by warranty deed "(s)ubject to one-half interest in mineral and oil rights as conveyed to Wm. Henderson." In fact, there was no prior conveyance and no such person as "Wm. Henderson." Title to the one-half mineral interest remained in the grantor, and the grantee was deemed to own only what he was purchasing all the land and one-half of the minerals.

In Oldham v. Fortner, 221 Miss. 732, 74 So.2d 824 (1954), the grantor conveyed land "except all minerals and mineral rights, heretofore sold and conveyed." This was held to be a valid exception of all of the mineral rights, whether or not the prior conveyance of mineral rights was valid.

In Pich v. Lankford, 157 Tex. 335, 302 S.W.2d 645 (1957), the Texas Supreme Court construed two deeds, the first containing the following language after the description of the land: "Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under said land, which have been heretofore reserved." The second deed contained this language following the description of the land conveyed: "Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the Southwest Quarter thereof, . ....