United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp.

• Citation: 194 Va. 872,75 S.E.2d 694
• Parties: , 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2470, 23 Lab.Cas. P 67,542 UNITED CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, AFFILIATED WITH UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 50 UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AND UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERCA v. LABURNUM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
• Decision Date: 20 April 1953
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Page 694

75 S.E.2d 694

194 Va. 872, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2470, 23 Lab.Cas. P 67,542

UNITED CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, AFFILIATED WITH UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 50 UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, AND UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERCA v. LABURNUM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

April 20, 1953.

James Mullen, Walter E. Rogers, Crampton Harris, M. E. Boiarsky, Willard P. Owens, for plaintiffs in error.

Archibald G. Robertson, Francis V. Lowden, Jr., T. Justin Moore, Jr., George E. Allen, Jr., for defendant in error.

JUDGE: EGGLESTON

EGGLESTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a tort action instituted in December, 1949 by Laburnum Construction Corporation, sometimes hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, or Laburnum, against United Construction Workers, Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America, District 50 United Mine Workers of America, and United Mine Workers of America, sometimes hereinafter called the defendants, for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in the aggregate sum of $500,000.

The notice of motion for judgment charges that in July, 1949, while the plaintiff was engaged in certain construction work in Breathitt County, Kentucky, pursuant to contracts with Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Spring Fork Development Company, the defendants' agents came to the site of the work and demanded that the plaintiff's employees become members of the United Construction Workers, that plaintiff recognize that organization 'as the sole bargaining agent' for its employees on such projects, and threatened that if the plaintiff and its employees refused to comply with these demands it would not be allowed to continue with its work on these projects; that upon the refusal of the plaintiff and its employees to yield to these demands and threats the defendants' agents by 'a series of violent, malicious and unlawful acts,' so threatened and intimidated the officers and employees of the plaintiff that it was unable to continue with the construction projects and was compelled to abandon them. It was further alleged that as the direct and proximate result of such acts of the defendants' agents the plaintiff was greatly damaged and injured 'in and about its property and reputation,' its profitable business connections were lost and destroyed, and it was deprived of large profits which it would otherwise have earned.

Each of the defendants filed a plea of not guilty and grounds of defense, denying all of the material allegations of the notice of motion for judgment.

After a protracted trial the jury, by their verdict, found all of the defendants 'jointly and severally liable' and awarded the plaintiff 'compensatory' damages of $175,437.19, and 'punitive' damages of $100,000, making a total of $275,437.19. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the jury's verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence and grant a new trial, assigning numerous errors during the proceedings. While this motion was pending the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment and enter a final judgment for the defendants, on the ground that the court was 'without power, authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues in this action because such determination would be repugnant to and in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (61 Stat. 136, ch. 120, Section 1, et seq., Public Law 101), and to Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. ' These motions of the defendants were overruled and judgment was entered on the verdict. We granted writ of error.

JURISDICTION

We shall first deal with the assignment of error which challenges the authority and jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine the issues in this action. The contention is that the conduct of the defendants' agents upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded -- that is, coercing plaintiff's employees to become members of one of the defendant unions -- constitutes an 'unfair labor practice' in violation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., § 151, et seq.), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., § 141, et seq.); that that Act 'established a single paramount administrative authority for the redress and prevention' of such practice; and that although the Act does not 'provide for damages to the employer' because of such practice, yet the State courts are deprived of jurisdiction to entertain 'any action for damages based upon such conduct.'

The defendants argue that the record shows that Laburnum is a Virginia corporation, with its home office in Richmond, Virginia; that it engages in industrial construction work in several States; and that at the time of the acts complained of it was engaged in construction work for two large coal producers with mines in Kentucky and West Virginia, whose output was being shipped in interstate commerce. Hence, it is said, the labor dispute in which the plaintiff became involved and out of which its cause of action arose, so affected interstate commerce as to be within the purview of the Act.

Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., § 151, et seq.), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., § 141, et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the 'Act,' recites that its 'purpose and policy' are 'to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.' (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., § 141.)

Under section 7 of the Act, 'Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities * * *. ' (29 U.S.C.A., § 157.)

Section 8 of the Act provides that certain conduct on the part of an employer or a labor organization shall constitute 'an unfair labor practice.' Under its terms, '(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: * * *.' (29 U.S.C.A., § 158.)

Section 10 of the Act provides these remedies through proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board and in federal district and appellate courts: The Board is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce (§ 10(a); 29 U.S.C.A., § 160(a)), and to that end may 'issue and cause to be served upon' a person charged with any such practice 'a complaint stating the charges in that respect' (§ 10(b); 29 U.S.C.A., § 160(b)), conduct a hearing upon the charges and, upon a finding that they have been sustained, issue an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice (§ 10(c); 29 U.S.C.A., § 160(c)). A right of appeal from a final order of the Board is afforded to an appropriate United States circuit court of appeals (§ 10(f); 29 U.S.C.A., § 160(f)). Pending a hearing of the matter before it the Board may petition an appropriate United States district court for, and such court may grant, an 'appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.' (§ 10(j); 29 U.S.C.A., § 160(j).)

We may assume, without deciding, that the acts of the defendants so affected interstate commerce as to come within the purview of the Act and, at the instance of the plaintiff, could have been dealt with in the manner there prescribed. But it does not follow that that was the only redress open to the plaintiff. It did not seek relief because the acts of the defendants' agents were unfair labor practices, nor is its present case predicated upon the Act. It sought damages for a completed common-law tort for which admittedly the Act affords no redress.

It is settled by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., § 151, et seq.), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., § 141, et seq.), Congress has occupied and closed to the States the field of 'regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages' in industries engaged in interstate commerce. International Union, etc. v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457, 70 S.Ct. 781, 783, 94 L.ed. 978; Amalgamated Ass'n., etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390, 71 S.Ct. 359, 363, 95 L.ed. 364.

But this is not to say that by the passage of the Act the courts of the several States have been deprived of their traditional power and jurisdiction to deal with unlawful conduct committed within their respective territorial limits during the course of a labor dispute which may affect interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an 'intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested. ' Allen-Bradley Local, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825, 86 L.ed. 1154, and cases there cited. As was said in Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.ed. 3,' * * * the exercise by the state of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so ...