Union Trust Co. v. Stearns

• Decision Date: 06 January 1903
• Docket Number: 2,615
• Citation: 119 F. 790
• Parties: UNION TRUST CO. v. STEARNS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

119 F. 790

UNION TRUST CO. v. STEARNS et al.

No. 2,615

United States Circuit Court, D. Rhode Island.

January 6, 1903

Edwards & Angell and Walter F. Angell, for complainant.

Charles F. Stearns, for defendants Stearns and Greenough.

Wm. J Brown, for defendant Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co.

COLT Circuit Judge.

The eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States was adopted in 1798 as a result of the decision of the supreme court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440. This amendment declares that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. If this is a suit against the state of Rhode Island, the court is without jurisdiction, and the bill must be dismissed. This is the question raised on the demurrer to the bill by the defendants Stearns and Greenough. The purpose of the eleventh amendment was to prevent the subjection of a state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. To secure this purpose the amendment has been interpreted 'not literally, and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of its purpose. ' Accordingly, it has been held that the state need not be formally named as a party. It is sufficient if it is the real party against whom the suit is brought. It has also been adjudged that this prohibition extends to suits against a state by citizens of the same state. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 505, 506, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 Sup.Ct 504, 33 L.Ed. 842; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 524, 528, 529, 19 Sup.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535. The general assembly of the state of Rhode Island, on June 1, 1902, passed an act to regulate the hours of labor of certain employe's of street railways. The act contains the following section relating to fines for violating any of its provisions:

'Sec. 3. Any street railway corporation violating any of the provisions of the preceding sections of this act shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, one-half thereof to the use of the complainant and the other half to the use of the state. ' Pub. Laws 1902, c. 1004.

The bill avers that the fines imposed by this act must be recovered by indictment preferred and prosecuted by the attorney general or the assistant attorney general of the state; that the defendants Stearns and Greenough are, respectively, the attorney general and assistant attorney general; and that they threaten and intend to prefer and prosecute indictments under the act, and to collect the fines imposed; and the bill prays that stearns and Greenough are not named in the act, nor charged with any special duty in connection therewith. They do not occupy any different relation with respect to this penal statute than with respect to other penal statutes of the state. It is their duty, by virtue of the offices they hold, to institute proceedings for the enforcement of this statute, just as it is their duty to institute proceedings for the enforcement of other penal laws. They are threatening to do no wrong or trespass against this complainant in any other sense than is involved in the threatened prosecution of all violators of the criminal laws of Rhode Island. If they can be restrained from instituting prosecutions under this act, they equally may be restrained from instituting prosecutions under any criminal law of the state. In this way the enforcement of every criminal statute of the state might be enjoined by a bill in equity brought in the federal courts against these defendants, until the question of constitutionality has been finally passed upon by the supreme court of the United States.

The purpose of the present bill, in substance and effect, is to enjoin the state of Rhode Island from the enforcement of a penal statute. Indictments under the act are brought in the name and on behalf of the state for the protection of the state. These defendants, the attorney general and his assistant, merely represent the state in such proceedings. They are simply the officers and agents of the state. It is not as individuals, but solely by virtue of their holding such offices, that they prefer and prosecute indictments in the name of the state. A state can only act or be proceeded against through its officers. If a decree could be entered against the state of Rhode Island enjoining prosecutions under this act, it could only operate against the state through enjoining these defendants. An order restraining the attorney general and his assistant from the enforcement of this statute is an order restraining the state itself. The present suit, therefore, is as much against the state of Rhode Island as if the state itself were named a party defendant. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 497, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 529, 19 Sup.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535.

The supreme court has decided in several cases that a suit to enjoin the attorney general of a state from bringing suits or prosecuting indictments under a state statute is a suit against the state.

In the case of Ex parte Ayers it was held that a suit against the attorney general of Virginia and certain other state officers to enjoin them from proceeding to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute of the state was a suit against the state. The prayer of the bill in that case was that R. A. Ayer, attorney general of Virginia, the auditor of the state, and the treasurer and attorney of each county, city, and town 'may be restrained and enjoined from bringing or commencing any suit provided for by the said act of May 12, 1887, or from doing any other act to put said statute into force and effect. ' The circuit court ordered the injunction prayed for. The supreme court reversed this order, and directed the bill to be dismissed on the ground that the suit was against the state of Virginia, within the meaning of the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States. 123 U.S. 443, 450, 507, 8 Sup.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216.

In Fitts v. McGhee it was held that a suit brought to restrain the attorney general of the state of Alabama and one of the state's solicitors from taking steps to enforce a legislative act claimed to be unconstitutional was a suit against the state. The act was for reducing tolls on a bridge which crossed the Tennessee river. The circuit court adjudged the statute unconstitutional and void, and enjoined the defendants from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings under the forfeiture clause of the act, or by mandamus or otherwise to compel the observance of and obedience to the act. In reversing the judgment of the circuit court and dismissing the bill, the supreme court said:

'As a state can act only by its officers, an order restraining those officers from taking any steps, by means of judicial proceedings, in execution of the statute of February 9, 1895, is one which restrains the state itself, and the suit is consequently as much against the state as if the state were named as a party defendant on the record.' 172 U.S. 516, 529, 19 Sup.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535.

In Cotting v. Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 22 Sup.Ct. 30, 46 L.Ed. 92, the supreme court dismissed the bill as to the attorney general upon his objection that the suit was against the state. That was a bill brought by a nonresident stockholder against the defendant company and the attorney general of the state of Kansas, for the purpose of declaring unconstitutional and void a statute of the state regulating the charges of stock yards, and for enjoining the attorney general from instituting proceedings to enforce the statute. The attorney general appeared, but did not raise the objection that the suit was against the state until after a full hearing and decision on the merits, and just previous to the entry of a final decree in the circuit court. Under these circumstances the supreme court considered the case on its merits, dismissed the bill as to the attorney general, and expressed no opinion on the question of jurisdiction. The court said:

'Without expressing any opinion as to the jurisdiction of the court if it had been properly and seasonably challenged, we think the true solution of this matter will be found in reversing the decree upon the merits, and directing a dismissal of the suit as to the attorney general, without prejudice to any other suit or action.' 183 U.S. 114, 22 Sup.Ct. 30, 46 L.Ed. 92.

These decisions have never been questioned, and they are controlling and binding on this court in the case at bar.

There is a class of cases in which the supreme court has held that a suit against...