Union Sch. Dist. #45 v. Wright & Morrissey Inc

• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Trial Helen M. Toor Geoffrey W. Crawford
• Decision Date: 20 July 2010
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. 670-10-12 Wncv,NO. 2009-369,2009-369
• Citation: Union Sch. Dist. #45 v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., DOCKET NO. 670-10-12 Wncv, NO. 2009-369 (Vt. Jul 20, 2010)
• Parties: Union School District #45 v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc.

Union School District #45

v.Wright & Morrissey, Inc.

NO. 2009-369

DOCKET NO. 670-10-12 Wncv

Supreme Court of Vermont

JULY TERM, 2010

Filed: July 20, 2010

ENTRY ORDER

APPEALED FROM: Washington Superior Court

Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor Geoffrey W. Crawford

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant Wright & Morrissey, Inc. (Wright) appeals from the superior court's order denying Wright relief from an earlier judgment finding the corporation liable for damages to a sidewalk it constructed for plaintiff Union School District #45 (District). For its part, the District has filed a motion asking that this Court strike Wright's brief and sanction Wright by awarding the District attorney's fees that it incurred in this appeal. We affirm, but deny the motion for sanctions.

This is the third time this case has come before us. The first time we rejected all but one of the arguments in Wright's appeal from a superior court judgment awarding the District roughly $100,000 based on a project architect's liability determination arising from an alternative-dispute-resolution provision in the parties' construction contract. See Union Sch. Dist. #45 v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 2007 VT 129, 183 Vt. 555 (Wright I). One of the arguments we rejected in that appeal was Wright's contention that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Id. f 8. We affirmed the superior court's judgment in all respects, except that we remanded the matter for the superior court to calculate prejudgment interest due on Wright's counterclaim. On remand, Wright filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, and Wright appealed to this Court. In our second decision, this time heard by a three-justice panel, we held that our remand to the superior court for calculation of prejudgment interest on Wright's counterclaim did not "generally reopen the case to reargument or authorize the court to consider issues beyond the scope of our remand." Union Sch. Dist. #45 v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., No. 2008-289, slip op. at 2 (Vt. March 5, 2009) (unreported mem.) (Wright II). We also stated that the superior court "was plainly correct in ruling that each of [Wright's] claims [on remand] was squarely considered and rejected in Wright I, which established the law of the case." Id.

In May 2009, the District commenced efforts to enforce its judgment. In response to these efforts, notwithstanding the earlier rulings of the superior court and this Court, Wright filed a motion for relief from judgment under V.R.C.P. 60(b) again claiming, among other things, thatthe superior court had lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy between the parties. The superior court denied the motion, stating that Wright was raising the same arguments already litigated extensively, and rejected, by both the trial and appellate courts. The court also ruled that any claims of misrepresentations of the underlying facts were precluded under principles of res judicata. In a later decision, the superior court also granted the District's motion to impose sanctions on Wright for raising claims that "were previously resolved through the course of repeated hearings and appeals."

On appeal, Wright argues that (1) the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the District's original complaint; (2) the District waived the right to bring the original complaint; (3) even if the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over the original complaint, it exceeded its authority in ruling that the architect's decision established Wright's liability; and (4) in any event, in reviewing the decision of the architect, the court erred by not employing the review standards applicable to a court entertaining an application to confirm an arbitrator's award. Notwithstanding the previous rulings precluding Wright from raising jurisdictional objections to the District's original complaint, Wright once again raises essentially the same issues already adjudicated against it. Moreover, Wright does so (1) without asserting that this is an appeal...