UNITED FURNITURE WKRS. v. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 04 February 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 3289.,3289. |
Citation | 148 F. Supp. 129 |
Parties | The UNITED FURNITURE WORKERS OF AMERICA (AFL-CIO), Plaintiff, v. The LITTLE ROCK FURNITURE MFG. CO., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Henry Woods, of McMath, Leatherman & Woods, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.
W. P. Hamilton, Jr., of Moore, Burrow, Chowning & Mitchell, Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.
This suit was begun on December 12, 1956, by the filing of a complaint by the United Furniture Workers of America (AFL-CIO) against the Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Company wherein it was alleged that the plaintiff is the bargaining agent for the employees of the defendant; that the defendant is engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce and that on March 1, 1956, the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement, a copy of which was attached to the complaint as Exhibit "A".
The complaint alleged that on or about October 11, 1956, defendant discharged one of its employees, a member of plaintiff's union, and that on October 19, 1956, defendant was asked to submit the dispute arising from the discharge to arbitration; that the defendant refused to arbitrate the dispute and that such refusal constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The prayer of the complaint reads as follows:
On December 31, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, (1) that the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of the complaint, and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendant upon which relief may be granted in that there is no provision in the contract requiring arbitration of the discharge of employees.
Article II of the Agreement which relates to grievance procedure and arbitration reads as follows:
There are two questions presented by the motion, the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint. I shall discuss the latter of those questions first.
It is seen that the agreement covers the right of arbitration of any dispute that arises in the application of any provision of the agreement, and following the detailed provisions regarding procedure the various subjects intended to be covered by the agreement are set forth in Articles III to XI, inclusive (omitting Article VIII). These provisions cover specifically: vacations, hours of work, leave of absence, seniority, wages, strikes, lock-outs, holidays and termination of the agreement.
Article VIII is entitled "General Provisions", which are: the posting of notices, one steward in each department, the right to visit the plant by a representative of the plaintiff, superannuated or incapacitated employees, military service, and restriction against requirement of employee to do work for which he is not qualified.
The court has been unable to find in the agreement any specific provision relating to the right to arbitrate growing out of the discharge of an employee, and it does seem that if it had been the intention of the parties that a grievance or dispute growing out of the discharge of an employee had intended to be covered by the agreement, it would have so provided.
Counsel for plaintiff contends that the contract calls for the arbitration of any dispute between the Union and the management involving working conditions. It should be noted that the agreement itself neither specifically nor generally provides for arbitration of any dispute arising under the subject of "Working Conditions". It is true that the contract states that the company recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to all working conditions, but having recognized the authority of the Union to bargain, the agreement then proceeds to set out the subjects as hereinabove indicated.
Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that the subject of the discharge of an employee or the right to discharge is covered by the term "working conditions".
In the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Norwood, D.C.Ark., 42 F.2d 765, it was held that the term "working conditions" used in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., did not cover the enforcement of the Arkansas Full Crew Law, that is, the term did not bestow upon the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to make a regulation permitting the railroad company to disregard a state statute requiring a certain number of men in train and switching crews. The court there said that the term "working conditions" simply means conditions affecting the work of the employees as might be the subject of agreement between the carriers and the employees, thus indicating that the term is generic in character and would become effective only when the matter under consideration by the parties to the contract is specified and defined.
See also In re Chicago North Shore & M. R. Co., 7 Cir., 147 F.2d 723 and Southern Pacific Co. v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees, Locals 456 and 582, 9 Cir., 165 F.2d 26.
I am, therefore, extremely doubtful that the agreement on which this suit is based contains any provision relating to the right of the defendant to discharge one of its employees.
The remedy sought here is specific performance of a contract. The plaintiff asks the court to require the defendant to submit to arbitration a dispute growing out of the action of the defendant in discharging an employee for the apparent failure on the part of the employee to conform to certain requirements of the employer. As heretofore stated, the subject of discharge or re-employment of an employee is nowhere mentioned in the contract. I, therefore, find that the contract does not meet the requirements of certainty to give the court authority to act, as such requirements are set forth under the subject of "Specific Performance" in 49 Am.Jur., page 34, as follows:
* * *"
In the case of Wyatt v. Yingling, 213 Ark. 160, 210 S.W.2d 122, 123, the court quoted from another chapter in Am.Jur. on the question of the sufficiency of a contract to warrant Specific Performance, and there said:
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