Union Sch. Dist. of Jackson v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 49.

• Decision Date: 08 September 1948
• Docket Number: No. 49.,49.
• Citation: 322 Mich. 165,33 N.W.2d 807
• Parties: UNION SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF JACKSON v. STARR COMMONWEALTH FOR BOYS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

322 Mich. 165

33 N.W.2d 807

UNION SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF JACKSON

v.STARR COMMONWEALTH FOR BOYS.

No. 49.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 8, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; John Simpson, judge.

Proceeding by the Union School District of the City of Jackson, a Michigan corporation, against the Starr Commonwealth for Boys, a Michigan corporation, to condemn realty of the defendant for school purposes. From an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant appeals.

Order affirmed and case remanded for further proceedings.

Before the Entire Bench.

Phillip C. Kelly, of Jackson, and Theodore Van Dellen, of Albion, for respondent and appellant.

Robert L. Drake, of Jackson, for appellee-petitioner.

BUTZEL, Justice.

Plaintiff, Union School District of the City of Jackson, Michigan, is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of Act No. 453 of the Local Acts of Michigan of 1897, as amended by Act No. 502, Local Acts of 1905. It filed a petition to condemn certain property in the city of Jackson for school purposes and selected as its method of procedure that prescribed by Act No. 149, Pub.Acts 1911, as amended, 1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 3763 et seq., Stat.Ann., 1947 Cum.Supp. § 8.11 et seq. From the description of the property in the petition as well as from the map attached to petitioner's brief, about which there apparently is no dispute, the property sought to be acquired by plaintiff constitutes a narrow strip of land, at the widest point 148 1/2 feet, between Winthrop and Wildwood Avenues in the city of Jackson, Michigan, on which a dwelling house is located. Plaintiff owns the adjacent land both to the east and west of the property in question, the respective buildings of the Jackson City High School and the Jackson Junior City College being located thereon. North of the land in question and across Winthrop Avenue, plaintiff owns a very large lot which is evidently vacant and used as an athletic field.

Defendant, Starr Commonwealth for Boys, is a private, nonprofit corporation.It operates a home for homeless and neglected boys and provides for their education in industrial and vocational trades so as to make them good and useful citizens. It deservedly enjoys the reputation of being a most worthy, well-conducted and beneficient institution but this fact cannot, however, change the rules of law applicable.

Previous to the commencement of the present litigation, plaintiff purchased from defendant a piece of property to the north and across the street from a narrow strip sought to be presently acquired. At that time plaintiff agreed ‘that students of Starr Commonwealth for Boys in residence in Jackson county shall have the right to attend Jackson Public Schools and Jackson Junior College at the same rates and terms as resident students of the City of Juckson, Michigan.’ It should be noted that defendant's institution is located in Calhoun county, and that it uses the house on the property in question as living quarters and a study hall for those of its boys who come over to Jackson to make use of plaintiff's educational facilities.

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's petition, which motion was denied by the court below after allowing plaintiff to amend its petition in certain respects not material to this appeal and allowing defendant to amend its motion so as to include estoppel as one of its grounds. The trial judge, however, did not change his decision. The case was adjourned for further proceedings.

Numerous questions are raised on appeal, some of which can be grouped together for purposes of discussion. Defendant contends that the legislature, in creating the Union School District of the city of Jackson, did not delegate to it the power of eminent domain, and that even if it had such power, it is limited in the exercise thereof to the method prescribed by the school code, and may not proceed under Act No. 149, Pub.Acts of 1911, supra. This act provides for condemnation of private property by State agencies and public corporations. It defines ‘public corporations' as including ‘all counties, boards, commissions and agencies made corporations for the management and control of public business and property.’ Section 3 thereof empowers public corporations to exercise the right of eminent domain. A school district is a public corporation as well as a State agency within the meaning of the definition. School District No. 4 of Township of Marathon v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484, 33 Am.Rep. 421;Seeley v. Board of Education, 39 Mich. 486;Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, 43 N.W. 24;Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289;Waterman-Waterbury Co. v. School District No. 4, 183 Mich. 168, 150 N.W. 104;Daniels v. Board of Education, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23, L.R.A.1916F, 468;Child Welfare Society v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 189 N.W. 1002;In re Detroit City Board of Education, 242 Mich. 658, 219 N.W. 614.

Considerable stress is placed on the fact that on September 8, 1947, plaintiff's board of trustees passed a resolution to acquire defendant's property by condemnation under a different procedure than the one under which it is presently proceeding. However, it appears...