Union Pac Ry Co v. Harris

• Decision Date: 20 May 1895
• Docket Number: No. 896,896
• Citation: 158 U.S. 326,15 S.Ct. 843,39 L.Ed. 1003
• Parties: UNION PAC. RY. CO. v. HARRIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

158 U.S. 326

15 S.Ct. 843

39 L.Ed. 1003

UNION PAC. RY. CO.

v HARRIS.

No. 896.

May 20, 1895.

Willard Teller, Sam'l Shellabarger, and J. M. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. G. Vest, for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

The complaint alleged Harris to be 'a citizen of the state of Colorado,' and complained of 'the Union Pacific Railway Company, defendant, which was heretofore and now is duly chartered and organized under and by virtue of the laws of the United States, and having its principal place of business in the city of Omaha and state of Nebraska, and is now, and was at the time and times hereinafter stated, a citizen of the state of Nebraska.' The motion to dismiss is made upon the ground that the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was final, inasmuch as the jurisdiction was dependent upon the opposite parties being citizens of different states. As, however, the judgments of the circuit courts of appeals are final in this class of cases only when the jurisdiction is dependent 'entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or controversy being aliens and citizens of the United States or citizens of different states,' plaintiff in error insists that this judgment was not final, since the jurisdiction depended not solely on diverse citizenship, but also upon the fact that plaintiff in error was a federal corporation.

In Railroad Co. v. Amato, 144 U. S. 465, 12 Sup. Ct. 740, a suit was brought in the supreme court of New York against the railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, and was removed by the defendant into the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of New York on the ground that it arose under an act of congress, in that the defendant was a corporation created thereby, and a writ of error to the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit was sustained. In that case the citizenship of the plaintiff was not mentioned in the complaint or in the petition for removal, and the petition stated that the action arose under an act of congress. It was accordingly held that the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was not made final by section 6 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891. In the present case jurisdiction was invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship; and it is said that that was the sole ground, and that the reference to the authority under which the corporation was chartered and organized was merely incidental; and, further that, as the case did not involve the validity or construction of the charter of plaintiff in error, no federal question arose. It is not for us to inquire why writs of error to circuit courts of appeals in actions for damages for negligence of railroad corporations should be allowed simply because the cop orations are chartered under the laws of the United States, in a statute whose object was to relieve an overburdened court, since such is the effect of the statute according to its plain language. Nevertheless, as plaintiff below appears to have really proceeded on the ground of diverse citizenship, we think there was color for the motion to dismiss, although, as the other fact upon which jurisdiction could be predicated existed, we are obliged to overrule it. But this brings us to the motion to affirm, which, as we do not need further argument, we proceed to dispose of.

The complaint alleged that plaintiff on July 30, 1892, was a passenger for hire upon one of defendant's coaches in a train with a locomotive, being operated and conducted by defendant between the city of Georgetown and the city of Denver, defendant being, by the terms of the contract of passage, bound to deliver plaintiff safely at Denver, having undertaken to carry and convey him in safety to that city, and to use due care and diligence thereabout; but that defendant, in disregard of its undertaking and promise and its duty in that behalf, carelessly and negligently ran one or more of its freight cars out on one of its sidings, known as 'Silver Age Mill Siding,' and negligently left the same insecure and unsafe, and in such a position and condition as to interfere with the passage of the train of cars upon which plaintiff had passage, along the main line of defendant's track, so that, when the train upon which plaintiff was a passenger came along, it ran into this freight car, and the injuries complained of were inflicted. This was supported by the evidence, from which it also appeared that the freight car in question was loaded for the Silver Age Mill Company with coal, and was unloaded by that company's men.

The defendant, in its answer, denied all negligence, but admitted 'that it had standing upon its side track, at about the place mentioned in said complaint, one or more freight cars, but denies that the said freight cars were left insecure or unsafe, or in such a position as to interfere with the passage of the train of cars upon which this plaintiff was riding.' The answer contained no allegation or suggestion that any other company had any control over the side track or the freight cars, or that any other company was in any manner responsible for the negligence which resulted in the collision.

The circuit court charged the jury that 'there is no room for controversy, notwithstanding the fact that this car was delivered to the mining company filled with coal, and for the use of the mining company, and that it would seem from the evidence that, after unloading the car, it was not sufficiently fastened in respect of the brakes; perhaps it was necessary to block the wheels also in such a place as that; but that whatever was necessary to keep it securely in place upon the side track was not done, and it moved down upon the track so as to overthrow the cars in the train which came down with the plaintiff. The act of negligence of the servants of the mining company is to be ascribed to the defendant. In other words, the railway company, as to its passengers, is bound to keep its track clear from obstructions of this kind, to see that the cars which it uses on side tracks are secured in place, so that they will not come upon the track to overthrow any train that may come along; and there seems to be no question but that the car in which plaintiff was riding was overthrown by the freight car coming down from the switch or side track, and onto the main track, in collision with the cars of the train which carried the plaintiff.'

To the giving of these instructions defendant excepted. But we agree with the circuit court of appeals that, on the evidence and under the pleadings, there was no reversible error therein; and that this is so as to the motion at the conclusion of the evidence by defendant...