Union Pac. R. Co. v. Olive, 11200.

Citation156 F.2d 737
Decision Date16 July 1946
Docket NumberNo. 11200.,11200.
PartiesUNION PAC. R. CO. et al. v. OLIVE.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Leo A. McNamee and Frank McNamee, Jr., both of Las Vegas, Nev., for appellant.

Ham & Taylor, A. W. Ham, and Ryland G. Taylor, all of Las Vegas, Nev., for appellee.

Before GARRECHT, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.

Appellee brought an action against appellants for damages in the sum of $64,742.08 for violation of the agreement hereafter described. Appellants answered, a trial was had, a verdict was rendered against appellants for $8,675.40, and judgment was entered on the verdict. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellee was an employee of appellants from May 9, 1925, to October 20, 1936. He was a carman — an inspector and repairer of cars. On February 25, 1934, he was injured while at work and was thereby disabled. He therefore applied for and obtained leaves of absence covering the period from February 25, 1934, to May 25, 1936. On and after June 3, 1934, he was a member of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America. The Brotherhood was the duly authorized bargaining agency of its members. On November 1, 1934, it made an agreement with appellants for the benefit of its members. The agreement was in writing and was in effect at all times after November 1, 1934. Its pertinent provisions were:

"Rule 37. No employee shall be disciplined without a fair hearing by a designated officer of the carrier. Suspension in proper cases pending a hearing, which shall be prompt, shall not be deemed a violation of this rule. At a reasonable time prior to the hearing such employee will be apprised of the precise charge against him. The employee shall have reasonable opportunity to secure the presence of necessary witnesses and shall have the right to be there represented by counsel of his choosing. If it is found that an employee has been unjustly suspended or dismissed from the service, such employee shall be reinstated with his seniority rights unimpaired, and compensated for the wage loss, if any, resulting from said suspension or dismissal.

"Rule 38. No journeyman or regular helper who has been in the service of the railroad ninety days shall be dismissed for incompetency, neither shall an employee be discharged for any cause without first being given an investigation.

* * * * * * *

"Rule 45. Employees injured while at work are required to make a detailed written report of the circumstances of the accident just as soon as they are able to do so after receiving medical attention. Proper medical attention shall be given at the earliest possible moment and employees shall be permitted to return to work just as soon as they are able to do so, pending final settlement of the case, provided, however, that such injured employees remaining away from work after recovery shall not be held to be entitled to compensation for wage loss after they are able to return to work. * * *"

On or before May 25, 1936, appellee, claiming that he had recovered from his injury and disability, offered to return to work, but was not permitted to do so. This action was commenced on March 31, 1941. The complaint alleged, in substance and effect, that on May 25, 1936, and at all times thereafter appellee was ready, able and willing to perform his duties; that appellants suspended him from service on May 25, 1936, and, without any hearing or investigation, dismissed and discharged him on August 20, 1936; that he had requested appellants to reinstate him and to compensate him for time lost since May 25, 1936; and that they had failed and refused to do so. The answer denied these allegations, but the evidence showed or tended to show that they were true, except that, instead of August 20, 1936, the date of appellee's dismissal and discharge was October 20, 1936. Thus, in effect, the complaint alleged, and the evidence showed or tended to show, that the agreement of November 1, 1934,1 was violated by appellants on May 25, 1936, and continuously thereafter.

The answer alleged that appellee was notified on May 25, 1938, that he would be returned to work if he could pass the physical examination required of carmen. The evidence showed that appellee was notified that he would be returned to work if he waived his claim for compensation for time lost since May 25, 1936, and not otherwise.

The answer alleged that appellee refused to return to work except on condition that he be compensated for time lost since May, 1935. The evidence showed that appellee offered to return to work, unconditionally; that...

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8 cases
  • Shipley v. Pittsburgh & LER Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • March 8, 1949
    ...Cent. R. Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754, 85 L.Ed. 1089; Beeler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 169 F.2d 557; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Olive, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 737. The ultimate issues relate (a) The interpretation and construction of the 1928 and 1936 Contracts. (b) The authority of......
  • Jenkins v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1952
    ...754, 85 L.Ed. 1089. Some cases reach a different result, Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 180 Miss. 276, 176 So. 593; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Olive, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 737. Defendant's position is that, regardless of the law of which state governs the interpretation of the contract and a det......
  • Poppert v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • September 3, 1971
    ...not required the state statute of limitations on written contracts applies. Moore v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., Supra, Union Pac. R. Co. v. Olive, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 737; Davis v. Rush (Tex.Civ.App.), 288 S.W. This opinion is not to be taken as expressing any view on the substantive claims of......
  • Sandobal v. Armour and Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 4, 1970
    ...six years for actions "founded upon an instrument in writing," rather than one of four years for oral contracts. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Olive, 156 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1946). It is interesting to note that one of the cases relied upon by the court in its decision is the Nebraska case of Rentsc......
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