Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Mason City Fort Dodge Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 06 November 1905
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 199 U.S. 160,50 L.Ed. 134,26 S.Ct. 19
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt. , v. MASON CITY & FORT DODGE RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

199 U.S. 160

26 S.Ct. 19

50 L.Ed. 134

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt.,

v MASON CITY & FORT DODGE RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 18.

Argued October 19, 20, 1905.

Decided November 6, 1905.

On a bill filed by the Mason City & Fort Dodge Railroad Company (hereinafter called the Mason City company), the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska entered a decree, August 19, 1903 (124 Fed. 409), requiring the Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter called the Union Pacific company) to let the plaintiff into the joint use of the railroad bridge between Omaha and Council Bluffs, and the approaches thereto. On appeal this decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, February 29, 1904. 64 C. C. A. 348, 128 Fed. 230. Thereupon the Union Pacific company appealed to this court.

Messrs.John N. Baldwin and Maxwell Evarts for appellant.

Messrs. Frank B. Kellogg, James M. Woolworth, William D. McHugh, and Cordenio A. Severance for appellee.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:

[Argument of Counsel from pages 162-164 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The Mason City company contends that its right to the use of the bridge and approaches was determined by the decision of this court in Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 163 U. S. 564, 41 L. ed. 265, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1173. And further, that if mistaken in this contention, it has that right under the statutes of the United States, and by the terms of a contract between the Union Pacific Railroad Company, on the one hand, and the city of Omaha and county of Douglass, Nebraska, on the other. The case in 163 U. S. arose on two contracts: one between the Union Pacific Railway Company and the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company, and the other between the first-named company and the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway Company. The opinion of the circuit court (47 Fed. 15) considered only the contracts, sustained them, and entered a decree for the plaintiffs, awarding the joint use of the bridge and its approaches. That decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals (2 C. C. A. 174, 10 U. S. App. 98, 51 Fed. 309), and the case was thereupon brought on appeal to this court. Here the decision was rested not simply on the contracts, but also on an obligation held to have been imposed on the defendant by the statutes of the United States, the court saying (p. 586, L. ed. p. 273, Sup Ct. Rep. 1181):

'For the provisions of the Pacific Railroad acts relating to the bridge over the Missouri river, its construction and operation, imposed on the Pacific company the duty of permitting the Rock Island company to run its engines, cars, and trains over the bridge and the tracks between Council Bluffs and Omaha, and, we think, that South Omaha was included.'

This was followed by several paragraphs pointing out the statutes imposing the duty. Counsel for the Union Pacific company in the case at bar earnestly contend that so much of that opinion as referred to this statutory obligation was obiter dictum, that the statutes were misconstrued, and also that the status of the present Union Pacific company differs so much from that of the then defendant as to make the ruling inapplicable.

We are unable to yield our assent to these contentions. While the claim of the plaintiffs in that case was founded directly upon contracts, yet, if there were a statutory duty to let them into the joint use of the bridge and its approaches, that was enough to sustain a decree in their favor, and the contracts might be regarded as simply relieving the court of the work of settling minor matters, such as method of use, compensation therefor, and matter of control. Indeed, the alleged invalidity of the contracts was rested largely on the scope of the statutes and the duties to the government and the public imposed thereby on the railroad company. Of course, where there are two grounds, upon either of which the judgment of the trial court can be rested, and the appellate court sustains both, the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the judgment of the court, and of equal validity with the other. Whenever a question fairly arises in the course of a trial, and there is a distinct decision of that question, the ruling of the court in respect thereto can, in no just sense, be called mere dictum. Florida C. R. Co. v. Schutte, 103 U. S. 118, 26 L. ed. 327, in which this court said (p. 143, L. ed. 336):

'It cannot be said that a case is not authority on one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter. Here the precise question was properly presented, fully argued, and elaborately considered in the opinion. The decision on this question was as much a part of the judgment of the court as was that on any other of the several matters on which the case as a whole depended.'

Further, we see no reason to question the conclusion announced in the former opinion. Chap. 67 of the Laws of Congress, 1871 (16 Stat. at L. 430), granting power to issue bonds for the construction of the bridge, provided that 'for the use and protection of said bridge and property, the Union Pacific Railway Company shall be empowered, governed, and limited by the provisions of the act entitled 'An Act to Authorize the Construction of Certain Bridges, and to Establish Them as Post Roads,' approved July twenty-five, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, so far as the same is applicable thereto.'

The act referred to in this quotation (14 Stat. at L. 244, chap. 246) authorized the construction of nine bridges, as to the first of which (a bridge across the Mississippi river at Quincy) it was stated that 'when constructed, all trains of all roads terminating at said river, at or opposite said point, shall be allowed to cross said bridge for reasonable compensation, to be made to the owners of said bridge.'

To the seven provided for by succeeding sections authority is granted 'upon the same terms, in the same manner, under the same restrictions, and with the same privileges, as is provided for in this act in relation to the bridge at Quincy, Illinois.' [§ 4.]

The remaining one of the nine bridges (that over the Mississippi river at St. Louis) was to be constructed by the St. Louis & Illinois Bridge Company, 'subject to all the conditions contained in said act of incorporation and amendments thereto, and not inconsistent with the following terms and provisions contained in this act.' [§ 11.]

It is insisted that the act of 1871 makes applicable to the Omaha bridge only the two or three provisions in the act of 1866 common to all the bridges named therein, and as the section authorizing the bridge at St. Louis contained no direction for its use by terminating railroads, that requirement, although imposed on all the other bridges, was not brought into the act of 1871, and is inapplicable to the Omaha bridge. Counsel for the Union Pacifie company have also called our attention to a few statutes authorizing the construction of bridges, which contain no provision in respect to use by other railroad companies. As against this, counsel for the Mason City company have cited over 350 acts, to be found in the several ...