Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Louisiana ex rel. Ieyoub, CIV.A. 97-872-B-M1.

Decision Date05 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 97-872-B-M1.,CIV.A. 97-872-B-M1.
Citation32 F.Supp.2d 377
PartiesUNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. State of LOUISIANA ex. rel. Richard P. IEYOUB, Attorney General, and Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

Sam A. Leblanc, III, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, LA, Warren E. Byrd, II, Robert Layne Coco, Adams & Reese, Baton Rouge, LA, for Union Pacific Railroad Company.

Paul Edward Schexnayder, Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Baton Rouge, LA, for Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police.

RULING

POLOZOLA, Chief Judge.

This case requires the Court to determine whether federal law preempts a state law which governs the conduct of railroads transporting hazardous materials. Specifically, the Court must determine whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:15101 is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)2 and/or the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)3.

This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. For reasons which follow, the Court finds that Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is preempted by the FRSA4 insofar as it applies to railroads.5

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arose out of two incidents which occurred while plaintiff's trains were transporting hazardous materials. The first incident, which occurred on August 30, 1995, involved the derailment of three tank cars carrying corrosive liquid. While none of the cars overturned, one of the cars did incur damage to its outer jacket; the parties dispute whether there was any damage to the inner jacket of this car. Furthermore, the parties disagree over whether there was a "threat of release" from any of the tank cars. There was no leakage of any material and no one was killed, injured, or required medical treatment as a result of this incident. Plaintiff estimated the damage to the tank car was less than $50,000. The Louisiana State Police cited plaintiff for a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 for its failure to make proper notification of the incident to the Louisiana State Police and proposed a penalty of $2,500.

The second incident, which occurred on February 18, 1997, involved the derailment of four tank cars carrying different flammable liquids. None of the cars overturned and there was no leakage of any material; furthermore, no one was killed, injured, or required medical treatment as a result of the incident. Plaintiff estimated the damage to the tank cars was less than $50,000. Once again, the parties disagree over whether there was a "threat of release" from any of the tank cars. Plaintiff was cited for a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 for its failure to timely report the incident and a penalty of $5,000 was proposed.

In response to both enforcement actions, plaintiff filed a notice to stop further administrative enforcement and notified the Louisiana State Police of the federal laws it alleged preempted Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510. The State Police has refused to voluntarily dismiss the enforcement actions.

The plaintiff now asserts, via its motion for summary judgment, that the FRSA and the HMTA enacted by Congress preempt Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510. Thus, plaintiff contends that Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is unconstitutional pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution insofar as it applies to railroads.6 Further, plaintiff asserts that Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.7 Finally, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant's enforcement of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 against railroads.

Defendant disputes plaintiff's claims and contends that the FRSA and the HMTA do not preempt Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510; further, defendant asserts that Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is not in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution since it does not create an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ANALYSIS

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."8

The well-established criteria that there must be no genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment will issue insures that a properly supported motion will not be defeated simply by the "existence of some alleged factual dispute."9 With respect to materiality, because the underlying substantive law is referenced to determine what facts are material,10 only factual disputes that might affect the action's outcome under governing law can properly preclude summary judgment; disputes over facts which have no effect on the action's resolution are irrelevant.11 However, even if material, a factual dispute will not prevent summary judgment if the dispute is not "genuine." Such a conclusion is reached when the evidence could not lead a rational trier of fact to return a verdict for the non-moving party.12 In examining the record, the Court will view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party.13

In this situation, both plaintiff and defendant have filed motions, and the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the issues at trial. Where the moving party bears the burden of persuasion on an issue at trial, the moving party must not only satisfy the initial burden of production on the summary judgment motion by demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on the claim itself by showing that it would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at trial.14 However, the Court need not determine whether the moving party has carried its ultimate burden of persuasion until after the movant's initial burden of production has been fulfilled. Upon such a showing by the movant, the nonmoving party is required to come forward with evidence which demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue for trial. When all the evidence presented by both parties "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and summary judgment is proper.15

In a situation where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial, the movant may discharge its burden by simply informing the Court of the basis for its motion and either producing evidence that negates the existence of a material element in the non-moving party's claim or defense or identifying to the Court those portions of the record which demonstrate the lack of proof supporting a crucial element of the non-movant's case.16

Once the moving party makes the proper showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to designate "specific facts" in the record, by way of non-conclusory affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, which evidence that there is a genuine issue for trial.17 Because it bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the nonmoving party is required to establish each element crucial to its action "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non[-]moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."18 The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving party's pleadings and "must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."19 When all the evidence presented by both parties "could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and summary judgment is proper.20

III. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

Three issues are presented by the parties' cross motions for summary judgment: (1) whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is preempted by FRSA; (2) whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is preempted by HMTA; and (3) whether Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 is in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

FRSA PREEMPTION

The question of whether the provisions of FRSA preempt Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1510 can be answered by looking at the language of FRSA's preemptive provision:

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order-

(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard;

(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and

(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.21

The Fifth Circuit as well as the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found this language to evince Congress' intent to supersede the police power of the states and to establish nationally uniform railroad safety regulations.22

However, the Fifth Circuit has also held that the preemptive effect of FRSA, while a general rule, is not ironclad; rather, the language of 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (1997 and Supp. 1998) contains two narrow exceptions or situations in which the states may regulate in the field of railroad safety.23

The first is where the Secretary of Transportation has not promulgated a federal standard "covering the subject matter" of the state regulation.24 The second requires the...

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