United Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Haley

• Decision Date: 30 October 1933
• Docket Number: 32142
• Citation: 178 La. 63,150 So. 833
• Parties: UNITED LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HALEY et ux
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

150 So. 833

178 La. 63

UNITED LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HALEY et ux

No. 32142

Supreme Court of Louisiana

October 30, 1933

Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles; C R. Bordelon, Judge.

Suit by the United Life & Accident Insurance Company against Anselm E. Haley and wife. A default judgment was rendered against the defendant Anselm E. Haley. From a judgment in favor of the remaining defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Reversed, and judgment rendered in accordance with opinion.

Hakenyos Provosty & Staples, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Couvillon & Couvillon, of Marksville, for appellees.

OPINION

O'NIELL, Chief Justice.

On the 2d of August, 1926, Anselm E. Haley and his wife borrowed $ 2,400 from the Security Mortgage Company, for which they gave their promissory note, together with a series of notes for $ 144 each, representing the annual interest on the loan at 6 per cent. Each note contained a stipulation for the payment of interest at 8 per cent. per annum after maturity and for the payment of 10 per cent. attorney's fees if it should become necessary to employ an attorney to collect the note or any part of it. At the same time, Haley and his wife gave a special mortgage on three tracts of land, belonging to the matrimonial community between them, to secure the payment of the notes and the interest and attorney's fees. The United Life & Accident Insurance Company acquired all of the notes, in due course, for a valuable consideration, before maturity. The interest notes of $ 144 each were all paid at maturity, except three of them. The United Life & Accident Insurance Company brought this suit against Haley and his wife, praying for a judgment against them in solido for $ 2,400, with interest at 8 per cent. per annum from maturity, November 1, 1929, and for the $ 432 represented by the three unpaid interest notes of $ 144 each and for 10 per cent. attorney's fees on the total amount of the principal and interest claimed. There was no prayer for the 8 per cent. interest on the three notes of $ 144 from their maturity. The plaintiff prayed for recognition of the mortgage on the property.

Anselm E. Haley did not answer or defend the suit. Judgment was rendered against him by default for all that was sued for. Mrs. Haley filed an answer, admitting the facts alleged in the petition, but denying personal liability for the debt, on the ground, first, that she could not bind herself personally with her husband for a community debt, and, second, that she had signed the act of mortgage and the notes for the purpose only of waiving the homestead exemption on the property mortgaged, and without intending to become liable personally for the debt. After trial of the case on its merits, as to Mrs. Haley, judgment was rendered in her favor, rejecting the plaintiff's demand for a personal judgment against her. The plaintiff has appealed from that judgment. There was no appeal from the judgment that was rendered by default against Anselm E. Haley. The only question therefore is whether Mrs. Haley is liable personally for the debt.

The case was submitted on a statement of facts admitted by all parties. With reference to Mrs. Haley's plea that she signed the act of mortgage and the notes only for the purpose of waiving the homestead exemption, and without intending to be personally bound for the debt, it was admitted that she and her husband, if called to the witness stand, would testify that Mrs. Haley signed the notes and the act of mortgage only for the purpose of waiving the homestead exemption, and without intending to bind herself personally for the debt. That defense, however, cannot prevail, because it was admitted also that the plaintiff had acquired the notes in due course, for a valuable consideration, before maturity. Mrs. Haley's signature appears on the face of the notes, as one of the makers; and hence, as to the holder in due course, she is liable as one of the makers of the notes. Whatever may have been her intention in signing the act of mortgage, there was no necessity for her signing the notes for the purpose of waiving the homestead exemption, or for any other purpose than to become liable as one of the makers of the notes. Our opinion is that Mrs. Haley is liable personally as one of the makers of the notes, if a married woman can legally bind herself personally with her husband for the payment of a community debt.

That question depends upon the provisions of Act No. 132 of 1926, which was the prevailing statute on the subject when the notes and mortgage were given. Mrs. Haley's attorneys contend, and the district judge maintained the contention, that, although the statute permits a married woman to bind herself and her separate estate for the benefit of her husband or of the community, it does not permit a married woman to bind herself personally with her husband. The argument is founded upon an expression of this court in the opinion rendered in Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. at 1075, 126 So. 556, 558, viz.:

"Generally speaking, but excepting the right to contract with their husbands, married women have, under the Act of 1926, as much power to contract debts as if they were single, though not so as to bind the community, or interfere with the husband's rights as head and master thereof."

Mrs Haley's attorneys and the district judge have construed the expression, "excepting the right to contract with their husbands,"...