United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States Bay Counties Dist Council of Carpenters of United Brotherhood of Carpentersand Joiners of America v. Same Lumber Products Association v. Same Alameda County Building and Construction Trades Council v. Same Boorman Lumber Co v. Same 10

Decision Date10 March 1947
Docket NumberNos. 6,s. 6
Citation330 U.S. 395,91 L.Ed. 973,67 S.Ct. 775
PartiesUNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA v. UNITED STATES. BAY COUNTIES DIST. COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS OF UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERSAND JOINERS OF AMERICA et al. v. SAME. LUMBER PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION, Inc., et al. v. SAME. ALAMEDA COUNTY BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL v. SAME. BOORMAN LUMBER CO. et al. v. SAME. to 10. Reargued &
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Under provision of Norris-LaGuardia Act making liability of organization interested in labor dispute for unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents dependent upon clear proof of authorization of such act, requirement of 'authorization' restricts liability, although officers or members are acting within scope of their general authourity, to those organizations or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof that particular act charged, or acts generally of that type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from a granted authority. Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 6, 29 U.S.C.A. § 106.

[Syllabus from pages 395-397 intentionally omitted] Mr. Charles H. Tuttle, of New York City, for petitioners United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc., in Nos. 6 and 7.

Messrs. Joseph O. Carson II, of Indianapolis, Ind., Harry N. Routzohn, of Dayton, Ohio, Hugh K. McKevitt and Jack M. Howard, both of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner Bay County District Council of Carpenters in No. 7.

Mr. Maurice E. Harrison, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners in No. 8.

Messrs. Guy C. Calden and Clarence E. Todd, both of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner in No. 9.

Mr. Morgan J. Doyle, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners in No. 10.

Mr. Holmes Baldridge, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

These are criminal cases in which conviction of various defendants has been obtained in the District Court of the Unit d States for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, 144 F.2d 546. They were charged with conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act, § 1.1 The parties to the alleged conspiracy were of two groups: on the one hand, local manufacturers of and dealers in the commodities affected and their incorporated trade associations and officials thereof; and, on the other, unincorporated trade unions and their officials or business agents. The indictment charged that the defendants below unlawfully combined and conspired together, successfully, to monopolize unduly a part of interstate commerce in millwork and patterned lumber. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy was alleged to be to restrain out-of-state manufacturers from shipping and selling these commodities within the San Francisco Bay area of California and to prevent the dealers in that area from freely handling them. It was alleged that the conspiracy also sought to raise the prices of the products affected. To achieve the purpose, a contract was entered into between the defendants for a wage scale for members of labor unions working on the articles involved, combined with a restrictive clause, '* * * no material will be purchased from, and no work will be done on any material or article that has had any operation performed on same by Saw Mills, Mills or Cabinet Shops, or their distributors that do not conform to the rates of wage and working conditions of this agreement,' with specified exceptions not here material. This clause, it is alleged, was enforced to the mutual advantage of the conspirators by some of the parties through conference or picketing or acquiescence in the arrangement. By means of the conspiracy, union workmen obtained better wages, the employers higher profits and manufacturers against whom the conspiracy was directed were largely prevented from sharing in the Bay Area business, all to the price disadvantage of the consumer and the unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce. The legal theory which was followed in their conviction was that conspiracies between employers and employees to restrain interstate commerce violate the Sherman Act.

Five petitions for certiorari were presented to this Court by different defendants either singly or jointly with others. It is sufficient for the purposes of this review to say that they raised the question of the application of § 1 of the Sherman Act to conspiracies between employers and employees to restrain commerce and, except the petitions in the employer group, the application of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in trial of such an indictment. 2 On account of the importance of the federal questions raised and asserted conflicts in the circuits, the writs of certiorari were granted.3

Since these cases were taken the important question of the application of the Sherman Act to a conspiracy between labor union and business groups has been decided by us. We held that such a conspiracy to restrain trade violated the Sherman Act. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939. This holding causes us to approve the ruling of the trial and appellate courts on the first question presented by the certiorari but it left unresolved the question as to the application of § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the point to which this decision is directed.

The indictment charges a conspiracy forbidden by the Sherman Act. On that issue, the power of the trial court is limited by § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Note 2, supra. The limitations of that section are upon all courts of the United States in all matters growing out of labor disputes, covered by the Act, while may come before them. It properly is conceded that this agreement grew out of such a labor dispute and that all parties defendant participated or were interested in that dispute. See § 13, 47 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C.A. § 113. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act first appeared in a draft bill of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as § 6 thereof. At that time its form was precisely the same as at present. The draft was drawn as a comprehensive substitute for S. 1482 of the 70th Congress, a bill providing only for a limitation on the jurisdiction of equity courts in the issuance of injunctions. In the 71st Congress, a similarly limited bill on the same subject, S. 2497, was reintroduced and a like comprehensive substitute proposed. Neither substitute was reported out of the Committee.4 These substitute bills are quite similar in form to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In substance, and therefore in effectiveness, they are the same.

In the next, the 72d Congress, the bill, H.R. 5315, which was to become the Norris-LaGuardia Act, was introduced. Section 2 succinctly states the public policy that it was designed to further—a definition of and limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes. 5 That purpose was in accord with that behind the earlier drafts referred to above.6 As the new bill was practically identical with these long considered committee substitutes, the hearings on H.R. 5315 were short.7 But even so, the attack conti ued on § 6 as a restriction on the general law of agency in labor disputes.8 The reply of the House Committee was that it did 'not affect the general law of agency' and was necessary 'under the circumstances' so that 'the courts should know that Congress expects them not to hold officers or associations liable for the unlawful acts of a member without clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization of, any unlawful acts by the officer or association.'9 The Senate Committee was of the view that it was a 'rule of evidence,' not a 'new law of agency.'

'There is no provision made relieving an individual from responsibility for his acts, but provision is made that a person shall not be held responsible for an 'unlawful act' except upon 'clear proof' of participation or authorization or ratification. Thus a rule of evidence, not a rule of substantive law, is established.'10

We need not determine whether § 6 should be called a rule of evidence or one that changes the substantive law of agency. We hold that its purpose and effect was to relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital,11 and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of the organization without clear proof that the organization or member, charged with responsibility for the offense, actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.12

Thus § 6 limited responsibility for acts of a co-conspirator a matter of moment to the advocates of the bill.13 Before the enactment of § 6, when a conspiracy between labor unions and their members, prohibited under the Sherman Act, was established, a widely publicized case had held both the unions and their members liable for all overt acts of their co-conspirators.14 This liability resulted whether the members or the unions approved of the acts or not or whether or not the acts were offenses under the criminal law. While of course participants in a conspiracy that is covered by § 6 are not immunized from responsibility for authorized acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy, they now are protected against liability for unauthorized illegal acts of other participants in the conspiracy.

The legislative history makes the intended meaning of the word 'authorization,' we think, almost equally clear. The rule of liability for acts of an agent within the scope of his authority, based on the Danbury Hatters Case, was urged as an argument against the language of § 6.15 When the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill, it dealt with this contention.

'But the argument is made that a man is held legally responsible for the acts of his...

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